

theories
and
critical
studies




progress



H. MOMJAN

**Marxism
and
the Renegade Garaudy**



HACHIK NISHANOVICH MOMJAN (1909) is an eminent Soviet philosopher, head of the department of Marxist-Leninist philosophy at the Academy of Social Sciences. Professor Momjan has written numerous works on questions relating to the history of philosophy, historical materialism and atheism. A number of his works have appeared in English, German, French, Spanish, Arabic and other foreign languages.





INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY,
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR

H. MOMJAN

Marxism
and
the Renegade
Garaudy



PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW

Translated from the Russian
Edited by *Murad Saifulin*

Х. Н. МОМДЖЯН
МАРКСИЗМ И РЕНЕГАТ ГАРОДИ

На английском языке

© Translation into English. Progress Publishers 1974

First printing 1974

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CONTENTS

In Lieu of an Introduction	7
<i>Chapter I.</i> From the Theory of Subjectivity to Subjectivism . .	15
1. Distortion of the Essence of Marxist Theory and Its Role in the Establishment of Socialism . .	15
2. Overcoming "Marxist Self-Isolation" by Eclecticism and Unprincipled Synthesis	22
3. Relativism Directed Against Adequate Knowledge	39
4. Garaudy's View of the Theory of Reflection . .	46
5. The Materialist Interpretation of History and the Theory of "Historical Initiative"	70
<i>Chapter II.</i> From Capitalism to . . . Capitalism	81
<i>Chapter III.</i> The Pseudo-Socialist Outlook for Europe	100
<i>Chapter IV.</i> "Plural Socialism" and Its Ideological Function . .	124
1. The Origins of the Theory and Practice of "Plural Socialism"	125
2. Garaudy's Personal Contribution to the Theory of the "Plurality of Socialism"	132
3. The Single Essence and Many Forms of Socialism	150
<i>Chapter V.</i> Revisionist Distortion of the Dialogue Between Com- munists and Christians	168
1. Real Basis of Joint Struggle of Communists and Believers for Progress	168
2. The Essence and Limits of the Dialogue Between Communists and Christians	180
<i>Chapter VI.</i> From Real Humanism to Quasi-Humanism	205
Conclusion	225

IN LIEU OF AN INTRODUCTION

Roger Garaudy, once an eminent French Marxist, has now turned his energies to revising a number of fundamental Marxist-Leninist ideas and opposing the political line of the French Communist Party and the international communist movement. The French Communist Party has expelled Garaudy from its ranks. This decision was dictated also by Garaudy's unworthy conduct in respect of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

From pretending to be a friend of the Soviet Union and the CPSU, which he did for many years, Garaudy has now gone over openly to the camp of anti-Sovietism and is today slandering that which he previously extolled in his numerous speeches, articles and books.

For the sake of accuracy it must be said that Garaudy's recent books also contain words of praise for the October Revolution, the Soviet people, its achievements and so on. But what are they worth if, in the very same books, Garaudy is seeking to prove that what has been built in the Soviet Union is nothing but a "deformed model" of socialism? What are they worth if, for example, in the book *Pour un modèle français du socialisme* (*Towards a French Model of Socialism*), he rejects the importance of socialism which exists in the USSR and other socialist countries? Garaudy addressed the following blasphemous words to the "searching" youth of today: "One cannot challenge the principle of communism, but only the first forms which it has assumed in other places and in the

past—in historical conditions radically different from our own.”¹ (French ones—*H. M.*)

How Garaudy could make such a “great volte-face” from Marxism-Leninism to views and opinions which flatly contradict scientific socialism and dialectico-materialist philosophy? One finds attempts to explain Garaudy’s behaviour by his personal traits: his inability to hold firm, consistent views, his frequent departures from strictly scientific thinking, his tendency to be governed by emotion rather than logic, and his passion for new ideas, regardless of whether they are correct. One should also mention his tendency to overstress the importance of this or that idea (for example, the by no means new concept of active thought or “historical initiative”).

Obviously one must take into account Garaudy’s personality and way of thinking in order to understand what has happened to him. Yet this alone cannot provide us with a full explanation of the *mutation*, to use one of Garaudy’s favourite terms, which has taken place in his political and theoretical views.

Analysing the objective causes of revisionism, revisionist departures from fundamental Marxist propositions, Lenin wrote: “... these departures cannot be attributed to accident, or to the mistakes of individuals or groups, or even to the influence of national characteristics and traditions, and so forth. There must be deep-rooted causes in the economic system and in the character of the development of all capitalist countries which constantly give rise to these departures.”²

What then are the objective socio-economic and political processes that have produced the hotchpotch of bourgeois, reformist views which Garaudy, Fischer, Marek and other revisionists of the Right are today attempting to present as the last word in Marxism, as a creative interpretation of new historical reality?

First and foremost, one must mention the further aggravation of antagonistic contradictions in post-war capitalism

¹ R. Garaudy, *Pour un modèle français du socialisme*, Paris, 1968, p. 385.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 347.

and the intensification of contradictions between the forces of socialism and capitalism in the world arena.

Contrary to the pressure from the revolutionary forces, capitalism is attempting to hold ground by mobilising all its reserves. It is becoming more aggressive and launching counter-attacks against socialism and the national liberation movement in an effort to change the world alignment of forces in its favour. The most militant and irresponsible circles of imperialism seek to overthrow regimes that do not suit their purposes, set up a string of puppet states, form military blocs in all parts of the world and spend vast sums on armaments.

All these and similar phenomena engendered by the profound and inevitable general crisis in the capitalist system are regarded by certain petty-bourgeois circles as a manifestation of the strength and power of imperialism. The same interpretation is placed on the growth of production in the developed capitalist countries, the absence of "great crises" of the 1929-32 type, and the apparent "order" and "organisation" which the bourgeois states introduce into economic life.

All this prompts the petty-bourgeois mind, not without the help of bourgeois ideology and bourgeois propaganda, to ask whether capitalism has not acquired a new lease of life. Has not state-monopoly capitalism succeeded in harnessing the scientific and technological revolution, in embarking on the creation of prosperity for all, in eradicating all antagonisms and depriving the class-political struggle and social revolution of all meaning?

From here it is easy to proceed to the false conclusion that the Marxist ideal and the means of realising it are "obsolete" and "useless" or, at least, that Marxism must be modernised, adapted to the age of atomic energy and cybernetics.

Thus, whereas the revolutionary proletariat and its Marxist-Leninist parties are not shrinking from the struggle for their historical aims in this increasingly complex situation, but rather drawing strength and organisation from them and boldly overcoming the difficulties in the way of socialism, the intensification of the class struggle in the modern world is regarded quite differently by the broad

mass of the petty bourgeoisie in the economically developed capitalist countries. Overestimation of the strength of capitalism and underestimation of the limitless possibilities of socialism give rise to fear and confusion in these circles, encouraging conciliatory attitudes and the search for short cuts to the "realm of plenty".

These ideas and sentiments engendered among the petty bourgeoisie also appeal to that section of the proletariat which has not yet experienced the class struggle or acquired the ideology and psychology of the revolutionary working class. The spread of conciliatory, reformist ideas among the proletariat is facilitated by the existence of more highly-paid sectors of workers whose salaries come from the super-profit obtained by excessive intensification of labour and exploitation of the economically less developed countries.

The Marxist-Leninist parties in the capitalist countries are not separated from the surrounding environment by the Wall of China. Their ranks are inevitably penetrated by vacillating elements with petty-bourgeois prejudices. Confronted by difficulties in the struggle against imperialism—and the formation of a new revolutionary order is always accompanied by difficulties, failures and temporary setbacks—these vacillating elements begin to panic, hesitate and doubt everything. They hasten to review and even revise principles which have been proved by practice, the truth of which they would never have questioned yesterday. They seek to reinterpret reality and reject the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, which have been confirmed by history, branding them as "dogmas" and "yesterday's truths". Yet in "creatively" developing Marxism or, rather, revising it, they invariably present as new theories a load of old, refurbished dogmas belonging to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois reformist ideology. Below we shall consider how Roger Garaudy is "renewing" Marxism in his writings.

Today than ever before the ruling classes in bourgeois society are particularly anxious to encourage revisionist conceptions directed against Marxism-Leninism and against socialism in both theory and practice. Here too one must give due credit to the avowed bourgeois ideologists. With incredible speed and precision they grasp the essence of the

ideas of the latest "Marxist renovator", praising the "depth" and "profundity" of his views, his "courage" and "independence", his mission to "modernise and civilise" Marxism. One might almost think that the sole aim of bourgeois theoreticians was to protect "true Marxism" and help to regenerate and perfect it.

The imperialist bourgeoisie supports revisionists in every way it can, because the latter help to spread bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas among the working class and the international communist movement. Revisionism is striving to subvert Marxism from within, to "soften" it, to synthesise vulgarised Marxism with bourgeois-apologetic ideas, to undermine the unity of the international communist movement, and to weaken the unity between the states in the world socialist system.

Unlike the right-wing reformist leaders, the revisionists do not openly reject either Marxism or Leninism. If we are to believe their assurances, their sole aim is to enrich Marxism-Leninism, to adapt it to modern tasks, and to throw light upon the complex problems of modern social development. They have raised the art of camouflage to new heights. Whereas the old revisionists in the days of Bernstein called us fairly openly and primitively "back to Kant", modern revisionists urge us back to . . . Marx and Lenin! The time has come when the authority of Marxist-Leninist theory is so high and unquestionable that people who want to attack it have to do so in the names of Marx and Lenin.

A number of questions which the theoreticians of modern right-wing revisionism are attempting to answer, for example, that of the conditions and social consequences of the scientific and technological revolution under state-monopoly capitalism, are undoubtedly extremely important ones. Yet the revisionist answers to them confuse the issue, rather than clarify it. These answers, as we have already noted, are usually based on bourgeois and reformist theories. Their "Marxist" guise does not, of course, make them any the less false. It merely helps them to penetrate more easily into the working class and the Communist parties, and disorientate the weaker elements in the working-class and communist movement both politically and theoretically.

Consequently it is impossible to conduct any kind of

effective campaign against imperialist ideology, its incorrect interpretation of reality, its false predictions, socio-political myths and reactionary utopias, without at the same time attacking reformist and revisionist "models" of bourgeois ideas aimed at disorientating the working class and its allies.

For our critical analysis of the ideas of modern right-wing revisionism, we have decided to concentrate on the works of Roger Garaudy. This choice was not determined in the slightest by the consistency or originality of his writings. We shall see later how easily Garaudy blurs out the distinction between his own ideas and those of other people, with what "creative" inspiration he reiterates the views of Sartre, Fromm, Teilhard de Chardin, bourgeois theoreticians of the scientific and technological revolution, Trotskyites and other enemies of the CPSU, supporters of the model of "market socialism" and, of course, the model of "socialism with a human face". Nor is he particularly concerned to defend the ideas he advocates by strict scientific argument. Isolated facts, frequently misunderstood or taken out of context and clearly "distorted", are regarded by him as an adequate basis for the most far-reaching conclusions and generalisations.

Aware of all these features of Garaudy's we nevertheless considered it necessary to answer him. For although he cannot claim to possess profundity of theoretical analysis or originality of ideas, one must acknowledge his ability to publicise his erroneous ideas and give them the semblance of truth.

Diderot used to say that "the most repulsive thing is a mixture of truth and falsehood". One cannot help recalling these words as one reads Garaudy's recent works. In such books as *Marxism in the Twentieth Century* and *Towards a French Model of Socialism*, truth and falsehood go hand in hand. Garaudy frequently reiterates well-known Marxist truths in order to advance and develop ideas which are totally incompatible with Marxism and a crude distortion of it.

One more preliminary remark. Garaudy is always ready to take up his pen at the slightest opportunity. He has flooded the book market with his essays on the basic components of Marxism, its history, its major and minor problems. With

little or no reflection he proceeds to discourse on dialectical and historical materialism, the theory of knowledge and logic, the theory and practice of socialism, ethics, aesthetics, religion, and so on.

The scope of this work does not permit us to analyse Roger Garaudy's ideas and inventions on this whole range of questions. Compelled to make a choice, we thought it advisable to concentrate exclusively on those problems which, to our mind, are the most important and the most distorted in Garaudy's writings. We are referring to philosophical questions, in particular, the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, the problem of the historical law and revolutionary initiative of the masses, the question of the unity and diversity of the formation of socialist society and, finally, the question of religion.

CHAPTER I

FROM THE THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY TO SUBJECTIVISM

1. DISTORTION OF THE ESSENCE OF MARXIST THEORY AND ITS ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIALISM

In his most recent works Roger Garaudy, as we have mentioned above, is particularly concerned to make Marxist philosophy "healthy", to "enrich" it, "modernise" it and adapt it "better" to the tasks of the last third of the twentieth century.

It goes without saying that the further development and improvement of Marxist philosophy through the profound interpretation of the world revolutionary process and bold generalisation of the scientific achievements of our age is a matter of prime importance. By its very revolutionary and critical nature Marxist-Leninist philosophy cannot help but strive to understand new phenomena and laws, to enrich themselves with new truths, to revive their scientific conceptual apparatus and to discard those conclusions and statements which have lost their importance as the result of changed circumstances.

Creative development is a basic law of all sciences, including Marxism-Leninism. Thanks to the collective efforts of the fraternal Communist and Workers' parties, Marxist-Leninist theory is overcoming the dogmatic errors of conservative and rigid elements and developing on the ascendant without a tinge of complacency. The theorists of the Communist and Workers' parties have concentrated their efforts on the unsolved or only partially solved problems of this great and, at the same time, complex and contradictory age of mankind's transition to communism.

When Garaudy babbles on incessantly, loudly and defensively about the need for the creative development of Marxism, of Marxist philosophy, one is justified in asking what exactly he means by the development and improvement of Marxism. With what sort of ideas does he want to enrich the treasury of revolutionary theory and precisely which conclusions and generalisations does he consider to be outdated, dogmatic and indemonstrable?

It must be said straightaway that in order to give more weight and meaning to his arguments Garaudy paints a most dismal picture of Marxist philosophy after the death of Lenin. By exaggerating real and apparent errors committed during the period of socialist construction, he produces a thorough caricature of Marxist philosophy. To quote him, this philosophy has been afflicted with "sclerosis", totally dogmatised and, if it has played any part at all in life, this is only a "conservative", "reactionary" role. Thus Garaudy talks of the decline of Marxist philosophy over the last few decades in the USSR and other socialist countries.

But how would it have been possible to build a socialist society in the USSR and create the world socialist system arbitrarily, without a scientific theory, just letting it blindly take its own course? Realising that he could find no answer to the question framed in this way Garaudy gets round it in this way. He announces that the sclerosis, stagnation and various other afflictions have infected not Marxism as a whole, but only Marxist philosophy. This produces the following strange picture: at the same time as Marxism is actively promoting the revolutionary transformation of the world, Marxist philosophy is wrapped in lethargic slumber! But can one conceive of the existence of Marxism without Marxist philosophy? What is Marxism without its revolutionary core—materialist dialectics? Garaudy's statements about Marxism without its philosophy may seem so incredible that perhaps we should quote the writer himself. "Marxism," writes Garaudy, "has given proof of its fruitfulness and creative effectiveness in countless practical fields. It has transformed the economic and social life of vast countries; it has allowed millions of men, enslaved for thousands of years, to have access to culture, and to win for themselves living conditions that are at last human. How then is it

that, in this tempestuous world of the twentieth century, Marxist philosophy, like the sleeping beauty, has been wrapped in slumber for the last twenty-five years?"¹

This was written in 1966. In his subsequent "works" Garaudy has extended this "sclerosis" and "dogmatism" to the whole post-war period of Marxism, without realising that he was doing so.

This ridiculous accusation that Marxism has become "dogmatic", "ossified" and "schematic", etc., in the last few decades does not require any special, detailed refutation. We shall simply limit ourselves to a few pertinent remarks.

The building of socialism in the USSR took place in a most bitter class struggle, which raged on the theoretical plane as well. It was essential to defend and creatively develop all the basic components of Marxist-Leninist theory. The building of socialism would have been inconceivable without a scientific theory, without a struggle against the many false theories and political trends which portrayed the future of the socialist revolution in a distorted light and rejected, either directly or indirectly, the possibility of building socialism in one country. Thus Trotskyism attempted by borrowing Menshevik dogmas and eclectically combining its own interpretation of Kautsky's theory of "productive forces" with a cheap brand of voluntarism to prove the impossibility of building socialism in one country and, particularly, in a country as economically behind Europe and America as Russia was at the time.

The right-wing deviationists, in their turn, arming themselves with the metaphysical and mechanistic "theory of equilibrium" and other equally wrong socio-philosophical, political and economic conceptions, sought to gloss over and reconcile the class antagonisms of the transition period, to discredit industrialisation and the collectivisation of agriculture, and in so doing to undermine the building of socialism in the Soviet Union.

This situation compelled the CPSU, its leadership and its political and theoretical workers to develop the materialist

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, London, 1970, p. 9.

interpretation of history, the Marxist doctrine on the objective laws of socialism, the role of the consciousness, will and organisation of the masses and their communist advance guard, to develop all the basic components of Marxism-Leninism, to demonstrate the dialectics of socialist development, its specific contradictions and ways of solving them. It compelled them to demonstrate the theoretical inconsistency and reactionary nature of anti-Marxist deviations, and convince the working class, the toiling peasantry and the intelligentsia of the correctness of the Leninist Party's general line.

No other people at any period in history have ever been compelled to solve such great revolutionary tasks in both theory and practice in such a short time. The years which Garaudy refers to sacrilegiously as "sclerotic" and "dogmatic" in the history of Marxist philosophy and Marxism as a whole were in fact years of unprecedented spiritual achievement, years of framing and solving tasks of universal importance. The Soviet Union, which had been encircled by hostile states for many years nevertheless remained the centre of the world revolutionary movement, its great bastion, the birthplace of the Comintern, a vast laboratory of revolutionary thought. All the basic problems of the world revolutionary process were discussed jointly by Soviet politicians and theoreticians with revolutionary leaders of the stature of Dimitrov, Thorez, Togliatti and Thälmann. Marxism-Leninism and the dialectical method of knowing reality made it possible to analyse imperialist contradictions between the two world wars, the economic crisis of the late twenties and early thirties which shook the bourgeois world to the foundations, fundamental questions relating to the international working-class and communist movement, the distinctive features, motive forces and forms of the national liberation, anti-imperialist movement and many other questions, the answers to which could not have been found without the further creative development of Leninism. Among these numerous questions one must also mention the problem of fascism. Without a profound analysis of the essence of fascism, its class basis and true aims, it would have been impossible to give a correct orientation to millions of people and raise them against nazism.

There is no doubt that even before its shameful defeat on the battlefields of the Second World War fascism had been ideologically routed by the efforts of Marxist theoreticians. Their brilliantly profound and penetrating assessments of fascism, their predictions as to the inevitability of its defeat and their indication of the ways in which this was to be achieved resound to the credit of Marxist theory and bear witness to its inexhaustible creative potential and remarkable effectiveness.

The impressive achievements of Marxism and Marxist philosophy have made it a banner of struggle on all continents, a tried and trusted weapon in the fight against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, the scientific basis for building a socialist society. Could a scientific theory that was "ossified", "arrested in its development", and "turned towards the past" dominate the minds of progressive mankind? Could such an "obsolete", "moribund" theory be capable of provoking such fury from the defenders of the old world? Why have hundreds of works been written and why are they still being written against a philosophy which, "like the sleeping beauty", is wrapped in slumber and not intervening in the affairs of the world?

Garaudy cannot answer any of these questions without blatantly contradicting the true facts.

While rejecting the false idea that Marxism has become "sclerotic" and dogmatic, which has also been borrowed by Garaudy from bourgeois ideology, no Marxist has the slightest inclination to overlook the difficulties in the development of Marxist thought, the mistakes made by its individual representatives, the unsolved questions, etc.

The errors connected with the cult of personality were subjected to sharp and detailed criticism by the Central Committee of the CPSU and its theoreticians long before Garaudy and his companions set about writing their reams on "creative Marxism" and discrediting Marxist-Leninist philosophy during the period of socialist construction in the USSR and other countries.

To return to the question of the role of Marxist philosophy, of materialist dialectics, however, not only in elucidating the fundamental socio-economic, political and ideological problems of our age, but also in enriching

philosophy itself on the basis of new social practice and new scientific knowledge, let us mention another point. To say nothing of dialectical materialism and the history of philosophy, in which most valuable work has been done, let us discuss historical materialism. And let us take, for example, a question which occupies a special place in Garaudy's writings, the so-called question of the methodology of "historical initiative". The rational content of this problem is the role of the creative activity of the masses, of social classes, political parties and the individual in history. Garaudy knows full well how many interesting works have been written on this subject in both Soviet and foreign Marxist literature. The authors of these works, who did not feel the need to borrow unnecessarily from Kant and Fichte, have drawn general conclusions from the actual building of socialist society and thus enriched the subject of "historical initiative" and made it more concrete. The same applies to the active, transforming force of social ideas in the development of society, which, incidentally, are very rightly stressed in Stalin's work *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*. The fact that a considerable number of other problems of historical materialism have been developed creatively by Marxist thinkers also refutes Garaudy's assertion that Marxist-Leninist philosophy and historical materialism, in particular, are ossified.

It should be noted that the revisionist theory of the "dogmatic degeneration" of Marxism interprets "dogmatism" in a pejorative way. The term *dogmatism* is often used to mean devotion to principles, the desire to defend and develop them instead of being "flexible", instead of replacing them by modish bourgeois or petty-bourgeois ideas, or "supplementing" Marxism with these ideas.

In their struggle against "dogmatic" Marxism the bourgeois, reformist and revisionist theoreticians take up arms against "absolute truth", fight for a relativist view of the development of knowledge, ignore or flatly reject objective truth and argue the plurality of truth, etc. As we shall prove below, this subjectivisation of the process of acquiring knowledge, under the guise of fighting against "dogmatism", has been firmly mastered by Garaudy. The subjectivisation of knowledge logically leads him and those of like mind to

revise the theory of scientific communism completely and to defend the revisionist concept of many "models" of socialism and even Marxism.

This does not mean, of course, that we should underestimate the real facts of the simplification and dogmatisation of Marxism—both past and present. Suffice it to mention, for example, caricatured Maoist "Marxism", in which vulgar dogmatism is a form of the revision of the essence of Marxist doctrine.

The 24th Congress of the CPSU raised the question of combining the struggle against revisionism with the struggle against dogmatism, the dogmatic distortion of reality.

In France itself the existence of so-called "theoretical anti-humanism", and the attempts of the supporters of this theory to turn Marxism into a scientific conception of the worst possible variety demonstrates clearly the danger of dogmatising Marxist doctrine.

It may appear that Garaudy sees the danger of dogmatism and wants to oppose it. But this is far from being true and we shall try to demonstrate it.

Before proceeding to examine the ways proposed by Garaudy for "de-dogmatising" Marxist theory, we should like to recall his former attitude to false accusations that Marxism was dogmatic. In his *Critique de la raison dialectique* Sartre wrote that "Marxism has ceased to develop". At that time, some ten years or so ago, Garaudy regarded it as his duty to challenge Sartre's mistaken views. In his pamphlet *Questions à Jean-Paul Sartre* he wrote: "Sartre believes that the historical conditions of the building of socialism and the prolonged blockade of the USSR, by forcing the latter to withdraw into itself, caused the divorce of theory from practice and led to dogmatic stagnation in the field of theory".¹ After refuting Sartre's flimsy arguments that Marxism or Marxist philosophy had become dogmatic and his assertions that modern Marxism was content to repeat endlessly the abstract scheme of the movement of history and limit itself to revealing an historical necessity, which is determined once and for all, Garaudy concluded: "This type of argument reflects, obviously, Sartre's extremely

¹ R. Garaudy, *Questions à Jean-Paul Sartre*, Paris, 1960, p. 26.

weak knowledge of Marxist philosophy as a whole, regardless of whether he is discussing the works of Marx and Engels or those writers whom he calls 'modern Marxists'.¹ Only this lack of knowledge of the basic ideas in classical Marxist works can explain Sartre's accusation against Engels, whom he regards as the "first representative of the 'modern Marxists' and the forefather of all dogmatic simplification of Marxism".²

Thus, in his dispute with Sartre, Garaudy rejected the accusation that Marxism was dogmatic and the attempts to portray Marxist theory as a closed, complete system of ideas divorced from the stream of time. In those not so distant years Garaudy defended not only Marx but also the "modern Marxists" against this charge of being dogmatic. True even when he wrote *Questions à Jean-Paul Sartre* his insufficiently profound view of things prevented him from understanding the true reason for Sartre's attack on Marxism. It was not because Sartre lacked a knowledge of Marxism, of course. After all Garaudy would probably not regard himself as lacking in knowledge of Marxism, but nevertheless he has adopted the same stand as Sartre in accusing "modern Marxism" of being dogmatic.

Allegations that Marxism is "sclerotic" and "dogmatic", that it is lagging behind the times, etc., are simply ways of trying to discredit Marxism and justify attempts to revise and "develop" it according to one's particular whim or fancy.

How does Garaudy think Marxism or Marxist philosophy can be cured from the serious diseases that have beset them?

2. OVERCOMING "MARXIST SELF-ISOLATION" BY ECLECTICISM AND UNPRINCIPLED SYNTHESSES

In his attempts to describe the "mishaps" which have befallen Marxist philosophy, Garaudy attaches great significance to the "self-isolation of Marxism" from other cultural and philosophical streams, from other doctrines which contain and develop different values, different hypotheses

¹ R. Garaudy, *Questions à Jean-Paul Sartre*, Paris, 1960, p. 27.

² *Ibid.*

and different truths. For the sake of clarity, we must point out that he has in mind, first and foremost, values, hypotheses and truths of idealist philosophical trends.

Having made his diagnosis, Garaudy proceeds to prescribe methods of curing the ailment. He recommends excluding a "sectarian spirit" and taking from the idealist doctrines of the past and present everything which, as he asserts, can enrich Marxist philosophy and make it more comprehensive and capable of grasping the many facets of reality.

First of all, we must establish exactly what Garaudy proposes to borrow from idealist doctrines. If it were simply a matter of making use of some scientific knowledge or other in these doctrines, there would be nothing new or unusual about that, for Marxism has never rejected such a possibility. It is a well-known fact that when it first originated Marxism borrowed in revised form many ideas which had been elaborated in idealist doctrines (albeit in a distorted way). Suffice it to mention the attitude of the founders of Marxism to the Hegelian dialectic and to the idea of active thought which is very clearly expressed in the philosophy of Kant and Fichte (again in a distorted way), to the theory of the qualitative diversity of the world, its heterogeneity in the idealist monadology of Leibnitz, etc. The existence of scientific ideas in idealist doctrines is one of life's contradictions. The idealist system inevitably distorts and misinterprets the elements of scientific knowledge, which are contradictory to its very essence. It tends to reject and exclude scientific facts. It is no accident that these ideas and facts seek and find proper philosophical expression and development in scientific materialist doctrines. This is convincingly borne out by the development of German idealist dialectic in the 19th century. Only a materialist dialectic could become a true instrument of cognition and action in Marxism.

Today also Marxist philosophy does not question the genuine achievements of this or that specialist in physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology, geology, economics, history, ethnography, etc., but rejects his idealist prejudices or delusions. Marxists follow Lenin's clear instructions about the need to draw a strict distinction between Mach the physicist and Mach the subjective idealist.

Obviously no one would dream of questioning Teilhard de Chardin's achievements in the sphere of geology, paleontology, evolution theory and so on, because of his religious beliefs. Nor would anyone refuse to acknowledge the scientific discoveries made by Freud, simply because he created a mystique around the human psyche.

Garaudy and other revisionists accuse "dogmatic Marxism" of refusing to recognise Einstein's theory of relativity, genetics and cybernetics. Yet Garaudy must know that these were the errors not of Marxism but of individual Marxists who were incapable of distinguishing the idealist and mystical speculation around problems of genetics, cybernetics, the theory of relativity, and resonance theory, etc., from the essence of these new scientific discoveries.

As for Marxist theory itself, it recognises these concepts and uses them to enrich itself and make its generalisations and conclusions more accurate, regardless of the religious and idealist beliefs of their authors.

Consequently the argument that Marxism has "isolated itself" from science and progressive ideas is a false one. Marxism, as Lenin pointed out, did not originate far from the highway of world civilisation. Marxism is the logical result of social progress. It has always absorbed in a critically interpreted and revised form all the achievements of progressive thought. It is well known that the revolution in physics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was of exceptional importance for the development as well as the confirmation of dialectical materialism.

The "self-isolation of Marxism" can mean one thing only: the refusal by Marxism, by Marxist philosophy as a matter of principle to acknowledge anything that is unscientific, to say nothing of openly anti-scientific conceptions. But the term "self-isolation" is a very imprecise expression of the ideological incompatibility of Marxism with idealism, religion, irrationalism and all conceptions which defend capitalism and its ideology as a whole whether overtly or covertly. The term is imprecise because Marxism does not "isolate itself" from alien and hostile theories—a passive attitude—but wages an active struggle against them.

The "self-isolation of Marxism" from non-Marxist ideas, this accusation against "modern Marxism" which is found

in revisionist writings, has another meaning. Garaudy and those of like mind are extremely anxious that there should be a mutual interchange of ideas between Marxist philosophy and idealist doctrines; between scientific atheism and religion; between Marxist aesthetics and all manner of non-realist and anti-realist aesthetic trends; between Marxist ethics and idealist, subjectivist, Kantian and Fichtean moral doctrines; and finally between scientific socialism and the various forms of modern petty-bourgeois utopian socialism.

Putting an end to the "self-isolation" of Marxism and turning it into an "open" doctrine capable of properly appreciating the values of "other cultures" and enriching itself with them, means for Garaudy and other revisionists replacing the struggle between alien ideological trends by their peaceful coexistence and mutual enrichment. Garaudy advocates excluding the "spirit of sectarianism" and taking from idealist doctrines of the past and present everything that is capable of making our knowledge "versatile" and "supplementing" Marxism with ideas which it lacks.

Garaudy glosses over the fundamental distinctions between materialism and idealism, atheism and religion, and encourages the reader to think that materialism developed not only by confronting idealism but also by absorbing idealist values.

As proof of this "continuity" between materialism and idealism Garaudy turns to the genesis of Marxist philosophy.¹ He attempts to prove that German *idealism* was the main source of Marxism. At first glance it may seem that Garaudy is referring to the well-known idea of the classics of Marxism-Leninism about the role of German *classical philosophy* in the formation of Marxism and Marxist philosophy. This is not the case, however; Garaudy is

¹ There is a kind of continuity between materialism and idealism, but it is not correct to say that idealism already contained materialist ideas. Nor is it true that the materialist system of generalisations includes thoughts and definitions from preceding idealistic doctrines. The continuity between materialism and idealism lies in their subject matter. The history of philosophy shows that materialist doctrines sometimes returned to problems posed by previous idealist doctrines in order to elucidate them from the materialist point of view. Idealism did the same with problems which had been previously advanced by materialist philosophical trends.

speaking not about German classical philosophy, but about German *idealism*. He writes that Marx, Engels and Lenin "... always maintained that the basic philosophic source of Marxist philosophy is precisely German idealism: German *idealism*, let me emphasise, because although Feuerbach must be included in German philosophy, it is not he who is cited as the basic source.... All dogmatic interpretations of Marxism begin by underestimating the legacy of Kant, Fichte and Hegel and going back to Feuerbach, Diderot or Spinoza".¹

It is not difficult to see how disparagingly Garaudy writes of Spinoza, Diderot and Feuerbach in order to present German idealism as the main source of the emergence of Marxism, of Marxist philosophy. But with what justification? Can Garaudy have forgotten that according to Marxism-Leninism materialism and idealism are mutually exclusive philosophical doctrines: Marxist materialism could not borrow from any *idealism* as such. The relationships were of a different order: Marxist materialism emerged as the most radical *rejection, discarding* of idealism as a whole and German *idealism* in particular. Marxist materialism as consistent materialism rejected not only the metaphysics and mechanism of the old materialists, but also their idealist misconceptions in their interpretation of social relations.

Marxism has always regarded all idealism, all idealist treatment of the basic question of philosophy as a direct deviation from science and the scientific world outlook.

Garaudy studiously confuses the real relationship between Marxism and the philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Hegel. As we know, Marx and Engels took from these thinkers not their *idealism*, but their *dialectic*, radically revising it on a materialist basis.

We are compelled to state these elementary facts from the history of philosophy, because Garaudy commences his campaign against consistent materialism by distorting these basic historico-philosophical propositions beyond all recognition.

In order to prove the exceptional role of German idealism in the formation of Marxist philosophy Garaudy frequently and tendentiously emphasises the "enrichment" of Marxism

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 41.

by the principle of subjectivity, the principle of active thought. In doing so he practically ignores the fact that idealism presents the problem of the activity of the subject in a completely distorted way, by turning the active subject and its consciousness into the demiurge of reality and thus rejecting all ideas of the objective world and its objective laws.

Let us recall that Marx was completely justified in accusing the early materialists, including Feuerbach, of contemplation, of being incapable of viewing the subject, reality, sensuousness as human sensuous activity, as *practice*. He goes on to say: "Hence it happened that the *active* side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such."¹

Garaudy manages to ignore the fundamental criticisms of idealism and 19th-century German idealism, in particular, by Marx, Engels and Lenin. He writes willingly and profusely about the "defects" and "shortcomings" of old and new materialism, but his most recent books and articles do not and, bearing in mind his attitude and intentions, cannot contain the slightest fundamental, consistent criticism of the idealist treatment of the basic question in philosophy. This question itself is either placed on the same footing as quasi-problems or demoted even further.

Let us now return to the question of the genesis of Marxist philosophy. How correct is Garaudy in stating that pre-Marxist materialist philosophy did not play a significant role in the formation of Marxism?

We must assume that Marx and Engels understood better than Garaudy the ideological trends which influenced the formation of their own teaching. Here it is relevant to recall how enthusiastically Marx and Engels welcomed Feuerbach's criticism of Hegelian idealism. In *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* quoted above, from which Garaudy so tendentiously extracts a number of statements in order to belittle the importance of Feuerbach for the formation of Marxist philosophy, Engels speaks of the liberating role of the ideas of the

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, 1969, p. 13.

Essence of Christianity. "One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much—in spite of all critical reservations—he was influenced by it, one may read in *The Holy Family*."¹

Lenin in his turn wrote this about Feuerbach: "To Marx Feuerbach's historic and 'epoch-making' significance lay in his having resolutely broken with Hegel's idealism and in his proclamation of materialism. . . ."²

This and other testimony by the classics of Marxism-Leninism shows how inconsistent and arbitrary are Garaudy's attempts to turn the role of German idealism into an absolute in the formation of Marxism, to deny the importance of pre-Marxist materialism in the latter, to regard Feuerbach as being outside nineteenth-century classical German philosophy and to reduce his role in the emergence of new, dialectical materialism to a minimum. It is not difficult to see how freely Garaudy juggles with the facts, with the opinions of Marx, Engels and Lenin, in his attempts to prove his point.

An important role in this "enrichment" of Marxist philosophy by idealism, past and present, is played by Fichte. One might almost think that Garaudy is fighting so passionately for a return to Fichte's philosophy in order to take from it, albeit somewhat late, something that could make Marxist philosophy more effective. In fact, however, he had to forgo Marx for the sake of Fichte, as we shall see this later on.

As we know, Marxism thought highly of Fichte's striving to prove the activity of the subject, the creative role of its thinking. Fichte did indeed devote considerable attention to ethical consciousness and particularly to the problem of freedom. He developed certain ideas of the Spinoza dialectic of freedom and necessity and even progressed further than the Dutch philosopher. Thus, Fichte saw that the degree to which a person may attain freedom is determined not only by his level of intellectual development, but also by

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, 1970, Vol. 3, p. 343.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 50.

the historical conditions in which he lives. These and many other rational dialectical ideas in Fichte's philosophy were absorbed *in revised form* by the founders of Marxist philosophy in the process of its formation. We emphasise "in revised form", because none of Fichte's ideas, however positive, could have been borrowed and included in the treasury of Marxist philosophy in its original form due to the fact that all his most progressive ideas were distorted and deformed to some extent by idealism.

Garaudy's idealisation of Fichte's philosophy compels us to restate a number of well-known truths for the sake of clarity. Let us begin with the fact that Fichte's defence of the idea of subjectivity was purchased at the price of extreme subjectivism, and his glorification of the principle of will was inseparable from extreme voluntarism. Fichte attempted to overcome Kantian dualism from the standpoint of subjective idealism, to completely oust the materialist element in Kantian philosophy—the recognition of the objectively existing world of noumena, "things in themselves". In Fichte's subjective-idealist system the Ego creates the non-Ego, i.e., the "objective" world, and in the final analysis they are both the products of a higher, supernatural element which has predetermined everything. "It is impossible," Fichte writes, "to perceive the position of a grain of sand in a different way from what it is, without being compelled to perceive the past in the endlessly ascending line and the future in the endlessly descending line."¹

This implacable predetermination also governs the Fichtean subject which, however, strives to acquire freedom. Fichte regarded it as one of his most important tasks as a philosopher to prove the possibility of this freedom. He endowed the Ego with a super-active nature, presenting it as a creative element which does not recognise any barriers to the achievement of its aims. He subordinated even the subject's consciousness to this all-overcoming will and emerged as one of the exponents of patent voluntarism.

The question arises as to how the Fichtean Ego could acquire freedom of action in a world where, according to

¹ Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen*, Berlin, 1800, S. 24-25.

his own definition, fatal necessity reigned supreme. It must be noted that Fichte was unable to resolve this contradiction, just as Kant also failed to do so. In the end the super-volitional subject in Fichtean philosophy was forced to restrict its activity to trying to comprehend necessity, which kept it firmly fettered. Fichte was compelled to urge moderation, self-restriction and passive contemplation. In this spirit of reconciliation with the inevitable he wrote: "Everything exists (as it does exist) not because God arbitrarily desires that form of existence, but because it cannot manifest itself in any other form. To understand this, to humbly reconcile oneself to this and to be blessed in the realisation of our identity with the Divine force—is open to everyone."¹

It is not difficult to see the contradictions in Fichte's interpretation of freedom, the confusion of the mutually exclusive principles of voluntarism and fatalism in his philosophy. The elements of dialectical thought in Fichte do not simply coexist with idealism, but are distorted by it, and it is no easy matter to accept his dialectical moments of insight and automatically discard his idealism.

Ignoring these facts, oversimplifying the problem in the extreme, and idealising Fichtean philosophy, Garaudy urges Marxists to study in Fichte not only the dialectic but what almost amounts to historical materialism!

Thus, according to Garaudy, Fichte provides us with an exemplary model of the effort to keep hold of both ends of the chain—ethics and society. "Fichte," he writes, "can help us to keep hold of both ends of the chain. It is on the meeting ground of Fichte's philosophy that dialogue on moral science can be most fruitful: if Marxists learn again to integrate the theory of subjectivity to be found in Fichte's existential thought, and if contemporary existentialists do not mutilate Fichtean existentialism by depriving it of two fundamental dimensions: the rational dimension and the social dimension."²

No one can deny the existence in so-called "practical philosophy" and particularly in Fichtean ethics of ideas

¹ Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*, Berlin, 1806, S. 309.

² R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 87.

which were interesting for their time on the predetermined nature of human actions and on freedom and necessity. But why should Marxists of the last third of the 20th century turn to Fichte, the idealist philosopher, for an understanding of the real correlation between society and social consciousness? Is not the scientific solution of these questions one of the finest achievements of Marxist theory and Marxist philosophy? If so, and no one can doubt that it is so, why all this inexplicable nostalgia for Fichte? The fact is that Garaudy, carried away by the principle of subjectivity, activity, which he has exaggerated into an absolute, naturally shows a heightened interest in the Fichtean glorification of the super-creative Ego. He thinks that the revival of certain Fichtean ideas could facilitate contact with modern idealist trends, in particular the philosophy of Sartre which a few years ago, before the appearance of *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, Garaudy rejected as a combination of the theory of finalist idealism in human knowledge and positivist agnosticism in the natural sciences. Today, however, Garaudy is attempting through the agency of Fichte to enrich Marxist philosophy with the philosophy of Sartre. "And cannot we Marxists," he writes, "inspired by Fichte's efforts to keep hold of both ends of the chain (society and morals—H.M.), interiorise and integrate Sartre's demand and so make of it an element of our own thought?"¹ By "Sartre's demand" he has in mind the recognition of the subjective-active nature of the human individual, his calling to model himself and make himself the measure of all things.

Following Garaudy's feverish search for links with Kant, Fichte and modern existentialism in order to substantiate the principle of subjectivity, activity, initiative, etc., one cannot help asking why Garaudy does not choose the shorter and more reliable path, the path leading to Marx, Engels and Lenin? For no serious importance whatsoever should be attached to the malicious and ignorant assertions about the "fatalist nature" of Marxism, which, it is alleged, in defending the idea of "iron" historical laws that determine in detail the whole course of historical development, does not

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

leave room for human freedom, for conscious human historical creativity.

Garaudy agrees that this is a false picture of Marxism, for Marxism was the first to give scientific substantiation to the active role of the consciousness, will and initiative of the masses, political parties and the individual in social development. In this case why should it be necessary to appeal to Kant and Fichte, if this task has long since been solved by Marxism, which inherited, in critically revised form, the rational dialectical ideas of these philosophers on the question of interest to us? Yet more ridiculous are Garaudy's appeals to Sartre and even religion (see below), in order to arm himself with arguments to defend the principle of subjectivity, activity, freedom of choice, self-expression, the self-assertion of the individual, etc.

In all probability, in spite of his many assurances to the contrary, Garaudy assumes that Marxism has not fully substantiated the principle of subjectivity, activity. This probably explains why he, Garaudy, is taking it upon himself to "complete the task" with the help of past and present idealist doctrines.

Let us now sum up the foregoing. In *Marxism in the Twentieth Century, Towards a French Model of Socialism* and other works Garaudy blatantly ignores the fact that materialism and idealism are diametrically opposed to each other and sets about "enriching" Marxist philosophy with idealist ideas.

It is interesting to note that in his attempt to analyse twentieth-century Marxism Garaudy ignores the most pressing problems in the ideological struggle of the present day. One might think that the struggle between the antagonistic classes and political parties was a thing of the past, and that we had seen the last of vicious attacks on communism and its philosophy by the imperialist bourgeoisie, its philosophers, sociologists, economists and politicians. Reading Garaudy's book *Marxism in the Twentieth Century* one might get the impression that idealism and mysticism have ceased to exist as such and have humbly retired to the pages of tomes on the history of philosophy and religion.

If anyone had really attempted to get an idea of twentieth-century Marxism from Garaudy's book, he would

probably have concluded that militant, revolutionary Marxism, uncompromising in its high principles, has given way to a collection of amorphous ideas, which instead of being directed against the reactionary concepts of a deficient society, are seeking a compromise with them, seeking to find something in common with them.

Whereas in his earlier works, which Garaudy himself has described as the writings of his "dogmatic period", he fought quite actively against neo-Thomism, existentialism and other idealist trends, against Henri Lefebvre and his supporters, who had long since embarked on a revision of Marxist philosophy, today having become a "creative" Marxist, Garaudy confines himself to restrained critical comments on existentialism and other forms of idealism. As can be seen, he is now obsessed by the desire to establish "business" contacts with idealism, to carry on peaceful dialogues with the extant and extinct exponents of idealist and spiritualist thought. He tries to "enrich" Marxist philosophy with stunted modern idealist thought. Lumping together people of widely differing authority, Garaudy writes: "...Even the period that has brought the collapse of imperialism has witnessed the birth of important works, from which we have much to learn: our Marxism itself would be the poorer if we still thought, for example, as though Husserl and Heidegger, Freud, Bachelard or Lévi-Strauss had never existed."¹ There can be no doubt that it is necessary to make a critical study of Husserl in order to understand more profoundly the progression of bourgeois philosophical thought in the age of imperialism, its aims and arguments directed against dialectical materialism. A knowledge of Husserl undoubtedly enables one to understand better the genesis and development of German existentialism. But why would Marxism "be the poorer" without Husserl, his "pure consciousness" and "pure essences", or without many of his ideas taken from the immanentist Schuppe? Garaudy does not say—because it is impossible to say—exactly what scientific, progressive and promising ideas are to be found in Husserl's philosophy. Why then this irrelevant flirting with "pure idealism"?

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 191.

While adopting an extremely "tactful" and considerate attitude towards these epigones of bourgeois philosophical thought and towards Christian theology, Garaudy becomes extremely harsh and acrimonious when attacking those who will not have anything to do with "conciliatory charlatanism", those who defend and develop the principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy; those who have taken upon themselves the difficult task of combating reactionary bourgeois ideology and its dangerous, cunning designs. It is precisely these people, true to their class and party, and in the front line of the battle against the imperialist bourgeoisie, who are the object of Garaudy's vicious attacks. It is they whom Garaudy accuses of being "dogmatists", "schematists", "Stalinists", "neo-Stalinists", "out-of-date Marxists" and so on.

As for Garaudy himself, as we have seen, he seeks for and finds unprincipled compromises with bourgeois philosophy, yielding it point upon point. This does not prevent him from constantly assuring the reader that he supports materialism and atheism, that he condemns eclecticism and upholds the dialectical unity of diversity, etc. But all these assurances are in complete contradiction to his behaviour. He is not only and not simply in favour of reconciling conflicting philosophical trends, but also attempts to elevate this behaviour into a principle, to give it theoretical justification. In his book *The Turning-Point of Socialism* he defends the principle of epistemological plurality and regards it as the "principle of cross-fertilisation".¹

Together with other revisionists Garaudy is fighting for a "tolerant Marxism" free from "Asiatic fanaticism" and capable of taking a broad view of things. This revisionist "twentieth-century Marxism" wants to be free from a "narrowly class" and "narrowly party" view of things, from the spirit and thinking of a "persecuted political sect". It wants to become an open doctrine capable of absorbing all the truths obtained by other, non-Marxist doctrines.

As is obvious, these arguments and pretensions of Garaudy's are totally false and hypocritical. One might almost think that Marxism supports narrow-mindedness, one-

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, London, 1970, p. 45.

sidedness, a sectarian spirit, a closed system of knowledge, etc. We have already had occasion to mention the simple and irrefutable truth that Marxism has always developed by enriching itself with all the fundamental truths discovered by human intellect and tested by practice, all truths, that is, with the exception of those which are not actually truths, but try to pass them as such. To these quasi-truths, to say nothing of open falsehood, Marxism bolts its doors! Can one really accuse it of being "closed"?

Returning again and again to the old idea of the pluralism, multiplicity of truth, Garaudy maintains that this pluralism is actually a distinctive feature of "modern humanism". At the same time he hastens to make the reservation that pluralism "in no way leads to scepticism or eclecticism".¹ Yet how can eclecticism be avoided if Garaudy is proposing to understand all truths not only in the natural sciences, but also in philosophy and the socio-political sciences, by proceeding from different, even *conflicting* hypotheses and by constructing different "models"? This unprincipled pluralism is described by Garaudy as "a necessary consequence of the new concept of the real which is no longer that of dogmatic materialism".² He tries frequently and in vain to frighten the reader with the bogey of "dogmatic materialism". Categorical rejection of pluralism and defence of the monistic view of the world belong first and foremost to dialectical materialism, and Garaudy gains nothing by confusing this question.

The "new" interpretation of reality on which Garaudy enlarges excludes the monistic view of the world, undermines the conception of the *dialectical unity* of the diversity of phenomena, and admits the coexistence and mutual enrichment of incompatible basic propositions. It examines reality without employing the concepts of the objective laws of the existence and development of the world, without strict laws of thinking. It is no accident that in describing twentieth-century Marxism and its philosophy as he sees them, Garaudy totally ignores the main question of philosophy, the basic laws of the materialist dialectic and almost all its most important

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 65.

² *Ibid.*

categories. He clearly regards all this as belonging to "dogmatic", "institutionalised" Marxism which "imposes" a principled approach to the world. Garaudy, however, tends towards the interpretation of reality which strips the latter of all definiteness, unambiguity and objective laws. His reality is relative and void of even comparative stability.

The pluralism with which Garaudy has armed himself has also been borrowed by him from the bourgeois ideology. This pluralism sees the world as the sum total of equivalent isolated substances, usually spiritual substances, which cannot be reduced to a single principle. Ignoring the question of ontological pluralism, Garaudy tends towards epistemological pluralism, a plurality of hypotheses, truths with an equal right to existence until the conflict between them ends in one victorious hypothesis absorbing all its less successful competitors. The latter do not disappear, but become partial elements of the hypothesis which has won the day.

Epistemological pluralism has long been used to argue "ideological neutrality" and is regarded as a means of rising above (in words, of course) materialism and idealism. In fact it is directed against materialist monism and serves to defend the idealist and religious world outlook. In the period of his "dogmatic thinking" Garaudy was well aware of this. Today, however, obsessed by the desire to reconcile mutually exclusive and philosophically alien trends, he has moved closer to hypocritical pluralism with his many reservations of a tactical nature.

The idea of a drawing together of materialism and idealism and the rejection of the principle of party commitment in philosophy is expressed most openly by Garaudy in his book *The Turning-Point of Socialism*. In it he writes: "If the Party wishes to be more than a doctrinaire sect, if it wishes to be the haven for all the forces which, in France, are desirous of building socialism, it cannot afford to have an 'official philosophy',..."¹

It is not surprising that Garaudy has been sharply criticised by many Marxists, primarily French Marxists, for his attempt to de-ideologise the Communist Party and force

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 230.

upon it a neutral attitude towards both materialism and idealism, as well as religion and atheism.

Realising how far he had gone in his frank admissions, how imprudently he had revealed his true desire to deprive philosophy of party commitment and the party of philosophy, Garaudy began to beat a noisy retreat and even justify himself by accusing his critics of underhand methods. He wrote: "A sentence of mine, occurring on page 230 of my book *The Turning-Point of Socialism* has been picked out and quoted out of context. I wrote that if our party was to become, not a doctrinaire sect, but rather the leaven of all the forces desirous of building socialism in France, it could not afford to have an 'official philosophy'."¹

In order to wriggle out of the difficult and awkward position he has landed himself in, he goes on to quote the definition of the word "official" in Larousse: "used of everything that is announced, proclaimed, ordained by a recognised authority; of that which emanates from the Government, from the administration".²

Garaudy may imagine that he has managed with the help of the dictionary to repulse his critics and defame the "dogmatists". Yet he forgets that in this ill-fated context the words "official philosophy", which he considers the Communist Party should not have, are explained so clearly that there is no need to look them up in Larousse. "The Party," Garaudy writes, "cannot . . . be in principle either idealist, materialist, religious or atheist." In other words, philosophy is a private matter for the Communist Party. The latter should not care what sort of philosophical doctrine underlies its programme, strategy and tactics, or what philosophical convictions are held by the members of the French Communist Party, the leaders of its press, publishing houses, research centres, etc.

Garaudy's "refutation" would make some sort of sense if, after criticising "official" philosophy he had stated clearly what sort of philosophy the Party should have. But this is precisely what he does not do. And he does not do so because he takes refuge in a blatantly opportunist line of

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Whole Truth*, London, 1971, p. 185.

² *Ibid.*

argument, namely, that if the party has a materialist and atheist philosophy this prevents it from going along with social layers and parties who reject both materialism and idealism. But in that case is there any point in the party talking about its goal, about a maximum programme, about the communist transformation of society, bearing in mind that such a programme at the present stage may also be totally or partially misunderstood by the non-proletarian strata?

Let us make an important reservation here for the sake of clarity. Recognition of dialectical and historical materialism as the philosophy of the Communist Party does not mean that the party closes its doors to believers. Garaudy gains nothing by having recourse to this quasi-argument. The question of whether believers and even certain priests can be members of the Communist Party has been solved long ago both theoretically and in practice.

Many decades ago Lenin wrote: "We must not only admit workers who preserve their belief in God into the Social-Democratic Party, but must deliberately set out to recruit them; we are absolutely opposed to giving the slightest offence to their religious convictions, but we recruit them in order to educate them in the spirit of our programme, and not in order to permit an active struggle against it."¹

Nor did Lenin avoid the question of the possibility of allowing priests to join the Party: "If a priest comes to us to take part in our common political work and conscientiously performs party duties, without opposing the programme of the Party, he may be allowed to join the ranks of the Social-Democrats; for the contradiction between the spirit and principles of our programme and the religious convictions of the priest would in such circumstances be something that concerned him alone, his own private contradiction. . . ."²

It is easy to see the clarity and dignity with which Lenin upholds the basic philosophical principles of the Party, distinguishing clearly between scientific and anti-scientific ideol-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 409.

² *Ibid.*, p. 408.

ogy, excluding compromises between them and taking care not to create false illusions for anyone whatsoever.

Garaudy, however, allegedly in order to make the programme of the Communist Party acceptable to the largest possible number of non-proletarian elements, is prepared, as we can see, to remove from the party programme, from its ideological conception, anything which may seem "unattractive" to the petty bourgeoisie, the "middle classes", the non-monopolistic bourgeoisie.

The policy of renouncing principles with the alleged aim of winning broad and diverse sections of the electorate over to socialism was used by the opportunist leaders of the Second International. The results of this experiment are well known. It is also well known that "ideological neutrality", that false slogan, is used by the right-wing leaders of the modern reformist parties belonging to the Socialist International.

Garaudy's recent writing is full of attempts to do away with "fixed" opinions and judgments which might appear "one-sided", too "party-minded" or not sufficiently "flexible", etc. He is busy "civilising" socialism and Marxist philosophy, rethinking them, giving them a content and appearance designed to charm "sensitive minds" and taking into account the latter's dislike for "party spirit", "one-sidedness", "boring monism", excessively categorical statements and "established truths".

In conceding to these dubious attitudes, Garaudy is taking a decisive step towards revising the dialectic of objective, relative and absolute truth. He requires such an interpretation of truth which would justify "pluralism of hypotheses", a conciliatory attitude in philosophy and would serve as a theoretical substantiation of the need to reject the principle of party commitment in philosophy.

3. RELATIVISM DIRECTED AGAINST ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE

In his book *Marxism in the Twentieth Century* Garaudy frequently returns to the dogmatic errors made in the field of theory and notes that they were usually connected with distortion of the dialectic of absolute and relative truth.

There can, incidentally, be no doubt whatsoever that Garaudy's own mistakes also result from the distortion of this dialectic, although in a different way, by making the relative into an absolute and removing established truths, confirmed by practice, from the process of cognition.

In order to combat real and imaginary dogmatic statements, Garaudy often blurs out the dividing line between the dialectic and relativism. He presents the matter as if *all* scientific truths are eventually discarded and replaced by new scientific truths which, in their turn, give way to other new ones, and so on *ad infinitum*. "...Dialectical materialism," he writes, "is conscious of the fact that the real is inexhaustible, is irreducible to the knowledge we have of it, and that every scientific concept is *always* a *provisional* construction, pending the appearance of richer, more effective and truer constructions."¹ (My italics—H.M.) This idea is correct in itself, but taken without reservations and more precise definition it becomes meaningless. Are the scientific discoveries of past centuries and decades bound to lose their scientific character and be ejected from the body of scientific knowledge? Do they change from truths into falsehoods? To insist on such a view is tantamount to saying that the acquiring of knowledge is merely the replacement of one seeming truth by another seeming truth or the replacement of one illusion by another, if slightly less crude illusion. Given such a view of things relative *truths* actually become relative *delusions*. According to this wretched dialectic, each new truth is engendered by the total denial of that which was considered to be true. Each new truth in its turn shares the same tragic fate as its predecessor and as a result (Garaudy ignores this point) there can be no cumulative process in the sphere of knowledge.

In fact the cognitive process is quite a different one. Some propositions which were regarded as true ones are rejected with time as being false; and at the same time, ideas which were thought to be false turn out to be true; some relative truths give way to other, more profound ones, which represent a more serious progression towards the cognition of

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 42.

absolute truth; a number of scientific hypotheses turn into demonstrated truths or, on the contrary, are refuted and rejected.

This multiple progression towards truth is replaced by Garaudy with his imaginary scheme of the substitution of one relative truth by, at best, another relative truth without the slightest accumulation of the particles of absolute truth.

It must be pointed out that Garaudy regards *scientific generalisations* merely as *hypotheses*. A scientific inference, he writes, presents itself "not as a dogma but as a working hypothesis".¹ In fact an hypothesis is an assumption which has a certain scientific grounding, but only when it is confirmed by experience, by practice, does it become a scientific proposition. The reduction of scientific conclusions to hypotheses is fully in keeping with Garaudy's desire to avoid all stable knowledge and stress the relative, fluctuating and flimsy nature of people's knowledge about the world and themselves. He frequently repeats the idea that *every* scientific conception is *always* a *temporary* construction. Naturally, our objection does not refer to dialectical change, the development and enrichment of scientific knowledge, which very often means the total replacement of obsolete scientific ideas by new ones. We object to a different point, namely, the statement that *all* truth is temporary. Does *all* scientific truth cease to be true with time? How can the law of gravitation cease to be true? Even Garaudy himself says that the doctrine of the primacy of matter and the secondary nature of consciousness cannot be turned into the opposite. It is interesting that Garaudy occasionally forgets about his categorical statements to the effect that the emergence of new knowledge does away with preceding knowledge and that the growth of knowledge "is not produced by mechanical addition, but by an organic development which at each stage calls for an overall reorganisation of concepts".² He expresses ideas of a different order two or three pages later. We are suddenly told, quite unexpectedly, that the new truth includes, assimilates the superseded truth as a particular case.

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 61.

² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

In Garaudy's works we find two conceptions which coexist eclectically in his understanding of the fate of superseded truth: the conception of "overall reorganisation" and the conception of "assimilation", "absorption" of the old truth by the new. This pluralist interpretation of the problem provides Garaudy with the necessary "flexibility" in assessing this or that doctrine of the past or present. Thus, the old materialism of Spinoza, Diderot, Holbach and Feuerbach, which comes in for all manner of criticism from Garaudy, is one of the doctrines subject to "overall reorganisation". A different fate awaits German *idealism*. "Marxism," Garaudy writes, "has inherited the great bourgeois humanism, and, in particular, the classical philosophy of the great German idealists: Kant, Fichte, Hegel. . ."¹

Nevertheless the conception of "overall reorganisation" of old truths clearly dominates over the conception of "absorbing" them by new ones. This is only to be expected. If the reverse were the case, how could Garaudy rid himself of the many truths of Marxism under the guise of fighting against "dogmatism", "Stalinism", etc.

By excessively extending the scope of extreme relativism, Garaudy gives a very strange interpretation of the dialectic of relative and absolute truth. In place of the universally accepted Marxist definition, according to which all relative truth contains within it a particle of absolute truth, i.e., of knowledge which cannot be changed or rejected as a result of the broadening and deepening of scientific information, Garaudy offers a different formula: "For a Marxist every truth is at the same time a relative truth and an absolute truth."² One might have passed over this wrong equation of relative and absolute truth, were it not for one important point. In defining the concept of absolute truth Garaudy proposes, alongside the accepted Marxist definitions, others which obviously deprive absolute truth of its absolute nature and turn it into a variant of relative truth. Here is an example of the terms in which he defines absolute truth: "It is to stand outside the real line of advance in the sciences to think that we can once and for all establish ourselves

¹ R. Garaudy, *Pour un modèle français du socialisme*, p. 85.

² R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 43.

in the concept, possess first principles, immutable and complete, and henceforth progress from concept to concept.

"There does exist a kernel of absolute truth won by science, which cannot be challenged; but of this kernel of absolute truth (that is, the sum total of the real *powers* of which we dispose, and the *resemblance* which that entails between the scientific models we have constructed and reality) we must say:

"1. That it *is never complete*.

"2. That it is present within *concepts, theories, models, which are constantly subject to revision and constantly relative.*"¹ (My italics—H.M.)

It is easy to see that, whereas in the first paragraph of the passage quoted Garaudy is busy extending the sphere of extreme relativism by criticising the idea of firm, basic principles, in the second he gives a definition of absolute truth which simply does not make sense. What sort of "kernel" of absolute truth is it that can be reduced to the "sum total of the real *powers* of which we dispose" and to the "*resemblance* which that entails between the scientific models we have constructed and reality"?

Not only is this definition nonsensical. Garaudy's basic definition of the "kernel" of absolute truth deprives it of all absolute nature and reduces it to relative truth. What sort of "kernel" of absolute truth is it that "is never complete" and whose growth calls for a constant reorganisation of concepts at each stage?

It can confidently be stated that the few correct definitions with which Garaudy intersperses his interpretation of the dialectic of absolute and relative truth cannot and should not lead anyone astray. His "criticism" of dogmatic errors, occasionally even justified attacks on the turning of relative truths into absolute, immutable truths divorced from the process of dialectical development, "change", "enrichment", —all these attempts cannot be successful because they are conducted by Garaudy from incorrect methodological positions and with intentions which do not fall within the province of science and scientific knowledge. There is no reason to turn relative truths into absolute ones, just as there is no

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

justification for attempts to turn absolute truths into relative ones. If turning relative truths into petrified dogmas destroys science, makes it into something of a religion, and deprives it of the possibility of understanding and transforming reality, is thoughtless relativism any better? What sort of science can be founded upon it, if there is nothing stable, constant and reliable in our knowledge of the world? Is it not obvious that relativism is inseparable from subjectivism in cognition? As Lenin wrote: "...To make relativism the basis of the theory of knowledge is inevitably to condemn oneself either to absolute scepticism, agnosticism and sophistry, or to subjectivism."¹

In his most recent works, too, Garaudy insists that he supports authentic dialectical materialism and wants to creatively develop and enrich Marxist philosophy and free it from dogmatic ossification. But can rejection of the principle of party commitment, can flirting with idealism and fundamental concessions to it, can mastery of relativist jargon be compatible with dialectical materialism? Such a path offers other prospects, other possibilities, namely, the gradual changeover to idealism and subjectivism which, in turn, may serve as the methodological basis for revising the economic, socio-political conceptions of Marxism-Leninism. Below we shall see that revisionism in philosophy was an introduction to revision of the fundamental ideas of Marxism-Leninism for Garaudy and those of like mind. But now let us examine the other forms of revising Marxist philosophy in Garaudy's works on the theory of knowledge.

We mentioned above that the author of *Marxism in the Twentieth Century* wrongly regards all scientific propositions as hypotheses; he goes on to raise the question of the plurality of hypotheses. It should be noted that nowhere does Garaudy give a precise definition of what he understands by an hypothesis, or formulate criteria which would make it possible to distinguish a scientific hypothesis from an unscientific one, or an anti-scientific one. We emphasise this point because Garaudy is constantly asserting that the collision of hypotheses concerning this or that phenomenon invariably ends in the victorious hypothesis, including in-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 137.

tegrating the hypotheses that have not justified themselves. In order not to inadvertently distort Garaudy's idea, we shall quote his own words on the subject. "... While dialectics," he writes, "involves the necessity of a critical assimilation, of an integration of all the partial truths found in the pluralism of hypotheses, it calls for an effort to overcome it: the truest hypothesis being ultimately that which is seen to be capable of integrating all the others."¹

The history of science knows of many cases when a confirmed scientific hypothesis, to use Garaudy's expression, "integrated" in itself all partial truths contained in refuted hypotheses. But the correctness of this or that hypothesis can surely not be measured by its ability to integrate in itself all other conflicting hypotheses. More often than not the victory of this or that hypothesis is connected with the discovery of the unscientific or anti-scientific nature of all or many of the other hypotheses. The concept of the Copernican revolution in science involved the flat rejection of all previous explanations or certain previous explanations of one and the same phenomenon. This rejection by no means involved the preservation in "sublated form" of the content of the refuted explanations. Thus, the theory of the earth's revolving round the sun in no way assimilated or preserved in "sublated form" the false idea of the sun revolving round the earth. The materialist interpretation of history dealt likewise with the idealist conception of social development.

The idea of the reconciliation of opposites is an Hegelian one, not a Marxist one. As for the "theory of assimilation", the theory of the synthesis of the victorious idea with the conquered ideas, it has nothing in common with Marxist dialectics. If this "theory of assimilation" has any meaning at all, it is to be found in the attempt to bring together materialism and idealism, science and religion, realism and anti-realism, in which Garaudy has been so busily engaged in recent years under the guise of fighting "dogmatism" and "Stalinism". It is not difficult to see that the "theory of assimilation", the "theory of synthesis" of opposing hypotheses also serves convergence ideas, ideas of the synthesis of the elements of socialism and capitalism.

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 48.

4. GARAUDY'S VIEW OF THE THEORY OF REFLECTION

Up to now we have concentrated mainly on Garaudy's deviations from Marxist dialectics to eclecticism and relativism. But it is obviously impossible to revise the Marxist philosophical method without attacking important principles of Marxist theory, and vice versa. The history of the revision of Marxist philosophy, beginning with Bernstein, fully confirms this point.

Garaudy refrains from open, direct attacks on Marxist materialism. On the contrary, he assures us that his aim is to free Marxist materialism from oversimplification, crude thinking and survivals of metaphysical and mechanistic materialism. Yet under the guise of fighting old materialism he attacks ideas without which there is not and cannot be any materialist philosophy, either old or new. Given such an approach to the matter, his attacks on old materialism are invariably aimed also against the fundamentals of Marxist materialism. We shall try to demonstrate this by quoting Garaudy's interpretation of the *theory of reflection*, which constitutes the core of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism.

True to himself, Garaudy in this question too intersperses individual Marxist propositions with erroneous ideas which are incompatible with materialist philosophy in general and dialectic materialism in particular.

He correctly reproduces the proposition on the activity of human thought, namely, that reflection is not a mirror-like reflection, not a single photographic reproduction of reality, that the establishment of truth is a complex, contradictory process, etc. He also rightly criticises old, metaphysical materialism for not understanding the dialectic of the interaction of object and subject in the process of cognition and not realising that practice is the basis and criterion of knowledge.

Garaudy's "critical fervour", however, is directed not only against eighteenth- and nineteenth-century materialism. With no less passion he lashes out at the so-called modern "philosophical sclerotics", the "collectively slumbering" Marxist philosophers of the "Stalin period". But the theo-

retical, epistemological truths which Garaudy is proclaiming in the second half of the sixties and of which he claims to be the author, have long since been the possession of all educated Marxists, particularly after the appearance of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and the *Philosophical Notebooks*. These truths can be found in all textbooks on Marxist philosophy published in the USSR and other countries.

Now to return to the problem of reflection. It cannot be said that Garaudy flatly rejects the concept of reflection, but he frequently gives it a different meaning from the Marxist one.

In noting that our thoughts reflect objective reality, Marxism stresses two closely connected and complementary ideas: firstly, the idea of the primacy of the object and the secondary nature of its image in human consciousness; and, secondly, the idea that the image, like the concept of the thing or phenomenon, reproduces this thing or phenomenon, their essence, with greater or lesser accuracy. Whereas the first part of the definition is directed against the idealist distortion of the question, the second excludes the agnostic gap between the object and the possibility of adequate knowledge of it. In fact, if we were to allow that our ideas and concepts are not capable of recreating the object accurately in thoughts, of reproducing its real form, its characteristic features, its essence in the *process* of cognition, we should also have to admit that the external world is simply an uncognisable "thing in itself", and mankind, its very existence and progress, would have to be explained as a sort of "miracle". And if mankind is not capable of forming a more or less true picture of the external world, of its properties and qualities, if in the process of its labour activity it does not discover the necessary links and relationships, the laws governing the objective world, then it cannot adapt itself to the objective world, or transform it, or even survive in it.

In his analysis of the concept of reflection Garaudy proceeds from the fact that reflection is the reproduction in human consciousness of real things and relations, but he is reluctant to admit that it is a more or less accurate, more or less profound reproduction of the object as it exists in

reality. Garaudy regards the actual recognition of the *correspondence* between the object and its reflection in human consciousness as something metaphysical and anti-dialectical.

Here is one of Garaudy's basic statements on this question. "... Knowledge," he writes, "is, *by its nature*, a '*reflection*', in the sense that it is the knowledge of a reality which is not our own work and, that it is at the same time, *by its method*, a '*construction*'."¹

Thus, knowledge, according to Garaudy, is knowledge of objective reality. As for the reflective character of knowledge Garaudy puts the actual concept of reflection into inverted commas here so that he should not be thought to belong to those who believe that "knowledge is reflection". Knowledge, as he understands it, is *construction*.

It should be noted, in particular, that in the extract quoted Garaudy refrains from the slightest reference to the questions of the *correspondence*, the *adequacy* of the reflection of the object to the object itself. He insists that to put the question in this way is to return us to the theory of knowledge of metaphysical materialism. He does not even wish to consider the fact that without the correspondence and adequacy of the reflection of the object to the object itself there is also no concept of truth. For in the last analysis the question of truth and illusion is the question of the adequacy or inadequacy of the reflection of the object to the object itself, which is confirmed or rejected by social practice.

Marxist philosophy, which states the resemblance between the object and its reflection in human consciousness, regards the *attaining* of this resemblance as a process. The formation of an image resembling an object is not a single act.² The ability to recreate the image of a thing corresponding to the thing itself is the result of many centuries of human practice. This ability, as science has proved, was formed

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 45.

² On problems of the theory of reflection see: *The Leninist Theory of Reflection Today*, Sofia, 1969 (in Bulgarian); M. N. Rutkevich, *Major Problems of the Leninist Theory of Reflection*, Sverdlovsk, 1970; A. M. Korshunov, *The Theory of Reflection and Modern Science*, Moscow, 1968 (both in Russian).

during the process of man's many centuries of struggle for his existence, in the process of his working activity.

In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Lenin sharply criticised the rejection of the resemblance and correspondence of conceptual images of things to the things themselves. Like Engels he determinedly rebuffed the attempt to depict our ideas and sensations in the form of conventional symbols. Lenin's position is extremely clear. He supported the theory that human sensations and ideas are not conventional signs, symbols or hieroglyphs, but copies, photographs of the real things and processes of the real world. Lenin wrote: "If sensations are not images of things, but only signs or symbols which have 'no resemblance' to them, then Helmholtz's initial materialist premise is undermined; the existence of external objects becomes subject to doubt, for signs or symbols may quite possibly indicate imaginary objects, and everybody is familiar with instances of *such* signs or symbols."¹ In this connection Garaudy openly engages in polemics with Lenin. In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* he perceives traces of the mechanistic interpretation of reflection, which was expressed in Lenin's acceptance of the idea of resemblance between the object and its conceptual image. According to Garaudy, Lenin only overcame the influence of the theory of reflection of old materialism in the *Philosophical Notebooks* on the basis of a profound study of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus writes Garaudy in his book *Lénine* (1968), in which he makes a very biased and tendentious study of the evolution of Lenin's philosophical and socio-political views. Later we shall show that this book seeks to persuade the reader that in the period of the 1905 revolution and for many years after its defeat Lenin adhered to the viewpoint not of Marx, but of Kautsky, accepting the latter's metaphysical, vulgar-evolutionist conception of social development.

Let us now return to the question of the "traces" of the mechanistic interpretation of the theory of reflection in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. Garaudy criticises Lenin's view that our concepts are copies of objective things. He regards this conception as being obsolete, as an

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 234.

empirical conception. He actually writes: in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Lenin seems to tend towards empiricism in defining sensation as the image of things.¹

These false, unfounded criticisms of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* arise in the case of Garaudy and of other revisionist critics of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism from extreme oversimplification of the Marxist theory of reflection and, in our view, even pre-Marxist materialism.

It should be mentioned that for some time now Garaudy has adopted a very disrespectful attitude towards the legacy of Diderot, Holbach and other exponents of eighteenth-century French materialism. These outstanding thinkers, who rebelled against centuries-old religious and idealist dogma and prepared men's minds for the French Revolution of 1789, appear in Garaudy's writings mainly as dogmatists, metaphysicists and mechanists who symbolise philosophical backwardness and primitivism. It is difficult and most disgusting to observe how Garaudy tries to pick holes in Diderot and the other great thinkers who are the pride not only of France but of the whole of mankind. Naturally the class, historical and theoretical limitations of eighteenth-century French materialism are indisputable. This question has been dealt with long ago. But can one, as Garaudy does, completely ignore the assessments of Marx, Engels and Lenin of the brilliant conjectures made by Diderot, the author of *Le neveu de Rameau*, his inspired hypothesis that sensation is the universal property of matter, his splendidly profound aesthetic ideas, his views on the development of the organic world which anticipated some of Darwin's ideas? Garaudy tries to prove that eighteenth-century French materialism and atheism have completely lost their relevance today. But in that case what about the behests of Engels and Lenin that the works of the eighteenth-century French atheists should be used in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? Garaudy says nothing about Engels in this connection, and as for Lenin's instruction, he interprets it most freely as if Lenin regarded the works of the French materialists and atheists as suitable only for the struggle "with the par-

¹ R. Garaudy, *Lénine*, Paris, 1968.

ticularly backward forms of religion in old Russia" (R. Garaudy, *Pour un modèle français du socialisme*, p. 344). In fact Lenin, to say nothing of Engels, never suggested that French atheism should be used only in the struggle "with the particularly backward forms of religion in old Russia". It is easy to see that Garaudy is deliberately distorting Engels' and Lenin's ideas on this point.

With regard to the question of the "activity" of thought, Garaudy blatantly exaggerates Marx's just criticism of the theory of knowledge in old materialism. Of course, old materialism could not produce a dialectical solution to the problem of the interaction of object and subject, or reveal and theoretically substantiate the activity of human thought, or correctly pose and solve the problem of practice, etc. But one should not conclude from the metaphysically limited theory of knowledge in old materialism that the French materialists did not understand the active role of ideas in social life. If that were so, why did they so strongly refute certain ideas and equally strongly uphold others? How can one possibly deny that they advanced and defended the views to which the future belonged? All this shows that many questions connected with the problem of the activity of the subject, the activity of its thought, while remaining outside the limits of the French materialists' views on the theory of knowledge, were, nevertheless, posed and solved arbitrarily, in everyday practical activity. Otherwise how could French materialism have become the philosophical introduction to one of the greatest revolutions in the history of mankind? It is quite inadmissible to caricature the shortcomings of old materialism in the way that Garaudy does.

According to Garaudy's oversimplified scheme of the theory of reflection there is the material world, on the one hand, and the human mirror of consciousness, on the other. It is clear that this mirror of consciousness is capable of passively reflecting only that which faces its surface.

And since the mirror reflects only the external appearance of things, it can reflect only phenomena which are incapable of ever penetrating the sphere of essential relations, inner contradictions, the law of the existence and development of things. This process of reflection reproduces only the existence of things, without any claim to see them

in their development, without any possibility, even proceeding from real existence, of advancing new projects, new mental constructions capable of actively penetrating the essence of things and scientifically forecasting the future. Naturally, the photographic reproduction of individual scenes of present existence, divorced from the process of movement, cannot and does not claim to reproduce reality dynamically. But is there any such claim in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*? Is there a common element between Lenin's actual views and their crude vulgarisation by Garaudy? Does Lenin favour the dead, mirror-like, meta-physical reflection of existing reality by consciousness? Of course not. On the contrary, he objects to an oversimplified interpretation of the image, the copy of the object, and to such a superficial interpretation of the resemblance between the mental image of the object and the object itself.

In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, as we have already noted, Lenin consistently criticises the idealist and agnostic interpretation of the relation between object and subject, rejecting Kantian *a priori*ism, the theory of hieroglyphs, and all doctrines and conceptions which reduce the material world to the sum total of the subject's sensations or attempt to erect an impenetrable wall between the objective world and the world of ideas reflecting this world. But at the same time Lenin also rejects the naively realist ideas about the relation between the object and its reflection in human consciousness. The famous Leninist formula according to which sensation is the *subjective* image of the *objective* world emphasises not only the objective bases of sensation, but also the idea that sensation cannot *totally* coincide with the object, being its *subjective* image.

In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Lenin, while defending the objective nature of so-called secondary qualities, did not ignore the subjective aspect of the question. Outside of and independently of human consciousness and sensations there exist light waves of various length and frequency which, by acting on the retina of the normal human eye, evoke various colour sensations. This means that in objective reality there is not and cannot be "redness", "yellowness" and so on. Without the retina colour *sensations* do not arise, which by no means repudiates the

objectivity of colours, if by this one understands the light waves of a certain length and frequency.¹

Lenin takes into full account the peculiarity of the reflection, the peculiarity of the *resemblance* between the object and its reflection at the various stages of cognition: the stages of sensation, idea, concept, judgment, inference and scientific theory.

Garaudy refuses even to consider how, in what sense, Lenin could use the words "photographing", "the making of a copy by the consciousness", having in mind the higher forms of cognition. How can one photograph the essence of processes, laws? Is it not clear that in the given case the words "photographing" and "the making of a copy by the consciousness" have a figurative meaning? That they stress the accuracy and precision of concepts, their correspondence to the objective prototype?

Garaudy tries to present the matter in such a way as to suggest that in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Lenin had not yet fully discarded the theory of reflection of metaphysical materialism, that he was unable to apply the dialectic consistently to the theory of knowledge. But one can only make such assertions if one has not examined Lenin's brilliant analysis of the dialectic of relative, absolute and objective truth. The theory of truth, upheld and developed by Lenin, is the concrete examination of the activity of thought, the active comprehension of truth by man. The comprehension of truth is described by Lenin as a complex, contradictory process, as the construction and testing by experience of hypotheses, the mental search for new approaches to the object with the aim of comprehending it, revealing its properties and qualities, its essence, the whole hierarchy of essences, from the less profound to the more fundamental. Lenin depicts the comprehension of truth as the transition from one relative truth to another which contains a greater portion of absolute truth. This process is endless, as endless and inexhaustible as the objective world itself.

In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Lenin, in attacking predominantly the Machist variety of subjective idealism, pays *much* attention to defending the materialist bases of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 55.

the theory of reflection. On the other hand, in the *Philosophical Notebooks* he gives an even more profound dialectico-materialist explanation of the process of cognition. But from this one cannot conclude that which Garaudy so irresponsibly states about Lenin's basic philosophical work.

Reading Garaudy one has the feeling that he really is attacking the metaphysical interpretation of the theory of reflection. But this is not the case. By his many definitions and assessments Garaudy casts doubt on the theory of reflection, regarding it as a past form of the theory of knowledge. What is more, he attempts to ascribe his own inventions, or rather what he has borrowed from idealist sources, to Marx. He tackles this difficult and ignoble task using means which are incompatible with science. Ignoring Marx's firm, unambiguous statements on the nature and essence of human consciousness, he endeavours to prove that the founders of dialectical materialism regarded consciousness not as the reflection of that which really exists, but simply as the anticipation of that which does not yet exist in reality. Let us quote Garaudy himself, for the sake of accuracy. "In Marx consciousness is not the reflection of something given," he writes, "but the anticipation of something possible."¹ The absurdity of his attitude to Marx and Lenin is quite obvious. How, one asks, can the consciousness anticipate the possible, if it does not proceed from the real, does not reproduce and study that which really exists, its inner contradictions, its essence and law of development? How could Marx substantiate the real possibility of socialism without analysing with the greatest care and depth capitalist reality, its antagonisms, its real movement? Marx's words that "consciousness [*das Bewusstsein*] can never be anything else than conscious existence [*das Bewusste Sein*], and the existence of men is their actual life-process"² have become famous.

The founders of Marxism pointed out that the fact that human consciousness appears to be independent of material existence could lead to the false conclusion that "consciousness *can* really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice".³

¹ R. Garaudy, *Pour un modèle français du socialisme*, p. 96.

² K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, Moscow, 1968, p. 37.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

Obviously foreseeing well-founded objections to his incorrect statement that consciousness is not the reflection of something which really exists, but the anticipation of something which exists only as a possibility, Garaudy is forced to modify his wording: "Consciousness which reflected only that which was directly given," he writes, "could not take us any further than that given object. Consciousness can play an active role in formation only when—as Marx showed in relation to work—it is the anticipation of a possibility, the knowledge of inner movement."¹

It might seem that these and certain other statements by Garaudy repudiate or neutralise his erroneous thesis that consciousness is not the reflection of that which exists, but merely the anticipation of that which does not yet exist in reality. In fact, however, these more cautious statements by Garaudy do not constitute a rejection of his attempts to present consciousness as a factor which has to do, if not exclusively then predominantly, with the possible, with the future. The fact is that Garaudy places his own most peculiar interpretation on Marx's famous thought that before creating this or that thing in his working activity man first creates its ideal image. Garaudy tries to interpret this indisputable truth in such a way as to suggest that consciousness is orientated predominantly towards that which does not exist, that which is possible. From this he concludes quite wrongly that the essence of consciousness lies not in the reflection of the real, but in striving to cognise the possible. It is obvious that Garaudy is proceeding from the absolute distinction between the real and the possible, ignoring the fact that the possible is determined by the real, and accordingly belittling the reflection of that which exists. According to him, when it is divorced from real existence, consciousness loses the possibility not only of revealing the essence of that which is directly given, but also of being the instrument of the cognition and creation of the future. This indeterminate existence of consciousness acquires unlimited freedom to predict and "substantiate" all things conceivable and inconceivable, to become a source of socio-political myth-making.

¹ R. Garaudy, *Pour un modèle français du socialisme*, p. 97.

There is no doubt whatsoever that the super-activity of thought upheld by Garaudy does not fit in with the materialist interpretation of thought. Let him not comfort himself with the idea that his interpretation of activity of thought does not fit into the framework of mechanistic, metaphysical materialism alone. The *a priori* nature of conceptual models and constructions, their primacy in relation to the object, the belittling and ousting of the principle of reflection do not fit in with any kind of materialism, particularly dialectical materialism.

In all cases thought proceeds from reality, reproduces objective reality and only from this starting point can it anticipate existence, not only reflect, but also create the world, refashion and enrich it, create a countless number of things, objects and phenomena not given to man in finished form by nature and the spontaneous course of social development.

In order to break "once and for all" with the "metaphysical" interpretation of the problem, Garaudy adds to the principle of reflection the principles of "construction" and "project", ignoring the fact that the Leninist interpretation of reflection, as we have seen, has no need of this whatsoever, since dialectically interpreted reflection presupposes a creative, active attitude to the object.

We have already noted that Garaudy does not reject *reflection*, but simply demotes it, as it were, by comparison with the *project*, because for him reflection symbolises the static state of knowledge, whereas the project embodies the principle of change, the principle of gaining new knowledge, the principle of discreteness in cognition.

Garaudy goes into speculative discussions which cannot help criticising materialism, the scientific interpretation of the sensory and rational in cognition, the dialectic of empirical and theoretical thought. The author of *Marxism in the Twentieth Century* maintains that accumulated authentic knowledge cannot be the starting point for cognition. We have already touched on this problem above. Let us confine ourselves here to certain additional aspects of it.

"Reflection," writes Garaudy, "—that is a reproduction or representation, more or less correct, of what actually happens in nature—is not a starting point (as the English

empiricists or the eighteenth-century French materialists believed), but the fruit of a lengthy work of constructing successive 'projects', 'models', hypotheses, by which we actively challenge things, accepting the denials they force upon us and then changing the initial hypothesis and completely reorganising our whole body of knowledge (as Newton did in rejecting Ptolemy's concepts, or Einstein in abandoning the physical system of Newton or even the geometry of Euclid)."¹

It is true that the search for new or more profound truth involves the rejection of old concepts and ideas which conflict with practice. It is also true that the search for new truth involves the active, creative activity of the intellect, the construction of new models, the advancing of different hypotheses, and so on. But it is utterly wrong to belittle the role of reflection and reject the part played by accumulated knowledge in the process of cognition.

The history of both the natural and the social sciences is proof of the indissoluble successive links between new discoveries, generalisations and former knowledge and the relative truths contained within it. New knowledge has never arisen out of the blue, without the support of previously accumulated knowledge, as the result of some sort of mystical intuition. Neither the method of the "negative dialectic" borrowed by Garaudy from Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt school, nor the category of the "project" taken from Sartre, are capable of severing the link between present and future, between old and new. Dialectically interpreted determinism retains its full validity here too. Every new step forward in science has been based either directly or indirectly on the earlier accumulated knowledge. The great discoveries were made by *departing from* existing knowledge. The very words *depart from* express in this particular case the dialectical negation which always retains the rational core in the old knowledge, if this core exists.

As an essayist Garaudy can, of course, allow himself to say anything he thinks amusing or engaging, but Newton and Einstein as scientists could not, in creating their great theories which disproved obsolete concepts, reject the whole

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 53-54.

sum of relative truths, if the latter contained a particle of absolute truth. They could perform their great feats in science only by basing themselves firmly on the preceding achievements of scientific thought. And however much Garaudy may belittle reflection which, according to his definition, is the "reproduction or representation, more or less correct, of what actually happens in nature", scientists know the value of these representations and regard them as starting points for attaining new truths.

From the statement by Garaudy quoted above we learnt what *was not* the starting point of cognition but were not told sufficiently clearly what this starting point actually was.

Returning frequently to this question Garaudy draws the following general conclusion: "The starting point of thought is never the bare noting of a prime datum. From the very beginning it is an act, the production of a 'model' or overall hypothesis, and thereby it includes some elements of myth.

"It is by this extraction from the datum, by this detachment from the immediate, that the movement of cognition begins, by way of myth."¹

Now things seem to be a little clearer. The starting point of cognition is not the "more or less correct representation" of the world, not the statement of prime data, but the act of creating a model; the movement of cognition begins, by way of myth, by detachment from the immediate.

But where do these models and global hypotheses come from, if they are independent of the reflection of real existence by consciousness? Are they not the result of a kind of instant illumination, the result of direct contemplation which cannot be reduced to sensory experience and discursive, logical thought?

Garaudy does not provide clear answers to these questions, but nevertheless there can be no doubt that the author of *Marxism in the Twentieth Century* is offering us epistemological views full of relativist and subjectivist judgments, instead of scientific, dialectico-materialist epistemology.

Proceeding from the correct idea about the contradictory nature of the development of human knowledge, Garaudy

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 54.

gives a very strange description of the development of knowledge which excludes the principle of determinism, to say nothing of simple consistency in the gradual ascent from ignorance to knowledge, from less profound knowledge to knowledge that gives a more profound, adequate reproduction of the truth. The progression of human knowledge as it is depicted by Garaudy is somewhat reminiscent of Cuvier's theory of catastrophes. According to Garaudy, knowledge does not develop by means of accumulation and spasmodic transition to new conceptions. He acknowledges only the spasmodic transition, not the accumulation of knowledge, nor the dialectical unity of the discrete and indiscrete. "Reason," writes Garaudy, "has a history. This history is not the history of successive answers given to one and the same question, but the history of complete recastings of the very formulation of the question".¹ This desire to exclude succession as totally as possible from the development, posing and solving of new problems is probably regarded by Garaudy as super-dialectics. In fact there is no dialectic here whatsoever. It has been replaced by subjectivist arbitrariness in depicting the history of cognition. And when Garaudy writes in the same book, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, that "the new hypothesis is the heir of the hypothesis it replaces and has destroyed",² this does not answer our criticism, because Garaudy, although he readily stresses the replacement and destruction of the old conception, nowhere speaks of its *dialectical sublation*.

It may very well be that by turning the creation of models or projects into an absolute and ignoring accumulated knowledge, Garaudy imagines he is attacking metaphysics and dogmatism. In fact, however, his open disregard for the theory of reflection is inevitably accompanied by departure from materialism. Yet again, by regurgitating other people's ideas, he strives to prove that knowledge derives not from the reflection by consciousness of "prime data" or, to put it more clearly, of reality, but from mythological thought. At a certain stage, he writes, scientific thought broke with mythological thought, but at the beginning it was mythological and ritual. There is a functional con-

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

tinuity between myth and science, he maintains, myth being past science.

Naturally no one would dream of denying the educational content of myths. In their own way, to a certain extent, they generalise and explain natural and social phenomena at the dawn of human civilisation; the aesthetic value of many myths is also indisputable. All this does not and should not give rise to any doubt, but neither should the fact that mythological and scientific consciousness are phenomena of a different order. At the point where realistic thought begins—albeit most primitive—mythological thought gradually recedes. "All mythology overcomes, subdues and forms the forces of nature in the imagination and with the help of the imagination; consequently it disappears with the arrival of true dominion over these forces of nature."¹

As we have seen, Garaudy seeks to prove the functional continuity between mythology and science, forgetting or refusing to stress the distinction between the scientific and the mythological reflection of reality. He even attempts to allow the mythological element a place in modern scientific cognition. It may seem that when Garaudy talks of the element of myth he is referring to the element of imagination, dream, in the process of cognition. But he does not clarify his ideas on this point. This lack of clarity becomes even more significant and expressive, if one takes into account his attempts to find points of basic contact between materialism and idealism, between Marxism and Christianity. Thus, we are justified in stating that Garaudy belittles the realistic reflection of reality with the aim of giving preference to one of the forms of the fantastic reflection of the world.

To complete our description of the concessions which Garaudy makes to idealistic philosophy, we must trace further his subjectivisation of the process of thought and his transformation of concepts, hypotheses and conceptual constructions into *a priori* elements.

As we know the Kantian subject of cognition was attributed the ability to possess *a priori* forms of sensory

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works* (in Russian), Vol. 12, p. 737.

contemplation, *a priori* concepts of reason, etc., with the help of which it introduces order into the world of phenomena and embraces them with categories and laws which are outside experience. Garaudy does not go as far as these idealist propositions, but the desire to oust the theory of reflection leads him to subjectivist arguments akin to Kantian ideas.

In this connection let us consider Garaudy's interpretation of the scientific laws of nature. "Scientific laws," he writes, "are not a copy of anything: they are constructions of our mind, always approximate and provisional, which allow us to take hold of a reality which we have not created, and of which only practice, methodical experiment can guarantee us that our models correspond in some degree to its structure, that from a certain point of view they are at least 'isomorphic'."¹

This extract contains a mixture of correct and incorrect ideas. While stressing the objective nature of reality and allowing "from a certain point of view" and "at least" the isomorphic nature of our models and the structure of reality, Garaudy is nevertheless attracted by another idea. We again find the attempt at an *a priori* construction of the laws of knowledge, which then have to stand the test of practice. Garaudy—and on this point his behaviour is most consistent—persistently ignores the questions of how these conceptual constructions are built and whether they are the fruit of the mind or objective reality. Choosing objective reality would lead Garaudy to the "traditional" materialist theory of reflection, which gives a clear and precise explanation of the source of our thoughts and the nature of their correspondence to their material prototypes. But if he favours the mind, he will not be able to avoid being accused of subjectivism and Kantian *a priorism*. He has fully deserved this accusation.

Casting doubt on the empirical sources of the origin of ideas and belittling the role and significance of the reflective ability of human consciousness, Garaudy advocates with a few reservations the very same Kantian ideas about embracing reality with concepts, models, and hypotheses, etc., taken from goodness knows where. "In knowledge," he writes, "we

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 62.

confront reality with our hypotheses."¹ Using the same Kantian language he formulates the task as follows: "To grasp the real and give it meaning."²

In drawing these risky parallels with Kantian philosophy Garaudy declares the desire to penetrate into the essence of things to be dogmatic. He urges us to be loyal to the critical traditions in philosophy and refrain from such attempts. Let us quote these remarkable statements by a man who regards himself as a Marxist: "Marxism," writes Garaudy, "is not a pre-critical, dogmatic philosophy. In philosophy, dogmatism is, historically, the opposite of *critique* in the sense which Kant first gave to the word, even though he did so in a context outside that of history. To simplify, we may say that the critical point of view in philosophy is the awareness of the fact that whatever we say about reality it is we who say it. Dogmatism, on the contrary, is the illusion or the claim of being entrenched in things and of pronouncing the absolute and definitive truth about them."³

The first thing that strikes one is Garaudy's attempt to bring together Marxist philosophy and Kantian philosophy as two similar critical philosophical doctrines. He cannot be unaware of the fact that Kantian criticism and the criticism of Marxist philosophy are two quite different things. Let us recall that in using the term "criticism" Kant was attempting to reduce philosophy to the criticism of man's cognitive ability and prove that human intellect was not capable of knowing "things in themselves". Kant's criticism essentially intertwined and merged with agnosticism. There is no need to argue the point that the critical nature of Marxist philosophy is revealed most fully in the principle of dialectical negation and has nothing whatsoever in common with the aims of the Kantian criticism.

In the same way the concept of subjectivity has a completely different meaning in Marxist philosophy than it has in idealist doctrines, particularly in Kantian philosophy. Whereas in Marxism subjectivity means the activity of the

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 98.

² *Ibid.*, p. 68.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

subject in its interrelation with the object, in its absolute acknowledgement of the primacy of the object, its independence of the cognising subject, this is by no means the case in idealism. Subjectivity, the activity of the subject, is hypertrophied here, and the object becomes the creation of the subject, disappearing as an independent primary element.

Garaudy is obsessed by the desire to break down the insurmountable barriers between the Marxist and Kantian interpretations of subjectivity.

His statement that our knowledge of reality is subjective might simply be regarded as a confused and ambiguous one. But knowing how passionately he is mastering Fichtean and Kantian philosophy today in order to "save" Marxism, how he is blurring out the distinctions between subjectivity and subjectivism, and treating hypotheses, models and other conceptual constructions as *a priori* elements, in order to "embrace", to "know" reality, we are fully justified in interpreting his statement just as he has written it: our cognition is subjective, i.e., it is not the reflection of objective reality.

One must also say a word about his strange definition of dogmatism in which one finds two quite different concepts given equal weight: a) stating the possibility of penetrating the essence of things and b) pronouncing the absolute and definitive truth about them. The second definition really does refer to dogmatism. But it is impossible to see why admitting the possibility of cognising the essence of phenomena should be dogmatism, unless one remembers Garaudy's obsession with Kant. From the point of view of Kantian criticism to admit the possibility of knowing the world of "things in themselves" is dogmatism of the worst kind. But this is the Kantian, not the Marxist point of view. The fact is that for some time Garaudy has not always been able to distinguish between materialism and idealism.

Revising the Marxist doctrine about the adequacy of the reflection of reality in human consciousness, gleefully drawing a distinction between "reflection" and "project" and nullifying the principle of reflection, Garaudy naturally tries to ignore the proposition about objective truth. He avoids stressing clearly and unambiguously that the *content* of this or that truth is objective, that it does not depend on the cognising subject.

There can be no doubt that truth as a cognitive "image" is subjective in form, but objective in content. Truths which have been proved in practice reflect, generalise and give an adequate reproduction of definite connections and necessary relations which exist independently of human consciousness. Only recognition and clear emphasis of these statements enables one to say that there is no truth without the subject, in the sense that the reflected *image* is inconceivable without consciousness.

All Garaudy's dubious and incorrect arguments about relative and absolute truth are divorced from the problem of *objective* truth. His endless, boring repetition of the principle of the subjective nature of cognition, the active nature of human thought, and his portrayal of truth as the fruit of conceptual constructions, models, projects, etc., are accompanied by glossing over the other side of the question—the question of the objective nature of the content of truth, the fact that all models and hypotheses are means of attaining objective truth.

In order to complete our critical analysis of certain epistemological problems in Garaudy's writings, we must consider once again the content of *Garaudy's new interpretation of reality* which takes up a good deal of space in his book *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*.

As we know, Garaudy has publicly and solemnly renounced his writings of the early fifties on epistemological questions, particularly his doctoral thesis in which the problem of the theory of reflection occupied a large place. Of course, these works by Garaudy, like the works of other Marxist writers, contained a somewhat crude treatment of the problem, an insufficiently full and comprehensive regard for the active nature of thought, a somewhat oversimplified interpretation of the question of the resemblance between the object and its conceptual reflection, etc. Nevertheless they were basically Marxist works, which cannot be said of Garaudy's present writings.

Garaudy renounced his writings of the early fifties in order, as he puts it, to "return" to Marx and to the *Philosophical Notebooks* of Lenin. Frankly this is a very strange return, for it is made on the crutches of Fichtean and Kantian subjectivism and *a priorism*.

Garaudy proclaims a new interpretation of reality. Below we shall show that the excessively "dialectical" dialectics in this new interpretation hang on a thin and flimsy materialist thread that is constantly snapping.

The "new reality" about which Garaudy writes so much is characterised by the fact that it is to a large extent the product of man himself, of his creative labour, his creative intellect.

There is undoubtedly truth in this statement, truth which has been expressed and substantiated in many Marxist works.

The modern age is characterised by a tremendous growth in the part played by spiritual elements in social development. There is a growth and strengthening in the role of consciousness, will and organisation in the struggle to consolidate the new socio-economic formation. Today, when the objective conditions are ripe for the universal collapse of the capitalist system, revolutionary consciousness and initiative are becoming a decisive factor in the progression of mankind towards new forms of human society.

A study of the problem of the object and subject in history must take into account the philosophical importance of the fact that science is turning into a direct productive force, one of the essential factors of the material basis of society. Man, the decisive element of the material productive forces, is today taking part in the production process, having at his disposal the splendid achievements of the twentieth-century scientific and technological revolution. This fact demonstrates most clearly the close intertwining of object and subject, the enhanced role of the latter in the formation of the historical process. What we call the objective and prime element in social life is becoming increasingly comprised of materialised spiritual phenomena, the results of mental labour. This objective element retains its primacy in all conditions, but it must be noted how considerably its structure is changing, how its power is growing thanks to the direct or indirect influence of the spiritual, scientific, and cultural acquisitions of the modern age.¹

¹ See *Topical Problems of Historical Materialism*, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).

If Garaudy's arguments remained within these confines, there would be no cause to cast doubt upon the true essence of his concept of "new reality". But the fact is that many of his definitions do not fall within the bounds of dialectico-materialist philosophy. The turning of the active nature of thought into an absolute principle, in which Garaudy indulges, is liable to present thought more in the Kantian and Fichtean sense than in the Marxist interpretation.

Thus in his discussions on reason and "things in themselves" Garaudy has recourse to some extremely risky definitions. He writes that dialectical reason "conceives the thing in itself as the horizon of my aims and constructions".¹ How very strange: the "thing in itself", which Kantian philosophy presents as existing outside us and acting on our sense organs (although it is essentially incognisable), is changed from objective reality into merely the horizon of human aspirations and conceptual constructions. Let us recall that here Garaudy is simply repeating the Neo-Kantians who, in their desire to liberate their teacher's philosophy from all materialist admixtures, announced that the "thing in itself" was nothing more than the *limit* of human knowledge.

These and similar arguments about thought and being are bound to make a Marxist extremely critical of the interpretation of "new reality" so persistently argued by Garaudy.

Garaudy's works also contain other forms and aspects of this attempt to bring Marxist philosophy closer to Kantian and Fichtean idealist propositions. Thus, he argues that what Marxism and the philosophical doctrines of Kant and Fichte have in common is that they are all philosophies of act and not of being. "It is only with Kant and Fichte," he states, "that a philosophy of *act* challenges the philosophy of *being*."² Attaching undue importance to the fact that Kant and Fichte rejected the philosophy of being for the philosophy of act, Garaudy also ignores the nature of this "philosophy of act", its extremely timid political essence, its total rejection of revolutionary action in practice. As we know, it was the sort of "philosophy of act" which, in

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 63.

² *Ibid.*, p. 66.

expressing the mood of the weak and cowardly German bourgeoisie, preferred to limit the idealistically distorted active principle by the sphere of speculative thought.

We have not the slightest desire to belittle the dialectical thought of Kant and Fichte, but it is impossible to agree with Garaudy when he makes the futile attempt to bring Marxist philosophy closer to German idealism, ignoring the fact that Marxist philosophy arose out of the dialectical negation of nineteenth-century classical German philosophy. Garaudy persistently tries to drag us back to questions which have long been answered, obviously thinking that in so doing he is taking a step forward towards the philosophical interpretation of the modern day.

On the question of the "philosophy of act" as well Garaudy writes without any substantial, serious reservations that Marxism absorbed the active essence of German idealism, its critical, anti-dogmatic essence. "A Marxism which never forgets Kant or Fichte, a Marxism, that is, which never forgets Marx or Lenin, is a critical and non-dogmatic philosophy in this sense, first of all, that it makes *practice* the source and the criterion of every truth and every value."¹

As can be seen from this strangely constructed sentence, Marxism which wishes to remain Marxism must first remember Kant and Fichte and then *also* Marx and Lenin.

In discussing Marxist philosophy which has made practice the basis and criterion of truth, Garaudy gaily links the names of Kant and Fichte with those of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

It is interesting to note that in extolling German idealism as the main source of Marxist philosophy, Garaudy sings the praises mainly of Kant and Fichte, without saying a word about Hegel in *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*. At first glance this may seem strange, if one remembers that it was neither Kant nor Fichte but Hegel and his dialectics that played the main role in the formation of Marxist philosophy. The fact is that Garaudy is interested not in the dialectics of German idealism taken as a whole, but in the subjectivism and voluntarism of Kant and Fichte, in order to "substantiate" the principle of subjectiv-

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 83-84.

ity, to "dynamise" Marxism. One gets the impression that Garaudy attaches more importance to the fatalistic, finalistic ideas in Hegel's system than to the dialectics of this great German philosopher. Garaudy is constantly reiterating the idea that "we must not reduce the legacy of classical German philosophy in Marxism to Hegel..." "With Hegel," he continues, "there is already a return to dogmatism, which makes subjectivity a moment of objective morality, but one that is so completely and definitively left behind that the individual subject has no existence or value except as a function of the rational and social totality."¹ Garaudy is obsessed with the idea that if Marxism had paid more attention to Kant and Fichte at its inception, the revolutionary-critical, active, subjective aspect in Marxist philosophy would have been better emphasised right from the start. Thus, albeit one hundred and fifty years later, Garaudy has set about correcting the error and "enriching" Marxism with the subjectivist and voluntarist ideas of Kant and Fichte.²

It emerges that Kant and Fichte, by rejecting the "philosophy of being" and upholding the "philosophy of act", have a similar standpoint to that of Marxism in certain important respects, because Marxism also "is not a philosophy of being", but only "a philosophy of act".³

Now a few words about "being" and "act" which Garaudy uses disregarding the fact that Marxism interprets being as the existence of the objective world. Such an interpretation does not permit a distinction to be drawn between being and act. There can be no scientific philosophy that is not at one and the same time a philosophy of being and a philosophy of act that transforms being. Only idealism rejects the scientific interpretation of being and uses the only concept of "act" usually to mean abstract mental activity and nothing more.

In order to justify his disdainful attitude towards being and the "philosophy of being", Garaudy goes into long discussions to the effect that the age of the Parmenidean inter-

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 79.

² *Ibid.*, p. 83.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

pretation of being, its metaphysical interpretation by old materialism, has long since passed. Being as a passive state, he writes, is being ousted by act, the concept of structure, interaction, etc. These arguments are very strange indeed. One might almost think that a change in man's ideas about being, that the deepening and enrichment of these ideas, could cast doubt on the reality of being and its importance. Garaudy is repeating the error of those who have confused the philosophical interpretation of matter with that provided by the natural sciences and, as a result of the collapse of old ideas about matter, have concluded that "matter has disappeared". The disappearance of historically limited metaphysical ideas about being cannot possibly provide grounds for rejecting the "philosophy of being" and seeking salvation in the "philosophy of act".

Marxist philosophy can never oppose the concept of being to that of the act. All that is material, all that exists, is in action, in change, in transformation. The active principle is the form of existence of being. The arbitrary interpretation of the concept of being cannot produce anything but idealist muddle.

In *Marxism in the Twentieth Century* Garaudy sets out to develop a critical philosophy which is not idealist and a Marxist "theory of subjectivity, which is not subjective".¹ However, as we shall see, he does not succeed in doing so. His "criticism" has clearly capitulated to Kantian *a priori*-ism and led to fundamental concessions to agnosticism. His disparaging attitude to the theory of reflection was bound to turn against materialism and open the door to idealist philosophy.

In exactly the same way Garaudy's overemphasis of the so-called "theory of subjectivity" and almost total disregard of objective processes, objective laws, leads him directly to subjectivism, regardless of all his assurances and promises.

Nor does he limit himself to attacking and grossly distorting Marxist materialism, but, as we have seen, gives a very free interpretation of the dialectic. He wants movement without relative rest, relative truth without firmly established truth, the discrete without the indiscrete, action without

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 80.

being. As for dialectical negation, Garaudy takes a most ambiguous and contradictory view of it. Thus, for example, his dialectical negation retains in "sublated form" all vanquished ideas, turning them into a particular case of the triumphant idea or conception. But without the necessary reservations and elucidation this dialectic is capable of justifying the existence (in "sublated form") even of false, reactionary ideas and turning them into particular cases of scientific theories and conceptions. In fact, dialectical *sublation* does not exclude the full negation and rejection of false, inconsistent ideas.

We have had occasion to see that alongside this "conservative dialectic" Garaudy has yet another which belittles accumulated knowledge and the importance of being, and places its stake on that which does not yet exist in reality. According to this "dialectic", it is not the present but the future which is of value. This quasi-dialectic precludes a differentiated attitude to existing reality, very often for the sake of fashionable conformism.

5. THE MATERIALIST INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY AND THE THEORY OF "HISTORICAL INITIATIVE"

Garaudy's crude distortion of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism, his substitution of subjectivist and idealist judgments and definitions in place of materialist propositions, and his reducing of the dialectic to relativism and eclecticism provide the general philosophical "basis" for his revision of a number of fundamental propositions in the materialist interpretation of history and the theory of scientific socialism.

He does not even try to conceal his sceptical attitude towards historical materialism, equating it with the watered-down, schematised judgments of the materialist interpretation of history which one finds in certain brochures and articles. After his "recovery" from "dogmatism", Garaudy carefully avoids the basic laws and categories of historical materialism. One might suppose that they were in fact nothing more than the fabrications of "institutionalised Marxism".

As a "super-dialectician" Garaudy rejects all stable laws and categories in the sphere of the interpretation of social phenomena as well. He seeks to reduce the materialist theory of social development entirely to the method or, rather, the sum total of subjectively interpreted dialectical principles.

In Garaudy's recent writings, even those which examine such important socio-political problems as the conditions and social consequences of the scientific and technological revolution in the twentieth century, the main contradictions and class antagonisms of modern imperialism, the relation of capitalist and socialist forces in the world arena, the laws of the transition from capitalism to socialism, etc., it is difficult to trace any consistent application of dialectico-materialist, Marxist class analysis of the subjects under review. Reading these works one might wrongly conclude that the dialectico-materialist solution of the problem of social being and social consciousness, the basis and the superstructure, the law-governed nature of social development and other great achievements of Marxist sociological thought have been superseded and discarded by social practice.

If Garaudy mentions the materialist interpretation of history at all, it is only to criticise it. What he is actually criticising, however, is not the materialist interpretation of history but a "dogmatised version" of it, which he claims is historical materialism. Still claiming to be a "trailblazer", he speaks of things which have long been acknowledged as established truths and are to be found in all Marxist textbooks on historical materialism.

Naturally one must not interpret the decisive role of economic relations in social development in an oversimplified, mechanistic way, or ignore the reverse effect of the superstructural phenomena on the basis, or establish automatic links between the material basis and the superstructure, or look for the photographic reflection of material, economic processes in this or that form of social consciousness, particularly in those which, like art, philosophy and religion, are more remote from the basis and have a very sharply expressed relative independence of economic relations. In short, one must not approximate or equate

historical materialism with economic materialism, a fact which the classics of Marxism-Leninism stressed very firmly.

In the same way the materialist interpretation of history does not equate mechanistic and dialectical determinism in the interpretation of both natural and social phenomena. The equation of natural and social laws has nothing in common with Marxism. While recognising the existence of objective laws in nature and society Marxist philosophy takes full account of their distinguishing peculiarities, rejects the "naturalisation" of social laws, regards them predominantly as law-tendencies, and precludes their fatalistic interpretation, the overlooking of the role of chance in history, disregard of the role of the consciousness, will and organisation of the popular masses, social classes, political parties and outstanding individuals in the realisation of historical possibilities. The materialist interpretation of history has nothing in common with the conception of mono-linear development which excludes the unity and diversity of the historical process and compares the course of history to that of a train running along fixed rails.

But the fact is that Garaudy is not fighting against the distortion of historical materialism, but is attempting to extend his idealist delusions, Kantian and Fichtean subjectivist ideas, to Marxist sociological theory.

Lenin warned that an absolute distinction between being and consciousness is justified only within the limits of the theory of knowledge. Outside these limits such a distinction would be pointless if only for the fact that consciousness is indissolubly linked with matter and is a property of specially and highly organised matter. In the same way social consciousness is not only the specific reflection of social being, but also a part of it.

In re-examining these initial premises of the materialist interpretation of history, Marxist philosophy and general history, Garaudy attempts to cast doubt on the correctness of drawing an absolute distinction between social being and social consciousness *even within the limits of the theory of knowledge*. This essentially dismisses the question of materialism and idealism in history which, however, as we shall see later, does not dismiss Garaudy's attempt to give an idealist interpretation of the historical process.

In order to disprove the materialist interpretation of history Garaudy calls on two Marxist ideas in order to reinterpret them in the spirit of idealism. These are, firstly, Marx's famous proposition that before a man begins his labours he already has in his head the ideal image of the thing he is about to create, and, secondly, a proposition from Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* that consciousness not only reflects the world, but also creates it. Garaudy wishes to approximate these well-known Marxist propositions, which reflect the active, creative, transforming role of human consciousness, to the idealist absolutisation of consciousness, the transformation of consciousness into the demiurge of objective reality. Incidentally we have already encountered these exercises of Garaudy's when we were examining his views on being and consciousness. Now we would draw attention to the fact that he attempts to extend all these views and judgments to the field of social relations, to "enrich" the Marxist conception of social development with ideas taken from Kantian and Fichtean philosophy and from modern idealist doctrines.

Garaudy's most obvious departure from the principles of historical materialism is revealed in his conception of the "historical initiative of the masses". What is the essence of this conception which he presents as practically the main point of Marxism? For the sake of brevity let us quote Garaudy's own definitions. In the book *Towards a French Model of Socialism* he examines Marxism "as the methodology of the historical initiative",¹ and in the book *Lénine* he notes that Lenin spent the last ten years of his life devoting constant attention to "all manifestations of the historical initiative of the masses, for which the socialist revolution creates radically new conditions of flowering, allowing each man and each woman to become the active subject and creator of actual human history. This is the essence of Leninism".²

Thus, according to Garaudy, the essence of both Marxism and Leninism is the consolidation of the "historical initiative of the masses".

¹ R. Garaudy, *Pour un modèle français du socialisme*, p. 7.

² R. Garaudy, *Lénine*, p. 49.

Before analysing these definitions of the essence of the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin, we should see why it is that Leninism did not acquire its essence until 1914.

In giving a most arbitrary appraisal of Lenin's ideas and works, Garaudy advances the false and absurd idea that up to 1914 Lenin basically shared the anti-dialectical, vulgar-economic conception of Karl Kautsky, because he had not yet understood the essence of Marxism: the "historical initiative of the masses".

Thus, discussing such works by Lenin as *The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx* (1913), *The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism* (1913), *Marxism and Reformism* (1913) and others Garaudy blasphemously proclaims that they "show an increasingly growing rupture with the dogmatism of Kautsky and Plekhanov, which led them to break away from reality to opportunism".¹

According to him, during the foundation of the Bolshevik party and for many years afterwards Lenin accepted Kautsky's vulgar evolutionism. Things are even worse with regard to Lenin's works attacking Narodism, particularly his book *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*. Apropos of this Garaudy pats the young Lenin on the back and writes that "Lenin, who was twenty-four at the time, fought against these (Narodist) theses in the name of a Marxism which was still only generally assimilated and viewed mainly through the scientific interpretation of Kautsky and Plekhanov."² If one is to believe Garaudy, it turns out that Lenin understood Marx's words "I regard the development of an economic formation as a natural-historical process" in the "Kautskian spirit of fatalist naturalism!"³

In falsifying the development of Lenin's thought, Garaudy attempts to prove that "in the work *What Is To Be Done?* the main theses are explicitly borrowed from Kautsky. . . . Thus there is nothing specifically Leninist in these theses on 'the Party as the advance guard' expounded in *What Is To Be Done?* This conception is that of Kautsky, and Lenin

¹ R. Garaudy, *Lénine*, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³ *Ibid.*

expressly underlines it. Nothing would be more wrong and more dangerous than to define Lenin's conception of the Party on the basis of *What Is To Be Done?* Nothing more wrong because Lenin himself refers constantly to Kautsky."¹

What exactly is it in *What Is To Be Done?* that does not suit Garaudy? One can safely say, without risk of error, that it is Lenin's interpretation of the relation between the working class and its communist advance guard—the Party.

Having proceeded to belittle the leading role of the Communist Party in the international communist movement and in the building of socialist society, Garaudy belatedly seeks to "correct" Lenin, to "save", "protect" him from Kautsky, trying to prove that the idea of introducing scientific-revolutionary ideology into the spontaneous working-class movement is not Marxism but Kautskyism, automatism, mechanism, etc. But Garaudy must be aware that both Marx and Engels saw the role of the Communist Party as being that the party, armed with a progressive theory, lifts the spontaneous working-class movement to a new level, acting as an organising force which guides this movement towards communism. In the new historical situation Lenin based himself on the views of Marx and Engels and created a theory of the party of the new type, the revolutionary party of the working class, which is capable of leading the working-class movement, armed with revolutionary theory and revolutionary principles of organisation, and indissolubly united with its class, with the working masses.

Guided by social practice and continuing and developing the ideas of his teachers, Lenin concluded that left to itself the working-class movement could only work out a trade-unionist ideology and nothing more. But in order to triumph the working class needed an ideology which was both revolutionary and scientific. It goes without saying that a *scientific* ideology cannot arise spontaneously, of its own accord. It can only be created by men of science and revolutionary action, since we are dealing with scientific, Marxist-Leninist ideology which generalises the experience of the revolutionary masses.

¹ R. Garaudy, *Lénine*, p. 20.

Garaudy's hostile, to put it mildly, attitude towards the leading role of the Communist Party compels him to draw a distinction between the Party and its leadership, on the one hand, and the initiative of the masses themselves, on the other, as if they were two mutually exclusive principles.

All these speculations linked with the "historical initiative of the masses" fit in with the idea of the spontaneous movement of the working class, which in the course of its development ostensibly manages to find its own solutions, without any need for "outside" help and advice or, to be more precise, without any need for a leading and guiding party which acts as the advance guard of its class.

It will be seen, therefore, that the eulogy of the "historical initiative of the masses" which we find in Garaudy is capable only of fettering this initiative and preventing it from finding scientifically based ways and the most effectively organised forms of struggle.

Garaudy carefully copies out Lenin's statements on the truly great role of the popular masses in history and with equal care ignores all his remarks which reveal the role of progressive political parties in giving full scope to the initiative and energy of the working class and the whole working people.

In his book *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in a Democratic Revolution* Lenin analysed the Mensheviks' repudiation of the principles of historical materialism and ignoring the role of a strong, effective revolutionary party of the proletariat. He wrote thus of the Mensheviks: "... They disparage the materialist conception of history by ignoring the active, leading, and guiding part which can and must be played in history by parties that have realised the material prerequisites of a revolution and have placed themselves at the head of the progressive classes."¹

According to the arbitrary division into stages of Lenin's ideological evolution proposed by Garaudy in the period in which he wrote *Two Tactics*, Lenin was still under the influence of ... Kautsky's vulgar evolutionism. The single statement of Lenin's quoted above is enough to show the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 44.

level of objectivity and probity in Garaudy's analysis of Lenin's thought and writing.

One might also add that right to the end of his life Lenin never divorced the historical initiative of the popular masses from the leading and guiding role of their communist advance guard. On the contrary, Lenin always saw the Communist Party as the force destined to take up and guide the initiative, the creative activity of the popular masses in the right direction.

With the victory of socialism, the labour enthusiasm of millions of free people, multiplied by the advances of science and technology, became a great creative force which, not spontaneously, but under the leadership of the Communist Party became capable of performing miracles, of consciously and purposefully transforming nature and social life.

Only he who believes in the people, who plunges into the spring of vital popular creation, will triumph and hold power, said Lenin. On the day of the fourth anniversary of the October Revolution, Lenin addressed the workers as follows: "All that we have achieved goes to show that we base ourselves on the most wonderful force in the world—that of the workers and peasants."¹

Could Lenin, in giving this description, ever have imagined that years later a man who called himself a Marxist would draw a distinction between the historical initiative of the masses and the historical initiative of their communist advance guard? Or, even more unlikely, that this strange "theory" would be ascribed to him, Lenin, and regarded as his main service to history?

The theory of "historical initiative" which has ousted the materialist interpretation of history in Garaudy's writings, is by no means the proclamation and glorification of the true initiative and creative activity of the popular masses. It is only the glorification of spontaneity in historical development, the glorification of *laissez-faire*. This "theory", which is aimed against the leading role of the Communist Party, revolutionary theory and organisation, is nothing other than the repetition of the ideas of Kautsky and the Mensheviks under the guise of attacking Kautsky's vulgar evo-

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 33, p. 117.

lutionism. Leninism actually grew up in the struggle against this theory of spontaneity of the Russian Economists and Mensheviks, the opportunism which gained the upper hand in the parties belonging to the Second International.

In summing up, let us note that Marxism has never divorced the historical initiative of the masses from the historical initiative of revolutionary parties and outstanding historical personages. It follows that Garaudy, in maintaining that the essence of Marxism-Leninism is confirmation of the historical initiative of the masses, is blatantly distorting the problem and belittling the importance of the initiative of the revolutionary, Communist Party and its leaders. The motives urging him to distort Marxism-Leninism in this way coincide with his struggle against the French Communist Party and its leadership and against all Marxist Communist and Workers' parties which are worthily fulfilling their leading role in the struggle of the popular masses for socialism, firmly upholding the principle of party commitment in all spheres of socio-political and ideological struggle, and guided by the principle of democratic centralism.

While recognising the great role of the historical initiative of the popular masses, one is hardly justified in reducing the essence of Marxism-Leninism to this theory of historical initiative. Communists always have and always will regard the essence of Marxism-Leninism as the theory on the conditions and means of the revolutionary abolition of the capitalist order and the establishment of a communist society.

In overemphasising the "historical initiative of the masses" and turning it into an absolute principle at the expense of ignoring their communist advance guard, Garaudy is disregarding a number of most important facts. Let us mention a few of them.

At all stages of historical development the popular masses have invariably played a decisive role in carrying out the production process, without which human society cannot exist. As a rule, the popular masses have been the main motive force in the political struggle, in social revolutions, in overthrowing obsolete socio-political regimes. They have also played a great part in creating cultural values, in the development of the world cultural process.

While noting the decisive role of the popular masses in history, however, we must not disregard such real facts as this or that people at this or that period of its existence becoming the instrument of the policy of reactionary classes. Therefore the abstract posing of the question of the "historical initiative of the masses", without a precise explanation of which masses one has in mind and the nature of their initiative, cannot lead to anything but confusion. It was with this abstract "self-initiative" of the masses, unencumbered by revolutionary theory and revolutionary leadership, that the Russian "Economists", Mensheviks, and all manner of anarchist organisations speculated to their heart's content at one time. These speculations are still being carried on today by various "left-wing" extremists, Maoists, Trotskyites, and others. Directed against the Marxist-Leninist parties and their role in the leadership of the masses, these speculations also injure the basic interests of the masses, disorganise them and prevent their initiative and energy from developing in the true revolutionary channel.

Placing the main emphasis on the abstractly treated problem of the historical initiative of the masses, Garaudy also devotes very little attention to the objective conditions of the historical activity of the masses. One gets the impression that this "historical initiative" is the prime, initial factor in the historical process. In fact, however, all forms of initiative of the masses are determined by the whole preceding stage of social development and cannot disregard the objective laws of history, cannot fail to take account of them in order to carry out the tasks posed by the very course of social progress. Garaudy, however, as we have already noted, painstakingly avoids such concepts as "social determinism", "objective historical laws", "conditioning" of the present by the past and the future by the present. All these concepts, without which there is not and cannot be a materialist interpretation of history, are branded by him as "dogmatic", "naturalist", "scientistic", etc. He apparently regards this abstract "historical initiative" as sufficient to explain all socio-political tasks.

It is easy to see that Garaudy's general philosophical arguments, his subjectivism, his disparaging attitude towards the "philosophy of being" and his glorification of the

"philosophy of act", divorced from reality, his passion for *a priori* constructions, for the "project" conjured up from goodness knows where, are also reflected in his interpretation of social life and social processes.

The "historical initiative of the masses", as Garaudy sees it, is the embodiment of the principle of "breaking with the immediate", with the whole preceding course of action. It is a project in action, not the reflection of existent being, but "pure creation". This "initiative" can neither replace historical materialism nor fit into its framework. It is without a doubt a "theoretical construction" of the subjectivist kind, although it manipulates such weighty concepts as "the action of the masses".

Garaudy's departure from historical materialism, his rejection of its fundamental laws and categories, cannot help influencing his analysis of modern capitalism and modern socialism. He frequently ceases to give a class analysis of modern society and begins to advocate a system of false ideas which contradict the objective picture of things and, consequently, also contradict the class interests of the workers and the interests of socialist society. These methodological defects are most clearly seen in the quasi-scientific analysis of modern imperialism which Garaudy is offering today.

He devotes special attention to an analysis of American society as the leading country in the capitalist system. Apart from everything else he explains his choice by the fact that the present state of American society, the trend of its development, shows the logic of capitalist development in other countries less developed than the USA.

Thus Garaudy's conclusions with regard to more developed American capitalism refer in some way or other to the whole capitalist world. What are these conclusions and the arguments supporting them?

CHAPTER II

FROM CAPITALISM TO ... CAPITALISM

Both before and after the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969 Garaudy blatantly accused the leaders of the international communist movement of being unable to analyse the contradictions of modern capitalism and of constantly reiterating "that the contradictions are intensifying without the qualification that many of those contradictions are new ones".¹

Such a posing of the question is bound to make any Marxist want to ask where the "old" basic contradiction has gone, the contradiction between the social character of production and the capitalist form of appropriation. Garaudy mentions, in passing, that the "old contradictions" have not disappeared, but shows no inclination to discuss them because, in spite of all his reservations, he does not regard them as the main, decisive ones.

The question then arises as to what attitude should be adopted to Marx, the Marxist analysis of the main capitalist contradiction and the related concept of the intensifying contradictions of antagonistic classes which is leading to the collapse of bourgeois society.

The fact of the matter is that in such crucial questions as the contradictions of capitalism, its main antagonisms and the socialist revolution, Garaudy regards Marx and Marxist evaluations and forecasts as obsolete. "All the analyses in Marx's *Capital*," he writes, "were based on the theory of commodities, i.e. of production for the market, and from

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 51.

this derived his key concepts of value, of surplus-value, of crises arising out of the internal limitations of the capitalist market, and of the law of the relative and absolute, impoverishment of the working class. His analysis remained valid, requiring no major modification until the early thirties of this century. Its last and most triumphant vindication was the great American and world crisis of 1929."¹

It is not difficult to see how boldly, to put it mildly, Garaudy relegates the teaching of Marx and at the same time of Lenin to the archives, declaring that the Marxist analysis of capitalism has lost its meaning and importance in the present day.

Garaudy seeks for and finds new teachers capable of explaining to him and those of like mind the essence of the processes taking place in modern capitalism. True, these teachers come from the ranks of the bourgeois economists, not from the Marxist camp. One of them is John Kenneth Galbraith, the author of the book *The New Industrial State*, whom Garaudy describes as a man who has stressed an "essential phenomenon whose implications we must now investigate."²

What is this phenomenon which conditions all the other processes taking place in modern capitalism? Following Galbraith, Garaudy answers: "*The new scientific and technological revolution, in that it demands long-term planning, necessitates an inversion of the relations between production and the market.*"³

This "inversion" means that, unlike the preceding stages in the development of capitalism when the market dictated its requirements to production and production was compelled to adjust itself to the demands of the market, today in the new situation that has arisen production is finding it increasingly difficult to adapt itself to the requirements of the market. As a result the market is adapting itself more and more to production, creating its requirements artificially. Does this not mean that the market is disappearing as an economic category? Here Garaudy makes the special reservation that it would be wrong to conclude that there is no

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 51.

² *Ibid.*, p. 50.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

longer any market in the United States. Having added this reservation, to be on the safe side, he continues his argument, proceeding on the assumption that the market has lost its significance in the modern capitalist economy and that the latter is ceasing to be a market economy in the old sense of the term. He says that "the development we are now witnessing—a development that is therefore the determining factor in analysis and forecasting—is the retreat of the market economy in the classic sense of the term, and the advance of those sectors in which the new laws are in evidence".¹

As we have already noted, the Marxist conception is "out-of-date", according to Garaudy, because all Marx's analyses were based on the theory of commodities, i.e., of production for the market, but modern capitalism is ceasing to be commodity production, production for the market. From these and similar statements taken from the works of bourgeois economists and sociologists that attempt to argue the new version of an "organised capitalism" which, according to them, is ceasing to be capitalism, Garaudy draws conclusions which are quite frankly reformist. We shall see later how he arrives at the "new" idea of the lack of prospects for the class-political struggle of the working class and for socialist revolution in the more developed capitalist countries. Here we shall simply note that, in spite of all his reservations and using Marxist terminology, Garaudy tries to defend the bourgeois-reformist idea that the scientific and technological revolution is gradually transforming capitalism and invalidating the need for socialist revolution and other Marxist-Leninist conclusions based on the analysis of capitalism as commodity production for the market.

Let us return, however, to the inversion of the relations between production and the market. Garaudy assures us that this inversion and the new laws which it has engendered do not invalidate the old laws of capitalism, but simply transform them.

There can be no doubt that in his recent writings, particularly in the chapter "The United States and the Consequences of the New Scientific and Technological

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 51.

Revolution" (in *The Turning-Point of Socialism*) Garaudy makes no attempt whatsoever to explain these new contradictions and new laws in the development of capitalism or their role in changing the old contradictions of bourgeois society.

In that case what socio-political conclusions does Garaudy draw from these statements about the changing relations between production and the market? He stresses the growing opportunities for the monopolies to impose their produce on the market, the consumer. People are not only taking part in production without participating in its planning and realisation, but they are increasingly consuming that which is forced upon them from above by the all-powerful monopolies. In this fact Garaudy sees, and we can completely agree with him, "the new source of man's alienation and dehumanisation".¹ But we soon learn that this is not only a new source of man's alienation under capitalism, but also the *main* motive force behind the anti-capitalist protest. It appears that millions, tens of millions of people in France and the other developed capitalist countries are taking up the struggle mainly because they have no part in the planning and running of the economy and have to accept the commodities forced upon them by the monopolies. Let us repeat that this form of alienation and the protest against it are undoubtedly of considerable importance in the present day. But to make them the *main* motive forces in the struggle against capitalism is totally unjustified. The masses of the working class take up the struggle against bourgeois society because they are being exploited, because capitalism is appropriating the fruits of their labour, because of social inequality and enslavement, material need, unemployment, uncertainty about the future, incursions upon and suppression of their liberty. The statistics quoted in *The Turning-Point of Socialism* show that even in the most developed capitalist country, the United States, tens of millions of people are deprived of a minimum living wage. Thus there are more direct and powerful economic and political causes for the growing discontent of the masses with capitalism than those forms of alienation which Garaudy deduces

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 52.

from the change in the relations between production and the market.

Incidentally, a word about this change from which Garaudy draws such far-reaching conclusions. We would note, first and foremost, that production has always imposed its "tastes" on the consumer to some extent or other, and artificially created his requirements, at all stages of capitalist development. It is true that at the present stage in the development of state-monopoly capitalism the adjustment of the market to the requirements of production has grown stronger and assumed new forms. It is also true that with the help of advertising and other methods capitalist production is forcing its commodities on the consumer. And that state-monopoly capitalism is extending outlets outside the market through the public sector's hypertrophy in respect of armaments and space research. But it is profoundly wrong to attempt like Garaudy, who is following his mentors from bourgeois economist and sociologist circles, to deny the commodity nature of modern capitalist production and on this false basis to bid farewell to the Marxist analysis of capitalism and the Marxist proof of the inevitable transition to socialism through revolution.

However the relations between capitalist production and the market may change, however the forms of commodity production may be transformed under capitalism, production here is always carried on for the market, for extracting the highest possible profit from selling the commodities produced.

If capitalism has ceased to be commodity production for the extraction of profit by individual capitalists or capitalist associations, if capitalism has ceased to produce for the market and capitalist production has changed or is changing quickly into non-commodity production, elementary logic forces one to admit that capitalism has disappeared or is in the process of automatically disappearing, changing into a different mode of production, a different social system.

This "conclusion" has long since been drawn by many bourgeois theoreticians who support the theories of the "industrial society", "convergence", "mass consumption", "the post-industrial society", etc. All these "theories" attempt to depict present-day state-monopoly capitalism as a society which is ceasing to be a capitalist, commodity-producing

one based on private ownership, or, at least, a society which is rapidly losing its capitalist features in the course of the scientific and technological revolution.

Garaudy obediently goes along with these well-worn bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas of the peaceful "transformation" of capitalism into "democratic socialism" or some other social utopia. In true bourgeois fashion he hastens to bid farewell to the Marxist analysis of capitalism, its main contradictions and the ways of their revolutionary resolution.

These renegade ideas of Garaudy's are particularly obvious in his discussions of the consequences of the scientific and technological revolution in the USA. He stresses that as a result of this revolution the changes in capitalist contradictions have most clearly affected the most developed capitalist country. "What we have to consider, besides the new type of growth, are the transformation of the classes and of class relations, the new role played by the state,"¹ he writes.

What form of expression does this transformation of classes and class relations take in the USA?

By considering a number of socio-class questions not in their development but statically, Garaudy tries to argue that class contradictions in the USA are dying away, and excludes the possibility of a socialist revolution.

Deliberately oversimplifying the question he writes: "In the present state of American economic development, can it reasonably be supposed that socialism will prevail in the United States as a result of some apocalyptic situation in which the mass of the working class will be driven by misery to a rebellion similar to that of the 'Chicago commune' in Jack London's 1907 novel, *The Iron Heel*?"²

Let us assume that there is no possibility of a rebellion like the one described by Jack London taking place in the USA today. But the question arises as to whether, if a *violent* revolution leading to socialism is ruled out, this also rules out a *non-violent* revolution. The fact is that Garaudy no longer believes in the possibility of either violent or non-violent socialist revolutions. He is putting his money on the peaceful transformation of capitalism in the further devel-

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 49.

² *Ibid.*, p. 52.

opment of the scientific and technological revolution. This is precisely what the "technocratic version" of reformism is.

The American working class, Garaudy announces, has been largely integrated by bourgeois society and does not contain within it any revolutionary potential. "On the evidence of American society alone it would be difficult to contest the theses of Herbert Marcuse on the integration of the working class."¹

Thus, if Garaudy's arguments are taken to their logical conclusion it appears that in the most developed capitalist country which represents the future of all the other countries in the world capitalist system, after the uprisings and revolutionary outbursts of the nineteenth and the first few decades of the twentieth centuries the working class has reconciled itself to the bourgeois order and become an organic part of it, interested not in destroying the order, but in improving and perfecting it.

What Garaudy is saying has been said before by many generations of bourgeois theoreticians, right-wing leaders of reformist parties and yellow trade unions, and is still being said today. And again under the guise of fighting against "dogmatism" and "Stalinism" Garaudy presents his readers with the old bourgeois and reformist banalities dressed up as "creative Marxism".

Let us return, however, to the question of the "integration" of the American working class by bourgeois society. How did this conception arise, which obviously proceeds from the theory that the antagonistic class contradictions of American capitalism are "dying down" or "disappearing" because it is overcoming economic crises, unemployment, relative and absolute impoverishment and all the main defects of bourgeois society.

Careful examination of this excessive idealisation of American capitalism shows that it arose and exists on the basis of a one-sided exaggeration of isolated processes and phenomena. Of course the standard of living of large segments of the American working class is higher than in the other capitalist countries. But it is wrong for the scholar to simply note a phenomenon without attempting to

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 55.

explain the reasons for its inception, its essence, its trend of development. One should not note the comparatively high standard of living of the broad mass of American society without drawing attention to the appalling intensification of labour in that country with all the related bitter consequences for the physical and spiritual development of tens of millions of people. Garaudy knows full well that this relatively high standard of living has been achieved by exploiting other peoples, particularly the peoples of Latin America, by unequal exchange which brings billions of dollars to the American monopolies. He also knows that the relatively high standard of living of the American working class is not a gift of the monopolies. It has been attained by the long and bitter struggle of the working class. And if the author of *The Turning-Point of Socialism* tries to back up his reformist, right-wing opportunist views by frequently returning to the question of the "obsolete nature" of the Marxist interpretation of the law of absolute impoverishment, he should attempt to understand what has really happened to this law under modern state-monopoly capitalism. It is not a question here of capitalism turning benevolent or of scientific and technological progress, but of the organised struggle by the working class for raising its standard of living. One can hardly agree with the view that the law of absolute impoverishment of the working class has ceased to operate in the developed capitalist countries. If it were simply up to the monopolies, if they were in a position to increase their profits by maximum exploitation of the working class, they would do so without a moment's hesitation. But in the present situation in the capitalist countries the operation of the law-tendency of absolute impoverishment of the working class comes up against the organised resistance by that class and is slowed down. Wishing to remain intact, capitalism makes partial concessions to the working class and does not dare encroach upon the living wage of the workers in the second half of the twentieth century in the most developed capitalist countries.

Now a word about the assertion that the American working class has "lost" all its former revolutionary potential and has all but turned into a pillar of capitalist society.

Let us note, first and foremost, that any approach which does not differentiate between various sectors in the working class is a mistaken one. There are the "lower" strata and the "upper" strata, and, consequently, the broad mass of this class. The extremely difficult position of the lower strata, which consists mainly of Negroes, Puerto Ricans and other "aliens", is a well-known fact. The Negro problem is a class problem as well as a racial one. Negroes compose a considerable part of the American working class. Everyone is aware of how much hatred has built up in the lower strata of the working class for American imperialism and how acutely this hatred manifests itself.

One cannot ignore the powerful strike movement which is on the ascendant in the USA. The broad mass of the American working class is carrying on a determined struggle against the monopolies, against encroachments on their standard of living, and for their rights. The distinctive feature of the American working-class movement at the present stage is not that it is weakening, as some say, but that it is not assuming any clearly political direction against capitalist development. In other words, the economic struggle is not developing into a political struggle in the USA. There are many reasons for this, primarily the fact that the intensification of labour and the exploitation of other peoples create in the USA additional reserves which the American monopolies are using to weaken class antagonisms and decelerate the growth of the class-consciousness of the American working class. This is also promoted by artificial stimulation of the economic situation, by colossal expenditure on weapons of destruction, etc.

This is the real state of affairs in the USA today. The working class there has not risen up sufficiently in active *political* struggle. But what follows from this? According to Garaudy, it follows that the American working class has not risen up in active political struggle and never will.

Contrary to all dialectics, Garaudy regards the present state of affairs in the USA as a permanent one and basically writes off the working class as a revolutionary transforming force. This is understandable. If Garaudy learns at the feet of bourgeois economists who maintain that social antagonisms and class contradictions are a thing of the past in the

United States, who assert that Keynes has triumphed over Marx, who assure us that economic crises will never occur again thanks to the guiding role of the state, and so on, naturally Garaudy too begins to echo their claims that there are no prospects for a revolutionary struggle for socialism in the USA.

In all his arguments one finds the idea that the American working class is politically passive. But why regard this passiveness as a permanent feature? Why not admit that the further deepening of the contradictions in American imperialism will make the working-class movement in the USA more radical?

Let us make an historical comparison here, bearing in mind, of course, that an analogy is no more than an analogy. As we know, at the beginning of 1905 Petersburg's workers walked to the Winter Palace with icons and portraits of the tsar on the assumption that the tsar could do away with injustice and help the suffering people.

These and similar facts led the Russian Mensheviks to ignore the revolutionary role of the working class and place their hopes on the liberal bourgeoisie. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, in their turn, assumed that the peasantry as a whole and not the working class could be the motive force of revolution.

It took the perspicacity of Lenin and the Bolsheviks to see the historically transient immaturity of the working-class movement and to regard the Russian working class as the force called upon to carry out the socialist reorganisation of Russia.

People like Garaudy talk a lot about the dialectics of social development, but in fact are enthralled by that crude metaphysics which is incapable of seeing life in its contradictory development or of perceiving the real picture of the future based on growing modern contradictions.

Garaudy assures us that "it would be false to speculate on a general impoverishment of the working class which would 'radicalise' it and drive it to take revolutionary action, such as might have been envisaged in the nineteenth century."¹

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 55.

This reference to the nineteenth century is an obvious verbal subterfuge. But is revolutionary action possible in the USA in the conditions of the twentieth century? Leaving aside his various reservations, one sees that Garaudy answers this question in the negative and writes off the prospects for socialism in the USA in the foreseeable future.

Obviously no Marxist-Leninist would wish to idealise the present state of affairs and expect a rapid growth of the American communist movement. The process of the working-class movement becoming more radical, the turning of the Communist Party of the USA into a powerful mass political organisation will require considerable time and effort. But only someone who has lost faith in the working class, its revolutionary mission, and socialism can write this off with sophistic arguments about the "scientific and technological revolution" and the "cybernetic revolution", etc.

The superiority of the "American way of life", the "fraternisation" between the workers and the capitalists in the USA, the dying away of class contradictions in the citadel of modern capitalism—this is the invention of bourgeois propagandists and nothing more. These fabrications cannot delude any Marxist, any person who is capable of seeing the facts and drawing the inevitable conclusions from them. Garaudy tries in vain to present the class lie of the imperialist bourgeoisie in Marxist terminology. No amount of repetition can turn this lie into the truth.

Unlike Garaudy, the ruling class in the USA and its government do not tend to underestimate the revolutionary potential of the anti-capitalist forces in their country. They have recourse to all forms of struggle against them. If the position of American imperialism were so firmly entrenched as Garaudy tries to make out, the monopoly state would hardly spend vast sums on maintaining such a large apparatus of force directed against the opposition. The mere fact that millions of people have their telephones tapped convincingly shows how the forces of imperialist bourgeoisie have mobilised themselves.

Of course, as has already been noted, the USA is far from any profound internal political crisis. The imperialist bourgeoisie has not yet experienced the onslaught of the organised revolutionary masses of the working class. But this is

today. Who can seriously believe, knowing the profound defects in the economy, finance, foreign policy and the whole social system in the USA, that the alignment of class forces will remain unchanged?

It is true that in American society today one of the most striking features is the political activity of the non-proletarian elements, particularly the student youth. Theoreticians like Marcuse interpret this fact as confirmation of their false theories about the loss of revolutionary potential by the American working class. Yet political activity by student youth which occasionally advances beyond the working-class movement is no new phenomenon. One should not forget that it was found in old Russia as well, and that it did not prevent the working class from emerging as the main force in the revolutionary transformation of society at the next stage of the historical movement.

The facts bear witness to a growth in the political activity of the working class in the USA and particularly of the young workers. Speaking at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969 the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USA, Gus Hall, drew attention to a most typical phenomenon: "The young workers, who are new in industry, are also in great numbers becoming the shock brigades for the working class. They spark the rank-and-file movements. They are pushing for a revitalisation of the trade union movement. It is these young workers, many of whom were themselves recently students, who form the link between the students and the working class."¹

Having excluded the possibility of both non-peaceful and peaceful socialist revolution, Garaudy believes that economic and socio-political progress in the USA is possible not as a result of a struggle between the main antagonistic classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—but of co-operation between them to achieve that which is *possible*. "If there is to be radical change in the United States," he writes, "it will not be effected by the victory of one party or the other,

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Moscow, 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 431.*

but by a conjunction of those social forces whose common aspiration is to provide new aims for the system."¹ He would appear to be stating quite clearly that the antagonistic forces should join together to give the system, i.e., the existing capitalist order, new aims.

Garaudy sees the possibility of "peaceful coexistence" between the sides in the fact that "both the ruling class itself and the middle classes are losing confidence in their own values, as is evident from the turmoil in the universities attended by their sons."²

In the book *The Whole Truth* he expresses extreme indignation at being accused of surrendering to reformism. Yet the idea of co-operation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for a gradual improvement of capitalism, its transformation into quasi-socialism, is the basic reformist idea. Why is Garaudy so offended when people call things by their real name?

He could object on the grounds that he does rule out the possibility of a revolutionary movement in the United States. But what sort of "revolutionary movement" is this and what are its motive forces and aims?

From the descriptions which Garaudy himself gives of this movement it is clear that it has nothing in common with scientifically interpreted revolution and revolutionary movement. And indeed what sort of revolutionary movement is it if it does not seek in some way or other to abolish the existing reactionary order? Garaudy's "revolutionary movement" is to be a constructive, not critical opposition. It is a most strange revolutionary movement because it is not supposed to upset anyone, reject anything or destroy anything. Let us quote Garaudy himself: "The first prerequisite for an effective revolutionary movement in the United States is that it should be autochthonous and should not seek to borrow models from other countries with a fundamentally different structure. In the second place, the opposition should not be purely ideological and negative; it should be critical but constructive and also pragmatic in

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 66.

² *Ibid.*

the best sense of the term, in that it is also based upon specific conditions, conditions which, being real and actual, can open up a concrete perspective."¹

It is not difficult to see that the "revolutionary movement" which Garaudy is recommending to Americans corresponds entirely to his idea of co-operation between the American bourgeoisie and the proletariat. What are the major problems which these "fraternising" classes are to solve? According to Garaudy they are the problem of poverty and the closely related colour problem, the problem of providing social amenities (building of cultural institutions, construction of motorways, etc.) and the problem of giving effective aid to the countries of the Third World. "Here we have three main sources of investment which could open up a new frontier for the 'Young America' in the sense of all that is best in its national traditions. It would result in a boom unprecedented in the American economy, an era of full employment and of one hundred per cent utilisation of the country's industrial potential."²

From Garaudy's subsequent argument we learn that the programme of the "revolutionary movement" which he is proposing for the United States is, on his own admission, nothing more than a series of measures to vitalise and develop capitalism. With regard to the socialist perspective for the most developed capitalist country, Garaudy does not consider it necessary to give this programme serious attention. All his remarks about the United States boil down to the single formula: from developed capitalism to a more developed capitalism which, on the basis of the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution is to abolish poverty and racial discrimination and switch millions of dollars at present being spent on increasing military potential to useful social projects and aid for the countries of the Third World. "This programme," he writes, "is feasible without undermining the principles and the fundamental laws of the regime. It would, on the contrary, make them fully effective by preserving, regenerating, and renewing those traditions that have contributed to the greatness of the

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 67.

² *Ibid.*, p. 74.

United States. *This does not spell socialism but a purposeful capitalism.*"¹

Garaudy ends his reflections on the "revolutionary movement" in America by urging "all the vital forces of 'Young America' " to embark on the "humanisation of the system".² In so doing he dismisses the prospects for socialism in the United States, giving the reader to understand quite clearly that those prospects are so remote that there is no point in talking about them seriously.

The US aggressive circles have become the force that turns scientific and technological progress into a weapon for suppressing people, a force which upholds all that is reactionary. But the "Marxist" Garaudy sees in it the great creative potential, the ability to overcome its defects. We have seen that he thinks it possible within the limits of American capitalism to put an end to poverty and racism, to embark on an ambitious social programme, to abolish the many social injustices, to bring disinterested aid to the countries of the Third World, to renounce militarism, aggression, etc.

But if it is possible to achieve all these virtues within the limits of capitalism, what is the point of thinking about American socialism, and raising the many millions of the working class to an organised struggle to destroy capitalist relations? Is not developed capitalism itself capable of realising the noble ideals of progressive mankind during the period of the scientific and technological revolution?

Bourgeois propagandists answer these questions in the affirmative. Somewhat belatedly Garaudy attempts in Marxist language to give an air of plausibility to these reactionary social myths and to call on the "white- and blue-collar workers", the intelligentsia and the working class, to join with the bourgeoisie and the other social strata of capitalist society in order to improve and humanise the bourgeois order, rating very low the chances for achieving real socialism in the USA.

No Marxist-Leninist would deny the need for fighting against racism, poverty, militarism, etc., but not in order to

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 76.

² *Ibid.*

defend "purposeful capitalism" and foresake the tasks of the socialist revolution. By speculating on the scientific, technological and cybernetic revolution Garaudy constructs concepts which reek of lack of confidence in a socialist revolution in the USA and in the American working class, which will inevitably turn sooner or later to the path of class-political struggle against the foundations of capitalist society. He insultingly underestimates the activity of the American Communists who are carrying on the struggle against American imperialism in most difficult circumstances. "The American Communist Party," he writes, "founded in the spirit of the Bolshevik Party, did not succeed in putting into practice the methods of Marx and Lenin in the conditions specific to the United States. It thus became—as, alas, did other Communist parties—far more a propaganda organ for the October Revolution than an internal force for the regeneration of American society."¹ Thus, with a single stroke of his pen, Garaudy dismisses the importance of the revolutionary calling of the Communist Party of the USA and, at the same time, of all the other Communist parties who have "yielded to Bolshevism".

Garaudy regards the striving of the Soviet Union to overtake the United States economically which, according to him, encourages "the ultimate illusion that even America is susceptible of Bolshevisation",² as one of the reasons which have led modern historical development down a blind alley.

He sees the solution of the "world problems" of today as lying not in the struggle between socialism and capitalism, which he rejects under the guise of criticising "bloc politics". In fact, nowhere does he consider the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism as the main content of the modern age. He attempts to adopt the pose of a "supraclass" arbiter, to criticise the "defects and errors" of modern socialism and capitalism, and to seek for ways of bringing them together socio-economically, politically and ideologically. He calls for the creation of a new "model of civilisation" dictated by the iron laws of the scientific and

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 247.

technological revolution, which would bring together the conflicting forces for a dialogue instead of a "brutal" class struggle. It is on this ultra-pacifist road at some point in the distant future, quietly and imperceptibly, without upsetting or offending anyone that world socialism will appear.

Roger Garaudy, who so pretentiously criticised the results of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties as "ineffective", "unrealistic", "triumphalistic", etc., advances his own profound estimates and forecasts. "*What can be done here and now,*" he writes, "*is to press, in the United States, for an improved form of capitalism.*"¹ What great wisdom do we find in the mere posing of the task of improving capitalism in the USA!

Garaudy avoids writing openly about the theory of the convergence of socialism and capitalism. This quasi-scientific view has already been most thoroughly and fundamentally discredited in both theory and practice. Nevertheless all his sophistic arguments about the social consequences of the scientific and technological revolution boil down in the final analysis to advocating the idea of the drawing together of differing socio-political structures and ideologies. Garaudy deduces his convergence ideas, not exhibiting any great originality, from modern science and technology, which are supposed to be inevitably producing a levelling, integration and drawing together of socio-political structures. He argues this false idea mainly by exaggerating what all industrial societies have in common—a more or less similar level of technological equipment, a similar technology of production and technical division of labour, similar forms of urbanism, etc. At the same time he ignores such important indicators which distinguish socialism from capitalism as the nature of production relations, legal and political relations, ideologies, etc. Divorced from the actual system of productive forces and production relations, technology, its spontaneous development, is turned into the basic element of social development. This vulgar "technological determinism", which is a variation of mechanistic, anti-dialectical determinism, is present overtly or covertly in all Garaudy's discussions of the social consequences of the modern scientific and techno-

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 249 (italics ours).

logical revolution. It must be said in all fairness that he verbally repudiates pure technological determinism in one of his works. "I do not believe at all in pure technological determinism," he writes. "The possibilities contained within technology will only be effectively realised if we set up corresponding social and political relations." But this correct statement is generally absent from Garaudy's lengthy discussions on the scientific and technological revolution of the twentieth century.¹

The "reconciling atom", he says, is at work preparing the way for a union of the most different and conflicting forces in the interests of a "new" civilisation. From this it follows, according to Garaudy, that at the present stage these conflicting forces must act in unison, leaving aside the Marxist teaching on antagonistic classes, the class struggle, revolution, etc.

Let us quote Garaudy himself. He is speaking of a universal movement towards regeneration. "The originality of this trend consists in the attempt to effect the unity of the world and man, not by way of hegemony, of negative toleration or an imposed uniformity, but by way of integration. From that integration there would arise a co-ordinated form of unity in which each nation and each regime would develop in accordance with its own particular law. It is wholly unrealistic to expect that peace will result from a renunciation of socialism by the USSR or from the overthrow of capitalism in the United States, for we have at most ten years in which to halt our headlong progress towards the apocalypse of famine and armament."²

It is not hard to see that all these masked objections to "hegemony" and "negative toleration" and the call to renounce the idea of abolishing capitalist relations in the USA express Garaudy's departure from the scientific interpretation of the modern age and its basic contradictions, from the Marxist interpretation of the class struggle, the socialist revolution and from a scientifically based conviction in the inevitability of capitalism being replaced by a socialist society in the United States.

¹ *Garaudy par Garaudy*, Paris, 1970, p. 93.

² R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 219.

In an analysis of the theses of the French Communist Party, adopted at its 19th Congress, Etienne Fajon said that what Garaudy emphasises is not the essential contradiction between capitalism and socialism, but the scientific and technological revolution, from which he draws wrong conclusion. "To base the progress of society," writes Fajon, "on changes in the productive forces, divorcing it more or less from property relations and the need to transform them, is to depart from Marxism and gravitate towards the technocratic conception, which rejects the imperatives of the struggle between classes and between social systems."¹

We have made a fairly detailed study of Garaudy's views on the fate of the working-class movement in the United States, because he draws the wrong conclusion that capitalism, once it has attained such a high level as in the United States, becomes immune to socialism or relegates it to the dim and distant future.

The question arises as to whether Garaudy extends his generalisations on American capitalism to the other economically developed capitalist countries in Europe and the other continents? Does he dismiss the possibility of socialism in Western Europe, say? Naturally enough, living in a country like France with its powerful working-class movement and large revolutionary Communist Party, Garaudy does not dare to go this far. His conclusions with regard to the class struggle against capitalism and the prospects for socialism in the European capitalist countries are more cautious. But, as we shall see below, this does not prevent them from contradicting the practice and basic principles of Marxist-Leninist science.

¹ *World Marxist Review*, June 1970, No. 6, p. 24.

CHAPTER III

THE PSEUDO-SOCIALIST OUTLOOK FOR EUROPE

Roger Garaudy does not openly deny the prospects for socialism in France and the other capitalist European countries. What is more, he is not averse to talking occasionally of socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In fact, however, the ways and means which he proposes for the attainment of this aim are such that they could not lead to scientifically interpreted socialism.

Let us consider the question of the working class in the capitalist countries. As we have seen, on the subject of the working class in the USA Garaudy joins with Marcuse and other revisionists in assuming that this class has become "integrated" by bourgeois society and is incapable of playing a revolutionary-transforming role. Not daring to say the same about the French, Italian and other national detachments of the international working-class movement, Garaudy confines himself to something else: *to belittling the historic role of the working class* in the transition to new forms of human society.

All right-wing revisionists, of whom Garaudy is one, are obsessed with the desire to "deproletarianise" Marxism, to deprive it of its class essence, class approach and analysis of social phenomena. The futile attempt is made to divorce Marxism from militant proletarian spirit, from revolution, in order to imbue it with ideas of abstract democratism and humanism, to make it acceptable to the petty bourgeois and the liberal bourgeois, to "universalise" Marxist teaching.

Sidney Hook, an old and cunning opponent of revolutionary Marxism, once produced a rather amusing description of this attempt by right-wing revisionists to "deproletarianise" Marxism. "The intellectual historian of the future will be

challenged by a strange phenomenon of the latter half of the 20th century—the second coming of Karl Marx. In the second coming, he appears not in the dusty frock-coat of the economist, as the author of *Capital*, nor as a revolutionary sansculotte, the inspired pamphleteer of the *Communist Manifesto*. He comes robed as a philosopher and moral prophet with glad tidings about human freedom valid beyond the narrow circles of class, party or faction. In his train flock not the industrial workers of the world but literary intellectuals of the capital cities of the world, not the proletariat but elements of the professoriat, not the socially disinherited but the psychologically alienated, and a varied assortment of writers and artists, of idealistic young men and women. . . .”¹

Garaudy is extraordinarily anxious to revise Marx the revolutionary, “deproletarise” his teaching, and reject the true role and calling of the working class in the struggle for social progress.

In order to give his arguments about the proletariat a more scientific air Garaudy often refers to the scientific and technological revolution and its social consequences. Proceeding from the correct idea that rapid technological progress in capitalist countries is bound to introduce some new elements into the class structure of modern bourgeois society, he nevertheless draws a number of false and tendentious conclusions from this.

His main idea is that the numerical decrease in the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie makes unnecessary the alliance between the working class and these classes and social groups. In his books *Pour un modèle français du socialisme* and *Garaudy par Garaudy* he makes the reservation that he does not entirely disregard the importance of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry or the urban petty bourgeoisie, but considers that the latter no longer constitute the force that they did in the 19th century and the first few decades of this century.

We shall see later that, apart from anything else, the idea of the “new, historical bloc” which Garaudy defends so

¹ *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1966, Vol. XV, Washington, 1966, p. 26.

ardently boils down to replacing the alliance of the working class with the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie by an alliance of the working class with the intellectuals, or to be more precise, the technological intellectuals.

Are there any grounds for distinguishing between these two types of alliances and for rejecting the revolutionary, anti-monopolistic potential of the many millions of peasants and urban petty-bourgeois strata in Europe?

The numerical decrease in the peasantry and urban petty-bourgeois strata is, indeed, one of the social consequences of the scientific and technological revolution in capitalist society. But over and against this purely quantitative indicator is an indicator of a different order: the growing discontent of the mass of the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie with the policies of monopoly capitalism. The monopolies are mercilessly exploiting not only the working class, but the whole urban and rural working population. This is why rejecting an alliance between the working class and the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie, no matter what reservations accompany this rejection, can only weaken the struggle against imperialism and the monopolies.

Addressing the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow (1969) the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, stressed most clearly that "the working peasants remain the chief allies of the working class, despite the fact that their number has declined considerably in the advanced capitalist countries. The concentration of agricultural production in the hands of big entrepreneurs entails ever spreading ruin of the small and middle farmers and an aggravation of social contradictions in the countryside. In many capitalist countries the 1960s were marked by large-scale peasant strikes, with the peasants fighting for their rights more and more frequently, calling for unity of action with the working class."¹

The events of 1968 in France showed what a considerable force the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie constitute and how much they can contribute, under the guidance of

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969*, p. 150.

the working class, to the common struggle against the power of monopoly capitalism.

Guided by this view of the problem, the French Communist Party is carrying on a great deal of work among the peasantry and non-proletarian strata of urban workers. In November 1971 the Politburo of the French Communist Party examined some important questions concerning the situation in the countryside and the party's agrarian policy. It goes without saying that the Politburo's decisions did not in any way reject the alliance of the working class with the peasantry. On the contrary, the Politburo noted the need for strengthening the links of the working class with other social strata oppressed by the monopolies.

As we have already mentioned, in place of an alliance of the working class with the peasantry Garaudy proposes the idea of an alliance between the working class and the intellectuals. He defends this idea by pointing to the generally accepted fact that exploitation by the monopolies of many sections of the intellectuals is intensifying. As a result the role of the intellectuals in the struggle against imperialism is also increasing and they are drawing closer to the mass of the proletariat. These are, of course, extremely important phenomena which should be correctly understood and evaluated.

The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969 gave considerable attention to assessing the new position of the intellectuals and their role in the struggle against imperialism. "In this age, when science is becoming a direct productive force, growing numbers of intellectuals are swelling the ranks of wage and salary workers. Their social interests intertwine with those of the working class; their creative aspirations clash with the interests of the monopoly employers, who place profit above all else. Despite the great diversity in their positions, different groups of intellectuals are coming more and more into conflict with the monopolies and the imperialist policy of governments. The crisis of bourgeois ideology and the attraction of socialism help to bring intellectuals into the anti-imperialist struggle."¹

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969, p. 25.*

The Meeting noted that the alliance between non-manual and manual workers was becoming an increasingly impressive force in social progress. While recognising the growing role of the intellectuals as an anti-imperialist force and drawing important conclusions therefrom, the international communist movement has also rejected the idea of a "new historical bloc" and the related concept of replacing an alliance of the working class and peasantry by an alliance of the working class and the intellectuals.

Let us return to the second, "positive" part of the "new historical bloc" in which the relations between the working class and the intellectuals are examined. Garaudy provides the following definition: "The new historical bloc is composed in such a way that the decisive place here belongs not to the peasantry and not to the urban middle classes, but to completely different strata of society which stand side by side with the working class and are sometimes even integrated with it—technologists, engineers, research workers and various other categories of 'organic intellectuals', including the students."¹

We have already noted the growing role of many groups of intellectuals in the anti-imperialist struggle and the fact that they are drawing closer to the working class in respect of social position and ideology. So on this part of the question similar statements by Garaudy cannot, naturally, produce any basic objections. The objections begin at the point where he attempts to interpret the alliance of "labour and science", of "white- and blue-collar workers" in such a way as to cast doubt upon the guiding role of the working class in modern social progress, to challenge very cautiously, almost imperceptibly for the inexperienced reader, the revolutionary potential and the leading role of manual workers who compose the majority of the working class.

Throughout all Garaudy's arguments runs the idea that in our age of science and technology social development can be guided only by those who are themselves the creators of scientific and technological progress, i.e., scientists and technocrats. Discussing the technological intelligentsia, he notes: "As a result of the development of productive forces, in

¹ R. Garaudy, *Pour un modèle français du socialisme*, p. 27.

particular the use of cybernetics in production, organisation and management, these strata of the intelligentsia have found themselves in recent years in a position which helps them to realise the basic contradictions and new contradictions of capitalism."¹ This clearly amounts to saying that the essence of the processes taking place in modern capitalism can be understood only by scientists and technocrats. Yet if this is the case, the guiding role in the movement towards the future, towards socialism, belongs first and foremost to the intelligentsia and not to the working class and its communist advance guard.

The idea of the special historic role of the technocrats is defended by Garaudy in many aspects. Thus, talking about the conjunction of social forces in the United States "whose common aspiration is to provide new aims for the system", he gives special emphasis to the intelligentsia. "There can be no doubt that a primary role in that conjunction will be played by the engineers, technologists, and managers, that is, by a great many intellectuals, and this for objective reasons—namely, the new structure of the productive forces and the leading role played by the organised intelligentsia."²

Garaudy's faith in the technical intelligentsia as the leading force in modern social development is conditioned by his interpretation of the scientific and technological revolution, which he views from a standpoint close to "technological determinism". But he knows full well that to put the question in this way is to reject the fundamental Marxist tenet about the working class as the grave-digger of capitalism. Consequently, in flagrant contradiction to his convictions, he automatically repeats the "formula" about the guiding role of the working class in the transition to socialism. And in order to somehow combine that which seems true to *him* with that which Marxist-Leninist theory and practice confirm, he argues the idea that the working class is being swelled by large numbers of scientists and technologists. We have already had occasion to note that this statement is quite true. But, it may be asked, if large

¹ R. Garaudy, *Pour un modèle français du socialisme*, p. 273.

² R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 66.

numbers of the intelligentsia are *merging* with the ranks of the working class, what is the point in talking about an alliance of the working class and the intellectuals? For obviously there cannot be an alliance between similar social unions.

Garaudy's main idea to give the scientists and technologists pride of place in guiding the modern revolutionary process either as an organic part of the proletariat or as its ally—is a crude distortion of Marxist-Leninist science. And it would be wrong to say that Marxism does not see or underestimate the swelling of the proletariat by the intellectuals and that it does not appreciate the growing role of the latter in the struggle against modern capitalism which, by its very essence, is irrational and on the decline.

The progressive intellectuals have always played an important part in the revolutionary proletarian movement. Suffice it to mention the name of Lenin. Yet none of the Marxist intellectuals ever questioned that the leader of the revolution was the working class.

Criticising Garaudy's conception of the "new historical bloc", Giorgio Napolitano, a member of the Politburo of the Italian Communist Party, quite rightly noted that in this new historical bloc "an essential element has been obscured: the guiding role of the working class".¹

The structural changes which are taking place in the composition of the working class in capitalist countries under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution are, of course, connected with the growth of "non-manual workers" and their participation in the struggle against capitalist society. But these phenomena cannot cast doubt on the truth that capitalism will be abolished by the united forces of the whole anti-imperialist camp led by the working class, and not under the guidance of scientists and technologists.

The working class is the direct opposite of the bourgeoisie. It is the grave-digger of capitalism. In vain Garaudy turns to the scientific and technological revolution in order to dispute these tested truths. The most progressive, revolutionary-minded intellectuals can attain their noble aims

¹ Giorgio Napolitano, "Roger Garaudy et 'Le nouveau bloc historique'", *La Nouvelle Critique*, No. 34 (215), mai 1970, pp. 7-10.

only as a force helping the proletariat to fulfil its historic mission. Only a mass revolutionary movement, with the working class as its heart and guiding force, can put an end to capitalist relations and head the socialist transformation of society. Practice has shown that in isolation from the working class and its leadership, even the most radical action by students and intellectuals is inevitably doomed to failure. As is quite rightly stated in a recent Soviet work "by contrasting the intellectuals with the working class, the revisionists are doing a bad turn to the intellectuals themselves. Such a contradistinction may impede both the intellectuals' own struggle for their social and professional interests and the common struggle for the unity of the broad anti-monopolist front."¹

In defending his mistaken views on the guiding force in the modern revolutionary movement and also on many other questions, Garaudy is not averse to presenting things in such a way as to suggest that he is defending ideas closely connected with the *French path to socialism*. In fact, however, the French Communist Party and its theoreticians have severely criticised Garaudy's attempts to present his anti-Marxist fabrications as ideas linked with "French socialism".

On all basic questions Garaudy's standpoint is incompatible with the aims of the French Communist Party. For example, let us quote Maurice Thorez. Stressing the guiding role of the working class he wrote: "Neither the peasantry, nor the petty bourgeoisie, neither the creative genius of scholars and engineers, nor the intellectual elite in general, can constitute the social force which directs the renovation of the world."²

It is easy to see that all this is very remote from what Garaudy is writing today with his hints at a special "French socialism".

Through all Garaudy's confused and contradictory arguments about the "historical bloc", as we have already noted,

¹ *Scientific Communism and Its Falsification by Renegades*. Edited by P. N. Fedoseyev, Moscow, 1972, p. 43.

² Maurice Thorez, *Oeuvres choisies. En trois volumes. III, 1953-1964*, Paris, 1965, p. 275.

runs the idea of the special guiding role of the intellectuals in modern social development. These revisionist arguments have met with a strong rebuff from French Communists.

"Essentially," write Antoine Casanova and Francis Cohen, "Roger Garaudy's reasoning is based on the idea that the scientific and technological revolution is finished and the fusion of manual and non-manual work is complete. From now onwards there will be no working class such as Marxism defines it, proceeding from an analysis of the capitalist mode of production. It will give way to a 'collective worker' within which the decisive strategic role will be played by the intellectuals. . . . This gives rise to the demand that the French Communist Party should change its strategy, its tactics and its principles: this line is coherent, but it is the line of revisionism."¹

In order to disguise his enhancement of the guiding role of the intellectuals, the "spiritual elite", and belittle the historic role of the working class, Garaudy replaces the concept of the "working class" by the wrongly interpreted concept of the "collective worker". He also has recourse to another risky device, namely, abolishing the distinction between manual and non-manual workers, between blue- and white-collar workers. The fact that modern scientific and technological progress in capitalist society promotes a drawing together of manual and non-manual workers does not require any particular substantiation. This process is undoubtedly taking place within certain limits and relations in modern bourgeois society. But the tendency of manual and non-manual workers to draw together is one thing, and their merging is quite another.² The solution of this task demands the abolition of capitalism and the victory of communist society. Garaudy, from his position of "technological determinism", obviously does not attach sufficient importance to the questions of the socio-economic and political structure

¹ A. Casanova, F. Cohen, "Où en est Roger Garaudy?", *La Nouvelle Critique*, No. 30 (211), janvier 1970, p. 39.

² On these questions see: *Scientific Communism and Its Falsification by Renegades*, Chapter I; Ileana Bauer, Anita Liepert, *Sirenen-gesang eines Renegaten oder die "grosse Wende" Roger Garaudys*, Berlin, 1971, Capit. III, § 5. "Historische Mission der Arbeiterklasse oder 'neuer historischen' Block".

and the prevailing type of production relations on which depends the possibility or impossibility of this or that social process, the trend of their development, etc.

It is a well-known fact that people who question the leading role of the working class in the transition from capitalism to socialism prefer to do so in an underhand way. Instead of openly rejecting the leading role of the working class they seek to cast doubt upon the role and significance of the communist advance guard, the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party of the working class. Roger Garaudy is no exception, yet this does not prevent him from showering compliments on the Communist Party.

Together with other right-wing revisionists Garaudy proposes a programme for "renovating" the party by taking into account the scientific and technological revolution, the cybernetic revolution and so on. This renovation is to consist in the Communist Party renouncing its leading role in the struggle for socialism and its firm ideological and organisational principles in favour of "broad democracy", and turning into a kind of educational organisation which would limit itself to disseminating useful political and other ideas, advice on which line of development to take and so on.

A curious logic indeed! One and the same person, Garaudy, notes that the struggle for socialism is growing increasingly complex and at the same time does all he can to deprive the socialist movement of its efficient Communist parties which are ideologically united and organisationally strong, with a high degree of revolutionary discipline and self-discipline. In place of all this he calls for "a radical break with what is termed its (the party's) 'leading role' in a centralised, state-controlled model."¹ Garaudy assures us that the "leading role" should now consist of helping the workers to take decisions on the basis of a profound knowledge of the problems. "As an organisation of the proletarian class such a party makes decisions but does not issue directives for their execution."²

The question arises as to how the multi-million army of the working people can conduct a struggle for the victory

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 165.

² *Ibid.*

of socialism without a leading centre, without its own revolutionary party which, by studying the given situation, the mood and thoughts of the masses, their advice and suggestions, not only draws up a concrete programme of struggle, but also guides this struggle from day to day. What is the value of a party which makes "political decisions" without seeing that they are carried out by all party organisations and by all its members? Garaudy's formula stresses clearly that the party should not regard its political decisions as directives. The absurdity of such a view is self-evident. Subjection to the will of the majority or to bodies freely elected by this majority is an elementary democratic requirement. Only a person who does not think seriously about revolution and talks about revolution instead of preparing it can speak of this requirement as an "evil", as "bureaucratism", "bureaucratic centralism", etc.

By refusing the Communist Party the right to insist that its directives be put into effect, to demand the subjection of the minority to the majority, to protect its unity by repudiating factional activity, etc., Garaudy was, of course, bound to criticise also the most important organisational principle of the Marxist-Leninist party—the principle of *democratic centralism*. With many reservations, subterfuges and "refinements" he tries to prove that this principle is invalid in present conditions. Democratic centralism, he assures us, was engendered by the fact that the Bolshevik and other Communist parties were underground organisations and it has lost its right to existence now that the situation has changed.

Garaudy has the presumption to say that democratic centralism has become "bureaucratic centralism"¹ in almost all Communist parties.

Having become almost overnight a great "specialist" on the scientific and technological revolution, cybernetics, and the application of mathematical methods to the study of social phenomena, etc., Garaudy juggles with scientific and technological concepts in order to give some kind of weight, scientific authority, to his anti-Marxist statements. Thus, in order to dismiss democratic centralism he turns to cyber-

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 223.

netics. It appears that the "CPSU model" derives from Laplacian determinism, that it is a "mechanistic model" in which centralism predominates and democracy is ignored. Now "the mechanistic model has been superseded by the cybernetic model".¹

What relation do cybernetics bear to democratic centralism? A most direct one, it appears. Let us listen to Garaudy himself. "A feature peculiar to the cybernetic model is its introduction of the feedback factor, that is to say control mechanisms which enable the system to be kept constantly adapted to the new conditions in which it has to function. In the particular case of human society, whether we are concerned with a political party or a factory, this means introducing the subjective factor, in other words the subjectivity of the militants or of the agents of production."² If we remember that the "subjectivity" of the "agents" means their "initiative" and "activity", the superiority of the "cybernetic model" becomes obvious. This model limits centralism to a minimum, in order to inspire faith "in the spirit of initiative, of responsibility and of creativeness".

Garaudy triumphantly concludes: "In the highly developed societies of today democratic centralism, if it is to accord with the dialectical inspiration of its founders, Marx and Lenin, must more than ever be conceived in terms of the cybernetic model rather than of the mechanistic model."³

The point of all these high-sounding arguments about cybernetics and other subjects is simply to reject democratic *centralism*, to deprive the Communist Party of its decisive role in the struggle for socialism, to paralyse its role as the advance guard, and to create something in the nature of pluralist centres of initiative which do not need any "directives". What is this, if not an attempt to disarm the revolutionary party both ideologically and organisationally, to deprive it of its single guiding centre, of its single ideology, single strategy and tactics? Moreover Garaudy is conducting this subversive activity against the Communist Party at a time when the counter-revolutionary

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 224.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

forces, taking little heed of cybernetics and other sciences, are concentrating their forces, organising themselves, drawing up unified plans for repressing progressive, socialist movements. The memory of the many thousand brutally massacred members of the Communist Party of Indonesia is still alive and the treacherous advice of the "cybernetic Marxist" Garaudy must be rejected. And what sort of situation would arise in France itself, in Italy and in the other capitalist European countries, if the Communist parties followed Garaudy's advice and renounced their role as the organisational and ideological leaders of the working class and the whole working people?

The history of the CPSU and the other Communist parties shows that all the anti-Marxist forces, in order to divert these parties from the revolutionary path and force upon them various types of petty-bourgeois "socialism", have always attacked first and foremost the ideological and organisational principles of the Marxist-Leninist parties. It should suffice to recall the "democrat" Trotsky who, together with his supporters, made the principle of "democratic centralism" the target of his bitter and futile attacks. True, in Trotsky's time there was no cybernetics or "cybernetic model" of party organisation. But we have seen the pitiful impression made by Garaudy's pathetic arguments about cybernetics and the "organisational principles" of the Marxist-Leninist party. This is not to mention the fact that a proper understanding of cybernetically organised production would make Garaudy realise that cybernetics by no means excludes centralised programming and control points.

We have already quoted Garaudy's irresponsible, to put it mildly, statements that in the French Communist Party and other Communist parties "democratic centralism" has turned into "bureaucratic centralism". For some reason Garaudy did not notice all these "anti-democratic" inconveniences for many years while he was one of the leaders of the French Communist Party. He began to notice them only when the party and its leadership repudiated his anti-party activities, called him to order and finally expelled him from the party. Both in Stalin's lifetime and after his death it took a long time before Garaudy became hysterical about "murdered" democracy and "canonised" centralism.

Garaudy's noisy attacks on democratic centralism began when the CPSU and other Communist parties embarked on the task of systematically correcting the errors made during the period of the cult of personality, extending and strengthening democratic principles in the party, retaining, naturally, and perfecting the principle of centralism.

Garaudy's "enlightenment" coincided with the intensification of the struggle between the world systems of socialism and capitalism, the intensification of the contradictions in the capitalist world between labour and capital, and also with the growth of revisionist trends in the ranks of Communist parties in the capitalist countries.

As the head theoretician of right-wing revisionism Garaudy has played, it must be said, a most shameful, treacherous role in supporting and inspiring anti-party forces during the Czechoslovak crisis. He supplied with "theoretical" arguments those who, under the guise of fighting for "democratic" and "humane" socialism, were seeking to bring about the collapse of socialism in Czechoslovakia. Fully aware of the role and mission of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in defending the socialist gains and in the future destiny of socialist Czechoslovakia, Garaudy launched particularly determined attacks during this period on the principle of democratic centralism and contributed to the disorganisation of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. We shall return to these questions later. Right now we should like to elucidate how Garaudy views the transition to socialism, now that he has rejected the leading role of the working class and its communist advance guard in the abolition of capitalist relations and the consolidation of socialism in developed European capitalist countries.

By force of habit, as it were, Garaudy continues to speak of revolution and, as we have already noted, even of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leading role of the working class (reduced to the interpretation of the "collective worker"), the Communist Party and a great deal else taken from the vocabulary and theory of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism! Yet all these concepts are deprived by him of their revolutionary-scientific content and basically reduced to nothing.

Garaudy is now placing all his hopes not on the revolutionary struggle for the transition to socialism, but on the

scientific and technological revolution which, he asserts, automatically paves the way for the socialist nationalisation of the basic means of production. He reduces the whole course of the movement from capitalism to socialism to the development of the productive forces or, to be more precise, of technology. Class relations and the notorious "new historical bloc" are seen as deriving automatically from the present stage of scientific and technological progress. The "automaticity" of Kautsky and those of like mind, which was criticised by Garaudy in his book *Lénine* and in other works by him, peacefully coexists with purely technological conceptions of social development, in which production relations are turned into the passive product of technological progress.

Garaudy has fully mastered this right-wing opportunist methodological conception. With many reservations and "amendments" he has also mastered the well-worn social-democratic idea of the gradual transformation of state-monopoly capitalism into socialism. True, unlike most reformists who support this idea, Garaudy, as we have already noted, still employs the concept of the socialist revolution, reducing it to a sum of actions which, when the economic and other conditions have been created, will simply show a handful of monopolists to the door. We shall have occasion later to return to this extraordinarily "easy" revolution which does not seem to need much decisive and organised action by the masses, or "street intervention".

A considerable part of Garaudy's discussion of France's transition to socialism is given over, as we have already seen, to the hopes he places on the "new historical bloc" which is sometimes an alliance of the working class and the scientists and technologists and sometimes a single class of wage-earners which corresponds to the concept of the "collective worker". It is interesting that, in ascribing such decisive importance to the concept of the "new historical bloc", Garaudy, like a superficial journalist, does not even bother to try and make a scientific analysis of this concept and do away with the elementary contradictions in his argument.

Yet however contradictory Garaudy's arguments are, there is one idea that runs through all his writings most clearly and persistently, an idea to which we have already given

attention: namely, that as a result of scientific and technological progress the scientists and technologists are gradually coming to the fore in the struggle against capitalism and occupying their rightful place as the leaders of the revolutionary process.

Even the highest evaluation of anti-monopolistic potential in certain detachments of the scientific and technological intelligentsia does not give us grounds for agreeing with Garaudy's assessments and statements on this question. Suffice it to consider the militant proletarian forces of the French Communist Party, its bodies from the local cells to the Central Committee, to see how ill-founded are Garaudy's attempts to relegate manual workers to a position of secondary importance in the revolutionary class struggle in France today.

One must mention that Garaudy himself is forced to admit that the non-manual workers' standard of living "is more akin to that of the bourgeoisie" and "their ideology bears the latter's imprint".¹ And in spite of such an undifferentiated view of the standard of living and ideology of the intellectuals, Garaudy, with little regard for logic, regards the scientists and technologists as the leading force in the "new historical bloc". In order to give his statements a semblance of truth he makes use of the argument that under modern capitalism the working people are suffering not so much from exploitation as from alienation. He has to draw this totally wrong distinction between exploitation and alienation in order to conclude that the intellectuals are more acutely aware of alienated work than manual workers. From here he proceeds to the desired conclusion that the intellectuals or, rather, certain strata of the intellectuals, are coming into the forefront of the struggle against capitalism.

What is most significant today is not the fact that the working class is growing steadily poorer (an impoverishment that is, indeed, relative), but "that, as the victim of the capitalist system's alienations, it is becoming steadily more alienated. This would help to explain why certain categories of non-manual workers who, as a consequence of the new

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 195.

scientific and technological revolution, are becoming increasingly integrated with the working class, are now painfully aware of that alienation and are turning radical not only because they are faced with growing exploitation but also because they refuse to become part of a system whose goals—or rather, whose absence of goals—they repudiate.”¹

On the many pages of his hastily written books Garaudy frequently returns to the growth of the role of the scientists and technologists (linked with the working class) in leading the revolutionary movement. While not openly denying the leading role of the working class, he in fact, as we have already noted, regards technological strata who are “painfully aware of alienation” as the true leaders of the modern revolutionary process.

This overestimation of the role of the scientific and technological revolution and the intellectuals is accompanied by an almost complete dismissal of the leading role of the Communist Party. No politician who is seriously concerned about the victory of socialism can renounce the means and forces without which there is not and cannot be a successful struggle for socialism. Yet none of Garaudy’s lengthy works on the transition from capitalism to socialism contain any true belief in the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of socialism and the real means of achieving it.

As we know, the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism demands a great effort by the forces of the revolutionary working class, an intensification of its hostility to the order of exploitation, enslavement, social inequality and the various forms of alienation between man and his work. Garaudy, like the right-wing reformists, places his hopes on an “economic mutation” as a result of which capitalism is alleged to be turning into socialism. According to him, the only possible significance of external pressure, the class struggle of the proletariat reducible chiefly to economic struggle is that it merely breaks the shell to let out the live creature which has formed inside.

This is the standpoint from which Garaudy sets about criticising and instructing the French Communist Party,

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 125.

suggesting to it tactics that are in keeping with the "spirit of the age." He writes: "The Party's way out of the impasse (?) is not a change of programme, still less a change of objective, but rather a transformation of its method and style of operating so that, instead of remaining simply a compact force feared and shunned by its enemies, it will become the living, dynamic centre of French life as it moves forward into the future."¹ So, for everything to go smoothly the Communist Party should cease to become a "compact force" because this will make it feared by its enemies! Yet how can the class struggle against capitalism be waged, one may well ask, without upsetting and disturbing its defenders? It may be argued that this is simply an accidental statement, for it is too absurd from the lips of a person who nevertheless talks from time to time of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and so on and so forth.

The statement is absurd, of course, but it does have a certain meaning and is not accidental with respect to Garaudy's general conception. This general conception is a striving to soften class antagonisms as much as possible by arguing that under capitalism scientific and technological progress will sooner or later put everything right economically and socially and then the age of socialism will dawn.

In his book *Lénine* Garaudy quite rightly criticised this interpretation of the question, regarding it as a Kautskian distortion of Marxism. Now this notorious Kautskian "theory of productive forces", the theory of the automatic transformation of capitalism into socialism, in slightly different form, multiplied by the strength of the modern scientific and technological revolution, has been turned by Garaudy into the latest discovery in "creative" Marxism. Kautsky and the entire right-wing reformist movement needed this theory in order to renounce the revolutionary political struggle of the working class for socialism. And for the same reason it is needed by modern reformism and revisionism.

With a great deal of reservations, "explanations" and "refinements", as usual, Garaudy places all his hopes on the "economic mutation" which will take place when everything is "ready" for it and only needs a stimulus from the

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 191.

outside. Hence Garaudy's barely veiled dismissal of the truly revolutionary-political and ideological struggle against the foundations of the capitalist system.

Garaudy does not, of course, deny the importance of parliamentary and other forms of class struggle against the monopoly state, but regards political forms of struggle as extremely secondary and ineffective. He bases his arguments on a gross exaggeration of the economic role of the bourgeois state. For example, he refers to the fact that in France 40 per cent of capital investment is made by the state. The bourgeois state, he maintains, cannot be transformed as a result of obtaining a majority in parliament. The state is merged with the economy and not with parliament. And it cannot be simply overthrown by street manifestations.¹ "If the state," he writes, "has essentially turned into a gigantic economic machine, it can be defeated, paralysed only on the same economic level, that is, on the level at which it is most effective."²

It is a fact that both in France and in the other developed capitalist countries the role of the bourgeois state in the sphere of economic relations has grown considerably compared with past decades. It is also true that the role of parliament and parliamentary forms of struggle has somewhat decreased by comparison with the increased importance of the executive power concentrated in the hands of the monopolies and their state. But it would be most wrong to conclude from this that there can be no growth in the role of parliamentary struggle as the representatives of the working masses gain a majority in parliament and turn it into an effective weapon against the dominion of the monopolies and the power which the latter have usurped. In this connection there is a very real possibility of growth for all forces opposed to state-monopoly capitalism and for their struggle against the hated exploitative order, a struggle which also includes mass street demonstrations by revolutionary forces.

Having dismissed the above-mentioned forms of political struggle of the working people against the monopolies and

¹ *Garaudy par Garaudy*, pp. 258, 261.

² *Ibid.*, p. 262.

branded them as "secondary" and "ineffective", Garaudy places his hopes on a *national strike* which alone, he asserts, can paralyse economically the whole bourgeois, as we already know from his own definition, economic order and state which has, in fact, become a force.

Garaudy constantly assures us that the idea of a "national strike" has nothing to do with the old anarcho-syndicalist myth of a "general strike" because the latter strove to embrace only the working class and thereby to isolate it from the rest of society. The national strike, according to Garaudy, is, as its name suggests, a national phenomenon embracing the whole nation with the exception of the monopolistic bourgeoisie.

It is easy to see that Garaudy is replacing the class struggle against monopoly capital by a "national" struggle. This argument demands serious elucidation.

There can be no doubt that the proletariat is called upon to unite around itself all the strata of society which are exploited by the monopolies. At a certain stage of the movement towards socialism the general anti-monopolistic front of the struggle is an important condition for achieving progressive democracy which will grow into socialism. At this democratic stage of the revolutionary movement the restriction of the power of the monopolies is carried out in particular ways, as are workers' control in production, the measures to consolidate democratic principles in the production process itself, and so on.

The 19th and 20th Congresses of the French Communist Party gave full consideration to the nature of progressive democracy and the conditions for its growth into socialism. Yet its policy statements did not, as one expected that they would not, include a call for a "national strike".

The fact is that such a call, in France at any rate, is fairly unclear and ambiguous. The question immediately arises as to whether the *whole* French nation is ready to wage battle on the monopolistic ruling circles. And why the middle and big (non-monopolistic) bourgeoisie should march hand in hand against monopoly capital, in spite of the real contradictions which exist between the monopolistic and non-monopolistic bourgeoisie? Are these contradictions more profound than those between the working class and the bourgeoisie?

We referred above to Garaudy's argument that there is nothing in common between the anarcho-syndicalist "general strike" and a "national strike". Naturally these two slogans arose in different historical periods and reflect different socio-economic aims. But nevertheless Garaudy is wrong to try and separate them totally. What they have in common is that they are both attempts to solve highly important problems without a political struggle, by purely economic methods. The "theoreticians" of anarcho-syndicalism by no means denied the a-political nature of the "general strike" or thought that it would lead to a revolutionary fight with capitalism. They regarded it as a general *economic* strike, as a result of which the capitalist order would be paralysed and the bourgeois system would disappear together with the bourgeois state. Anarcho-syndicalism rejected all forms of the political struggle of the working class, including the parliamentary struggle.

Even this brief résumé of the features of anarcho-syndicalism shows that its idea of a "general strike" is not so different from that of a "national strike". It is true that the class movement is replaced by a "national" movement in Garaudy's conception, but here, too, one finds the same reliance on the "economic" overthrow of the capitalist state, the same tendency to renounce the political forms of struggle and, in particular, the parliamentary form.

It is significant that, anticipating the just accusation that he is reviving certain anarcho-syndicalist slogans aimed against parliamentary struggle, Garaudy hastens to "warn" his readers not to draw "nihilist conclusions" or "revive the anarcho-syndicalism of another era".¹ This is one of the typical devices which he uses to ward off criticism.

But of what value are his warnings if, a few lines later, he writes: "Parliament can no longer play an operative role in political life, whether in the attainment of power or in the administration of national affairs."²

Let us cite yet another example of how Garaudy dismisses the political struggle in the developed capitalist countries. Again in order to avert criticism he writes: "The

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 211.

² *Ibid.*

revolutionary struggle has to be carried into every field: not only into the field of politics, but also into those of the economy and of culture."¹ Reading these words one might imagine that Garaudy is giving due recognition to all forms of the class struggle. But this is by no means the case. This reservation is merely a ruse. It is followed by what represents his real conviction, namely, that in the developed capitalist countries at least, the political form of the class struggle must not be overstressed. "The specific historical conditions, however, in which socialist revolution has been effected," he writes, "—as, for instance, in China and Russia—have meant that the emphasis has always been placed on the chronological and hierarchical priority of the political struggle, often to the exclusion of anything else. This may have been necessary in countries that were, at the start, economically and technologically backward or where there was no bourgeois democratic tradition."²

Thus Garaudy tries to make the priority of the political form of struggle—the most acute and effective form of struggle for socialism—a feature primarily of the economically and democratically "backward" countries. With regard to the developed capitalist countries it is easy to conclude from Garaudy's argument that the transition to socialism there is linked mainly with the economic struggle and economic transformations.

So here we have the basis of Garaudy's revisionist views on the lack of need for the Communist Party to play a leading role! In order for the "great mutation" to take place and capitalism to be transformed into socialism as a result of the "economic changes" accompanied by "democratic changes", there is no need for a class political struggle, or for a revolutionary Communist Party with its effective principle of democratic centralism, or for a Marxist-Leninist "official philosophy" scientifically substantiating the struggle for the consolidation of socialism.

Under the guise of fighting for "creative Marxism" Garaudy has modified and presented us with old right-wing reformist revelations, having "revitalised" them with refer-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

² *Ibid.*

ences to the scientific, technological and cybernetic revolutions, and so on.

Thus, whereas in the case of the United States Garaudy does not see any prospects for socialism in the foreseeable future, with regard to the other developed capitalist countries, his socialist forecasts are basically not very different from the "socialism" which he once criticised himself as opportunist pseudo-socialism. This can be seen, for example, from the fact that in his books on socialism he never provides a serious analysis of the respective alignment of antagonistic forces in France itself and in the other developed capitalist countries. His analysis contains little description of the enemy of the working class, the prospects for counter-revolution, its strategy and tactics, its reserves—both domestic and international—the essence of its ideological "demagogy" and so on. Only a person who writes a great deal about the struggle for socialism but shows little concern for this struggle, for socialism stems from the political struggle and the clash of antagonistic forces in capitalist society, could approach the problem in such a way.

Only a person who places his hopes not on a serious and tense struggle with monopoly capitalism but on the latter's gradual "economic" and "democratic" transformation into socialism could approach the problem in such a way. In this connection one should mention that on the basis of a few purely formal symptoms Garaudy tries to "prove" that in France, apart from the Communist Party and the communist press, there are basically no other parties or party press. He makes a partial exception in the case of the Socialist party. "Thus we see," Garaudy writes, "that there is no party outside the Communist Party having an organised, stable form and able to bring to a class or social stratum the consciousness of itself and its own ends, a party providing in addition an organisation for the attainment of those ends."¹ Just imagine! The bourgeois parties in France, and particularly the Gaullist party, have ceased to be conscious of their own interests, their own ends.

Garaudy is most "offended" when he is accused of right-wing opportunism and liquidationism. Yet these accusations

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 216.

are well founded. And it is unlikely that he is genuinely "offended". Otherwise he could not help reflecting on the fact that the 19th Congress of the French Communist Party unreservedly rejected all his revisionist ideas. This was bound to happen, because Garaudy was totally debunked. The French Communists realised only too well that all his playing about with fashionable words and ideas, his interpretation of the nature and social consequences of the scientific and technological revolution, his relegation of the working class to the periphery of socio-political life, his overestimation of the role of scientific and technical personnel in establishing the new order, his attempts to weaken the Communist Party ideologically and organisationally and a great deal more, all added up to a rejection of revolutionary class struggle and the tangible prospects for socialism in the European capitalist countries.

CHAPTER IV

"PLURAL SOCIALISM" AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTION

As well as giving a fundamentally distorted picture of imperialism and the outlook for its future development, Garaudy presents an equally distorted view of the theory and practice of socialism.

Of all the problems of socialism which Garaudy and his fellows subject to a revisionist treatment we shall consider only "plural socialism", the right-wing revisionist conception of "models of socialism".

This conception is based on exaggerating, turning into an absolute, the basically correct idea that in different countries and regions people do not advance towards socialism according to a standardised scheme, but by taking into account the specific features of the country in question, by choosing the most reliable and effective means of building socialism. This correct idea, which was upheld by the classics of Marxism-Leninism, is twisted by Garaudy and those of like mind into the idea of "different types of socialism".

We shall see later that the defence of "plural socialism" is not only the result of theoretical-epistemological errors. Garaudy and his supporters are preaching the existence of various "models of socialism" not because they love variety. Their search for "new forms" of socialism is aimed primarily at discrediting true socialism which has been built in the USSR and other countries.

These designers of socialism, Garaudy included, are trying to fragment the single scientifically interpreted concept of socialism into a multitude of social organisms which have little

in common with one another or with socialism itself. Garaudy's much publicised conception of "models of socialism" is aimed against the international unity of the communist movement and the world socialist system.

1. THE ORIGINS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PLURAL SOCIALISM"

The idea of "many versions" of Marxist teaching and socialism has a long history. Without dwelling on its earlier stages, we would note that with the very inception of Leninism, with the victory of the October Revolution, the theoreticians of reformism began to talk about natural existence of different interpretations of socialism and different interpretations of Marxism.

The ideologists of the Second International, for example, proclaimed that Leninism was a specific interpretation of Marxist theory, an exclusively Russian phenomenon. To them goes the "credit" for dividing socialism into "democratic" and "undemocratic". By their activity the reformist theoreticians showed that the construction of "models of socialism" is nothing but an attempt to legalise deviation from scientific communism, to replace it by doctrines which have nothing in common with it. And in fact, as practice showed, "democratic socialism" in the policy documents of the right-wing socialist parties is basically no different from "liberalised" capitalism, for it does not presuppose the abolition of the bourgeois order and the capitalist mode of production.

As can be seen from the new programmes of the Social-Democratic parties, adopted at the end of the fifties, "democratic socialism" replaces the final aim of the working-class movement—socialism—by a set of petty-bourgeois and liberal-bourgeois reforms which do not seek to undermine capitalist society. These programmes, which are full of fine words about the "freedom" and "dignity" of the individual, lack the demand for the abolition of capitalist property, without which all talk of the "complete freedom" and "equality" of the individual, its "flowering" and "self-assertion" are meaningless, a lot of flowery and sentimental phrases borrowed from the ideological arsenal of bourgeois liberalism. We have in mind the rejection of the demand

for the transference of the tools and means of production into the hands of the whole people. Meanwhile the abolition of capitalist property is the basic and indispensable condition for building a socialist society.

After the declaration of the Socialist International "The Aims and Tasks of Democratic Socialism" (1951), the programmes of the right-wing reformist parties have tried to direct the masses not against capitalism in general, but only against "uncontrolled capitalism". The nationalisation by the bourgeois state of some industries, its growing intervention in the economy, and the introduction of reforms under pressure from the working class are enough for reformist theoreticians to proclaim the triumph of "democratic socialism".

In the new programmes socialism is defined as a "mixed economy" system in which different socio-economic organisms, including even the monopolies, live together happily ever after. Thus, according to the programme of the Austrian Socialist Party, in a "socialist" society as well as state capitalist enterprises (which are unreservedly proclaimed to be "socialised economy enterprises") and middle and small private businesses there can also exist large capitalist enterprises if . . . they do not interfere with the public good. These enterprises will only be nationalised (with full compensation) if their "dominant position threatens the economic and political interests of the whole of society".¹

In precisely the same way the new programme of the SPD, adopted in Bad Godesberg in 1959, demands not the abolition of the capitalist monopolies, but only "containing the power of big business". The drafters of this programme were impelled not by the urge to establish socialist ownership, but by the desire to confer upon everyone private ownership. This well-worn reactionary utopia is presented as the latest in "democratic socialism", as one of the means for adapting the party programme to the "needs of the times".

In his address on the new programme at the Bad Godesberg Congress Erich Ollenhauer was forced to admit that

¹ *Das neue Programm der SPÖ. Beschlossen von ausserordentlichen Parteitag am 14. Mai 1958, Wien, S. 14.*

many people equated the Social-Democrats' economic ideal with the bourgeois economic policy of Erhard. Not daring to repudiate this assertion, Ollenhauer tried to explain the coincidence in question by ... the influence of "democratic socialism" on Erhard! Erhard, however, expressed the opposite point of view. Referring to the new SPD programme, he announced: "Everything good in it comes from me". This is, perhaps, closer to the truth.

We have given fairly detailed consideration to the social-democratic "model of socialism", because it is as similar to the bourgeois society as two peas in a pod. To jump ahead, let us point out that Garaudy's models, all his attempts to depict socialism as that which it is not, all his frantic hatred for the socialism built in the USSR and other countries, are rooted first and foremost in the theory and practice of old and new socialist renegades, the theoreticians and leaders of right-wing socialism and right-wing revisionism.

While Garaudy was having his long "dogmatic sleep" all manner of reformists and revisionists were rejecting the general laws of socialism and inventing various "models of socialism" which differ from one another radically. Long before Garaudy, the opponents of Marxism-Leninism had begun talking about "Western" and "Eastern" socialism, about "European", "Asiatic", "Latin American", "Soviet", "Chinese" and "Czechoslovak" "models of socialism", and so on. Not content with dividing up socialism according to national and regional features, the reformist and revisionist theoreticians classify it according to type of economic management, nature of relations between society and the individual, etc. As a result this many-faced socialism is "enriched" by models of "étatist" and "self-managing" or "market" socialism, "bureaucratic", "democratic", "humane" and "inhumane" socialism.

It must be said straightaway that our rejection of the revisionist conception of a variety of "models of socialism" by no means extends to the application of scientific models to the study of social phenomena. It also goes without saying that not all usage of the term "model of socialism" involves the distortion of Marxist-Leninist theory. Often it means the recognition of different ways of progressing towards socialism, different forms of building socialism by taking

account of concrete peculiarities. In this case all one can question is the expediency of using a term which has acquired anti-Marxist connotations thanks to the efforts of the reformists and revisionists and is capable of giving rise to confusion. Marxist theory has elaborated clear, precise concepts and categories to signify the dialectics of the general, particular and individual in the development of socialism. But we are not quibbling over words here. Our firm objection is to the profoundly erroneous attempts to present as a "model of socialism" something which is not socialism at all.

Garaudy has followed in the wake of his reformist and revisionist predecessors in defending the false idea of "plural socialism". He has learnt a great deal from the Czechoslovak revisionists and, in his turn, given considerable support to those who sought to suppress socialism in Czechoslovakia under the guise of "democratic" and "humanist" declamations. There can be no doubt that the attempt to destroy the socialist order in Czechoslovakia and replace it by something strongly reminiscent of the right-wing socialists' model of "democratic socialism" was fully supported by Garaudy and served as an important basis for his theoretical speculations on "plural socialism".

What exactly did Garaudy hasten to justify unreservedly and "theoretically"?

In the most critical period of the events in Czechoslovakia when the "quiet counter-revolution" was preparing to become a revolution that shot and hanged people, *Rude Pravo*, which had temporarily fallen into the hands of anti-socialist, right-wing elements, printed an article entitled "On the Eve of Decision-Taking" (*Rude Pravo*, July 10, 11, 12, 1968).

The article's aim was to vilify the "old, traditional model of socialism borrowed by Czechoslovakia from the outside" which, it was alleged, had originated in countries "that did not possess the material, social and cultural basis for socialist development". The authors of the article announced that the building of socialism in the USSR and in practically all the other socialist countries was an "historical mistake". Above all they attempted to discredit the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia itself.

The revisionists did their best to present as the "traditional model" of socialism the greatly distorted and broadly "generalised" mistakes (real or imaginary) made during the building of socialism in the USSR and other countries. Moreover, the recognition of the leading role of the Communist Party, the principle of democratic centralism, the right of the socialist state to plan the economy and direct the building of socialism, and a great deal more without which there is not and cannot be any genuine socialism, were presented, barely veiled and with this or that reservation, as "departure" from socialism.

As for the "model of socialism" offered by the revisionists to the Czechoslovak people, it was "free" of all "deformations", in that it rejected the need for state intervention in "spheres which do not belong to it, such as the economy, science, culture, etc.". "The full development of commodity relations", unhampered by the state and a state plan was seen as the economic basis of the "Czechoslovak model". In glorifying this utopian-anarchic ideal, the authors of the article announced that democratic centralism was a "temporary", compulsory measure during the period of the intense class struggle. But since the abolition of the exploiting classes meant the disappearance of all intensity in the class struggle inside the country, the principle of democratic centralism would also disappear, it was argued, giving way to "pure democracy" under which, according to this anarchist logic, local organisations would not be subordinate to a central one, or lower bodies to higher bodies, or the minority to the majority and, clearly, an era of universal chaos would arrive. To make this picture of the new "model of socialism" more complete, the authors recognised the right of opposition groups, i.e., factions, to emerge, unite and form within the ranks of the party.

Naturally enough the "Czechoslovak model" received most praise from the bourgeois and reformist circles in the capitalist countries, who realised full well that this "model" meant the rejection and vilification of true socialism and that if it became reality it was capable of returning the country to capitalist relations, to bourgeois democracy.

Addressing the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, the First Secretary of the Central Com-

mittee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Gustav Husak, said: "The content of socialism and its basic principles became an object of ideological and political speculation. Some associated the concept of socialism with pluralist bourgeois democracy and the reformist model of so-called democratic socialism from the programmes of the Right Social-Democratic parties".¹

The events associated with the "Czechoslovak model" showed clearly that its creators and defenders were by no means concerned with improving socialist relations, creating conditions for the fullest manifestation of its democratic and humanist essence, or searching for the best ways and means of building a developed socialist society in the country, but, first and foremost, with abolishing socialist Czechoslovakia.

As practice has shown, the ideas underlying the "Czechoslovak model of socialism" flatly contradicted the basic interests of the people. The attempts to introduce this "model" led to disruption of the country's socialist economy and gave rise to the anarchy so profitable to counter-revolutionary forces. Under the cover of "new democracy" these forces created their own organisations and used the mass media to disorganise the working people, disseminate reactionary, bourgeois ideas, whip up anti-communist hysteria, and encourage political provocation, diversion, and moral and physical terrorist methods against the Communists.

One might have thought that the counter-revolutionary activities of the anti-socialist elements in Czechoslovakia did not leave anyone in any doubt as to their true aim—using the revisionist conception of the multiplicity of "models of socialism" in order to deceive the people and restore the capitalist order. However, Garaudy has drawn totally different conclusions from the Czechoslovak crisis. The "Czechoslovak model of socialism", its anti-popular essence, the attempt to replace socialist democracy as quietly and "peacefully" as possible by bourgeois democracy, and the infamous collapse of the "model of socialism with a human

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Moscow, 1969*, p. 408.

face" provided, as it were, a new stimulus for Garaudy to "theoretically interpret" and defend the general conception of "plural socialism".

Naturally Garaudy does not utter one word of criticism against the quasi-socialist "Czechoslovak model of socialism". On the contrary, he talks endlessly about its obvious "advantages" by comparison with all the other existing models, and proclaims the "Czechoslovak model" to be the "true rebirth of socialism".

One of the crudest errors of the old leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was to give the anti-socialist, right-wing elements complete freedom to vilify socialism shamelessly, undermine its foundations, disorientate the working masses, and gain control of the most important posts in the mass media. Yet all this is regarded by Garaudy as nothing less than an inspiring feature of the "new model".

He has said even more absurd things, stating that the "Czechoslovak model" was a great programme intended to show for the first time in practice "the superiority of socialist production and socialist democracy over capitalist production and formal bourgeois democracy".¹ Thus, with one stroke of the pen, the renegade Garaudy seeks to dismiss the tremendous labours of millions of people who, for the first time, built socialism in the USSR and defended it with a courage unprecedented in the history of mankind.

In our brief outline of the theoretical and practical sources of "plural socialism" we have not, naturally, mentioned many of Garaudy's predecessors in "modelling socialism" from the camp of international opportunism and all manner of bourgeois "typologists" of various "socialisms" and "Marxisms", the "services" of M. Djilas and his supporters, O. Sik, one of the theoreticians of "market socialism", the leaders of the British right-wing Labour movement, who in the fifties, without being afraid of appearing ridiculous, assured simple souls that in Britain the Labour "model of socialism" was either completely constructed or nearing completion.

¹ R. Garaudy, *Pour un modèle français du socialisme*, pp. 180-81.

Without forgetting Garaudy's predecessors in the theory of the "plurality of socialism", we should not, however, overlook his own "contribution" to this so fashionable doctrine.

2. GARAUDY'S PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF THE "PLURALITY OF SOCIALISM"

For several years now, in book after book and using almost identical phrases and examples, Garaudy has been defending the idea that recognition of the "plurality of models of socialism" is a matter of prime importance.

In *The Turning-Point of Socialism* he speaks of the "unsatisfactory nature" of the work of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, stressing in particular that the meeting ignored the "central problem"—the problem of "the plurality of models of socialism".

One can understand the depth of Garaudy's dissatisfaction if one takes into account the fact that this is not the first time he has tried to attach special significance to "divergence" in the communist movement and the world socialist system. Moreover, his interest in this problem is motivated by the desire not so much to overcome existing disagreements and contradictions, as to justify the inevitability.

By "models of socialism" Garaudy means systems of economic, socio-political and ideological relations which have little and sometimes nothing in common.

It cannot be said that Garaudy ignores the general features common to all these different "models of socialism", but he passes over them quickly. This is no accident, for the motive behind his writing lies elsewhere, namely, in the urge to prove the fundamental difference between "models of socialism" both in the sphere of basis phenomena and particularly in the system of political management of society. In a sense these "models" are as qualitatively distinctive and dissimilar as Leibnitz's monads. They are peculiar local formations produced by specific, unique economic, social, political, socio-psychological, national, regional and other causes. Each particular "model of socialism" has its own special causes of origin and its own laws of development. Thus, recognition of different "models" means recognising not only differing ways of

transition to socialism, but also equally differing "socialisms". In order to show how serious these differences are, Garaudy makes use of the following comparison: just as bourgeois states can be democratic or fascist, differences of equal magnitude can exist between socialist states. Further on he draws his main conclusion: given more or less similar forms of social ownership of the instruments and means of production there can be both "democratic" and "undemocratic" socialism.

This conclusion is totally false and fundamentally contradicts the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of socialism. Socialism is inseparable from democracy, from the rule of the people, from extensive rights and freedoms for the people, from the creative initiative and activity of the popular masses and the individual. Socialism without democracy is not socialism. Socialism emerges as the result of the revolutionary creativeness of the masses and can exist and develop on the basis of the creative independent action of millions of working people. It is also an indisputable truth that true democracy can exist only under socialism.

Garaudy knows all this perfectly well and has written a great deal about it in his time. And, as we shall see later, he himself sometimes rejects the possibility of an "undemocratic model" of socialism.

He has grown accustomed to the idea that his political aims give him the right to be "plural" and to express conflicting statements on one and the same question, with a total disregard for logic.

To substantiate the essential differences between "models of socialism" Garaudy sets about reviewing the basic Marxist definitions of socialism. It turns out that socialism is not the first phase of the communist formation, but some sort of transition period from capitalism to communism. "Socialism," writes Garaudy, "is not a socio-economic formation like the slave-owning order, feudalism and capitalism. Socialism for Marx and Engels is the transitional form between capitalism and communism."¹

It is easy to see that Garaudy ascribes his own definitions to the classics of Marxism who, in noting the differences

¹ *Garaudy par Garaudy*, p. 48.

between socialism and communism, always stressed the essential features which linked them as two phases of one and the same formation. This is so well known that it does not require special argument.

Desiring to divorce socialism from communism and make socialism something intermediate between capitalism and communism, Garaudy turns into an absolute the well-known statement by the classics of Marxism-Leninism about the "birthmarks" of capitalism, the vestiges of capitalism in the economy and people's minds in the phase of socialist development. However, in emphasising the "existence of a large number of elements of the past" in socialism, he "forgets" that production relations—that decisive characteristic of the social order—are basically the same under socialism and communism. In both cases private ownership of the instruments and means of production has been abolished, as have the exploiting classes and exploitation itself. In both cases one finds an economy based on means of production which have been socialised in the interests of the whole people.

The idea of socialism as the transitional form from capitalism to communism, which has been taken, incidentally, from Maoist "theoreticians", as we have already noted, is the basis for the "theory" of different socialisms. And indeed, if socialism is not the first phase of communism but simply a transitional form to it, this deprives it of all the essential, generally binding, universal characteristics which derive from the fact that socialism is an indispensable stage in the single communist formation. Nor does Garaudy conceal the aim of his operations. He writes: "If we regard socialism as a transitional form, there must necessarily be a very great diversity of models (of socialism—*H.M.*) which differ fundamentally, for these differences are engendered by the diversity of the preceding social and economic structures, of traditions and circumstances."¹

It is evident that Marxism by no means ignores the differences in the level of economic, socio-political and cultural development of countries that embark on building socialism. Undoubtedly these differences also determine differences in ways and forms of building socialism in the respective coun-

¹ *Garaudy par Garaudy*, p. 48.

tries. But for all these differences one is still dealing with the same social order—socialism, with its objective and general laws.

In Garaudy's conception, however, these differences become so fundamental that they oust the general laws of socialism as the first phase of communist society. This also gives rise to the assertion that there are many different types of socialism or, as Garaudy himself puts it, different "models of socialism".

Here it must be recalled that Garaudy's "models of socialism" have nothing in common with scientific models of social phenomena. By "model" Garaudy means either existing social organisms or ones that could or should exist. Thus, alongside the "traditional model of socialism" in the USSR and other countries, and alongside the actual "Chinese model of socialism", etc., there is, for example, the "French model of socialism" which exists so far only as a *possibility*.

Most frequently Garaudy turns to "existing models of socialism" and particularly to the "Soviet traditional model of socialism". And it is here that one sees most clearly the meaning, significance and aim of the whole campaign for models of socialist society.

Fundamentally distorting the history of the building of the first socialist state, Garaudy maintains that "after the death of Lenin in the Soviet Union this bureaucratic deformation (of socialism—*H.M.*) ... raged for more than thirty years".¹ And a few pages later he makes another slanderous statement that "bureaucratic deformation has become a permanent trait of the Soviet regime".²

Gathering together all the facts concerning the violation of Leninist standards of party and state life, which were revealed and condemned by the CPSU itself, Garaudy constructs out of them the "Soviet model of socialism" which, he alleges, is characterised by the ousting of democracy and turning of the masses into the instruments of some external will.

Evidently realising how absurd and insulting these views are for the Soviet people, the CPSU and all communist in-

¹ R. Garaudy, *Pour un modèle français du socialisme*, p. 124.

² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

ternationalists, Garaudy hastens to "pacify" them by announcing that the alleged deformation of the "Soviet model" had irresistible objective historical reasons. Following Kautsky, the Russian Mensheviks, the Trotskyites and modern bourgeois "Sovietologists", he reiterates the old "argument" about Russia's former economic backwardness and lack of democratic traditions, which are seen to be responsible for the emergence and existence of the "deformed model of socialism".

He does not tell us, however, how this "bureaucratic socialism" produced such unprecedented economic, socio-political and cultural development in the Soviet land, how it provided such great outlets for the heroic enthusiasm not of isolated individuals but of the many millions of Soviet people, about whose fine achievements, incidentally, Garaudy himself has written a great deal with profound admiration in his time!

Let us draw attention to another interesting detail. Even in the books written after his "break with dogmatism", Garaudy continued to worship Lenin who, in spite of the dogmas of the Second International, maintained that Russia could and should build socialism in spite of its relative economic backwardness in comparison with the developed capitalist countries. Now he has turned Russia's former economic backwardness into his main argument in support of the view that the "deformation" of socialism in the USSR was inevitable. There is no logic here at all, but the political intention is clear enough—to discredit Soviet socialism at all costs with complete disregard for logic and ethics.

Garaudy wrote, for example: "Whereas Lenin resolutely led a workers' party along the road to revolution in a country still deeply imbued with feudalism and lagging a century behind England, France and even behind Germany, in the development of capitalism, Kautsky, who could not accept, 'the minutest deviation from the German model', and remained tied to a 'slavish imitation of the past', behaved towards the counter-revolution with the caution born of his dogmatic Marxism. Basing his argument on the postulate that a socialist revolution was only possible in the most advanced industrial countries, he declared that in Russia 'the objective economic premises' for socialism did not exist, hence there should be

no revolution." It is easy to see that here Garaudy, basing himself on Lenin, is asserting the possibility of building socialism in Russia in spite of its economic backwardness. Yet he goes on, both in the book we are quoting and in his subsequent works, to develop the idea that the victory of socialism in an economically backward country was the cause of socialism's "deformation".¹

Yet another point. Quite recently, in his book *Towards a French Model of Socialism*, Garaudy, for all his talk about the "deformation" of the "Soviet model", did not dare to cast doubt on the historic significance of the socialism built in the USSR. For the most part he lamented the absence of "democracy" and "freedom" in the Soviet Union to discredit and undermine Soviet power, to support the slanderers like Sinyavsky and Daniel, and all manner of Zionist riff-raff who seek to "assert themselves". Today, however, justifying all the hopes of his bourgeois publishers and anti-Soviet readers, he has taken yet another step towards shameful betrayal. Allying himself with Trotskyite provocateurs, traitors and defectors from the Soviet Union, Garaudy attempts in his book *Reconquête de l'espoir* (Grasse Publishers) to "prove" that there is nothing good at all in the Soviet Union. Everything there, he asserts, is on the decline—the economy, the power of the state, and culture. Judging by the fantastic and crudely slanderous picture which Garaudy draws, this great world power cannot exist at all without the financial support of the capitalist countries. On the basis of facts which he has picked out of thin air, he predicts that by 1975 the USSR will be seventh in the production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, behind such countries as Canada and Sweden.

In the book *Towards a French Model of Socialism* Garaudy is gracious enough to still regard the USSR as a socialist country, albeit a country with "deformed" socialism. Now, however, having finally "got angry" with the USSR, he has decided to stop considering it a socialist country altogether. "The Soviet Union," he writes, "is not a capitalist country because there is no longer any private ownership of

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, pp. 77-78.

the means of production. Yet nor has it reached the stage of socialism."¹

If one recalls that according to Garaudy socialism is a "transitional form" between capitalism and communism and that the USSR has not even "reached" this form, the question surely arises as to what kind of order does exist in the USSR. Is Garaudy perhaps wrong in announcing that the USSR is not a capitalist country? Of course, if his bourgeois publishers ask him Garaudy would easily correct his mistake and proclaim that the Soviet Union is a feudal state.

Garaudy has written a great deal about the "Chinese model of socialism".² He was obliged, of course, to disassociate himself from the crudest claims of the Maoist leaders that the "Chinese model" is the only possible model of socialism. Nor could he avoid noting the most glaring acts of provocation by the Chinese leaders, aimed at breaking up the international communist movement. He also makes a passing reference to certain "indubitable excesses" in Maoist China. Nevertheless it is easy to see that he is sympathetic towards a great deal that is being done by the Maoist leadership in China. He urges people to adopt an "understanding" attitude towards the "Chinese model" and to apply the principle of "to understand all is to forgive all" to it.

One can safely say that Garaudy's approach to the "Chinese model" and his assessment of it are dictated by purely pragmatic, political considerations. Hypocritically criticising the anti-Sovietism of the Chinese leaders, he himself, from a blatantly anti-Soviet standpoint, clearly sympathises with Mao and his frequently changing minions. Guided by the principle that "my enemy's enemy is my friend", Garaudy is constantly defending Maoism against criticism by the CPSU and other Communist and Workers' parties. Moreover, he blatantly distorts this criticism of Maoism. As we know, no Marxist-Leninist party, including the CPSU, has ever maintained that China has ceased to be a socialist country. They maintain something quite different:

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 26.

² *Le problème chinois*, Paris, 1967; sections on the "Chinese model" in *Towards a French Model of Socialism* and *The Turning-Point of Socialism*.

that Maoist policy is threatening the socialist gains of the Chinese people.

Garaudy, however, insists that the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties are accusing China wrongly and then asks with false indignation: in what way China (whatever may be the mistakes and excesses of her leaders) has "ceased to be socialist"?¹

The Maoist leaders' break, not only with Marxism-Leninism but often with elementary logic, is justified by Garaudy on account of the "historical conditions" of China's development, the special features of the peasant revolution and so on. Maoism with its personality cult, voluntarism, chauvinism and terrorist dictatorship directed against the finest members of the Chinese Communist Party, the working class and the peasantry, is justified by Garaudy, either overtly or covertly, by references to "objective conditions". It is characteristic that he justifies many of the anti-democratic and anti-socialist actions of the Maoists. He is as understanding and sympathetic towards the basic principles of Maoist policy as he is implacable to the fabricated "deformations" linked with the "traditional model of socialism".

Even the false revolutionarism of the Maoists, which in fact gets on perfectly well with imperialism, seeks and finds contact with American imperialism, assists the latter in its struggle against the socialist world and against the national liberation movement—this revolutionarism is regarded by Garaudy (with a few minor "corrections") as "serious" and "progressive".

Referring to the CPSU's criticism of this voluntarist revolutionarism, Garaudy writes quite shamelessly: "The argument which the Russians have raised against the Chinese in this connection smacks unpleasantly of the objections levelled by Kautsky against Lenin."²

"Analysing" the Chinese model, Garaudy basically, with a few mild reservations, justifies such shameful phenomena as the "Great Leap Forward" and the "cultural revolution" in Maoist China. He takes absolutely seriously the subjectivist and propagandist nature of the "Great Leap

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 128.

² *Ibid.*, p. 133.

Forward" which caused such harm to China's economy and its prestige. Had anything of the sort happened in the Soviet Union, Garaudy would have created a terrible commotion and begun to write a book a month. But birds of feather flock together! Garaudy thinks it possible to confine himself to the admission that it would have been better not to have set up "the rural blast furnaces of the Great Leap Forward".¹

As for the notorious "cultural revolution", which had nothing whatsoever to do with either culture or revolution, Garaudy attaches great political significance to this in the building of socialism in China. He regards it as a continuation of the "Mao Tse-tung line" in the struggle "to combat the dangers of a new mandarinat in the shape of a bureaucratic organisation of the Party".²

So it appears that the reckless bacchanalia called the "cultural revolution" was a great act in defence of democracy against the "bureaucratic degeneration of the party machine". Just imagine! The masses of hungweipings were the bulwark and support of "democracy"! Garaudy completely exonerates Mao who, in order to combat the bureaucratic elements, "ran the risk of appealing to the masses over the head of the Party itself."³ Garaudy is quite right in stating this. It is true that, in order to come into direct contact with the "masses", Mao and the military-bureaucratic leadership not only ignored the Communist Party and relied on the hungweipings, but also destroyed, with the help of fanatic young people, Party and state organisations to which Mao and the Maoists objected.

The "super-democrat" Garaudy regards this treatment of the Communist Party as perfectly correct and democratic. What is more, he sees this act as the realisation of the "historical initiative of the masses". "The Party," he writes, "was not regarded as the only subjective factor in the revolution. The appeal to the historical initiative of the masses was in the Leninist tradition."⁴ It is an interesting picture: the deified Mao leads the duped, fooled and fanatic elements

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 132.

² *Ibid.*, p. 131.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 132-33.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

of the civil population and the army in swooping down on the Party, the apparatus of the socialist state and the organs of power elected by the people, and Garaudy, seeing all this, welcomes hungweiping "democracy"! He describes the so-called cultural revolution "as a difficult but necessary stage in the realisation of socialism in China".¹

In recent years Garaudy has expended many hypocritical words in defence of the prestige of socialism, its noble essence and calling. Addressing a meeting of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party at Ivry in 1969 he made an hysterical appeal "to preserve the image of socialism in the minds and hearts of millions of people."²

How, one may ask, is it possible to preserve the image of socialism in all its purity by presenting the actions of the hungweipings as the realisation of the "historical initiative of the masses", and by ignoring the Mao personality cult, the lawlessness, the mass denunciations, the public executions without trial? Why does Garaudy turn into a Cicero when he is criticising the Stalin personality cult and lose the gift of speech when the Mao Tse-tung personality cult should be honestly and openly criticised? Is Garaudy not aware that a large number of bourgeois journalists have used the Maoist "cultural revolution" with all its cruelty, inhumanity and lack of culture simply in order to ridicule socialism and the socialist way of life? He knows this full well, but still attempts to justify the Maoist "model of socialism". Not because he really believes in it, but for purely political reasons, guided by his vicious anti-Sovietism.

On the one hand, Garaudy advocates the "Czechoslovak model of socialism with a human face", and on the other, he defends the "Chinese model", the creators of which reject humanism as a bourgeois invention. Garaudy also finds a great deal to say in defence of Maoist asceticism, although he accompanies this defence with the usual cautious reservations. He cannot, of course, ignore the fact that the Maoist glorification of a policy of frugality and asceticism engendered by backwardness and poverty has led to "excesses" which are responsible for a wrong interpretation of Marxism. But hav-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

² R. Garaudy, *The Whole Truth*, p. 119.

ing said this he attempts to discover a "creative" attitude to the problem of consumption in this absurd glorification of poverty because he wants to praise the creators of the "Chinese model". Having stated that the idea of asceticism, the idea of a "collectivised misery" is the complete antithesis of Marxism, he goes on: "But the principle of seeking a new type of consumption, of forming new needs and a different model of civilisation that is not based on individual comfort alone, has at least been stated and, if we shirk the problem, we shall be denying socialism the opportunity to reflect, as it must do, about its ends."¹

There can be no doubt that "individual comfort" is not the ideal of communist civilisation, but of what relevance here is the "Maoist model of socialism", all this demagoguery about asceticism and poverty? What is new, significant, or creative about this? It is as old as the hills. But, of course, Roger Garaudy needs to praise his fellow anti-Sovietists, even if they are advancing ideas that are incompatible with Marxism.

Having praised and justified the features of the "Chinese model" by reference to objective conditions, Garaudy proceeds to give special attention to the "model of market socialism". Discussion of this subject does not demand any great intellectual exertion on Garaudy's part, because its main principle has been elaborated in sufficient detail by the various trends of anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism. This is the old idea of removing the socialist state from the management of the economy and transferring the task to various organisations of direct producers. The opponents of public ownership maintain that social ownership should take the form of group ownership by producer organisations.

In discussing the socialist state and public state ownership, Garaudy does not even conceal his prejudices against them. He associates the socialist state with bureaucratism, disregard for the initiative of the "masses", and a "heartless centralism" which stifles all democratic principles.

Garaudy repeats the slanderous criticisms of the socialist state by bourgeois and reformist ideologists as if they were universally accepted truths. Listening to him you would al-

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 135.

most think that the very fact of this state's existence produces the "alienation of the individual". In order to confuse the reader and give his absurd, false arguments an air of "authority", Garaudy quotes certain Lenin's statements against bureaucratic distortion of the work of the state apparatus, statements he wrenched out of context. His favourite quotation is Lenin's famous statement that "ours is a workers' state *with a bureaucratic twist to it*".¹

One might imagine that this was all Lenin had to say about the nature and historic role of the socialist state! But did he not see the socialist state as the concentration of the will and power of the working class, the peasantry and all the working masses? Did not Lenin link the building of socialism with the existence of a strong state of workers and peasants capable of defending the new order from the enemy within and without, building socialist relations and promoting the cultural growth of the masses? To prove this one could quote hundreds of pages written by Lenin about the role of the socialist state in the building of socialism instead of the few critical words of his that we have cited above.

And what is behind these critical words of Lenin's if not the desire to strengthen and perfect the socialist state, rather than discredit it, as Garaudy does by speculating on Lenin?

Roger Garaudy is counting on the ignorance of people who are not acquainted with Lenin's works and have not heard of the discussion on the trade unions or the Leninist critique of anarcho-syndicalism. He carefully conceals from his reader the fact that it was Lenin who led the victorious battle against the anarcho-syndicalist group which called itself the "workers' opposition" and which actually defended the idea of removing the socialist state from management of the economy and transferring the running of the whole economy to an "all-Russia producers' congress".

The Communist Party and the Soviet state remain true to Lenin's behests. They fight against all bureaucratic phenomena and draw the multi-million masses into effective control in all spheres of social life. The 24th Congress of the CPSU noted the need for a further democratisation of all aspects of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 24.

social life in the USSR and for drawing more of the working people into creative activity in all spheres of communist construction.

In spite of all Garaudy's assurances to the contrary, the existence in the USSR and other socialist countries of centralised management of the economy by state organs not only does not prevent the creative activity of the working people but actually promotes it in all possible ways. Reasonable, dialectically interpreted centralism which recognises and leans upon creative activity in local bodies does not hamper or restrict, but actually facilitates the all-round active, conscious inclusion of workers' collectives in the production process.

Scientific and technological progress and the cybernetic revolution demand increased knowledge and initiative on the part of the worker. But the cybernetics industry cannot function without centralised management of industry. The point here is not to reject centralism in favour of self-management or to do the reverse, namely, to reject the self-management, initiative and activity of workers' collectives in favour of centralism, but rather to find a sensible combination of the two.

Socialism is inconceivable without a planned economy. This does not mean planned management of individual enterprises—which exists even under capitalism—but a state plan. How can this general plan of economic, social and cultural development be drawn up and implemented without the socialist state which expresses the interests of the whole of society?

Garaudy, however, believes in the power of the market. Describing the "model of market socialism", he writes: "But contrary to practice in the statist, centralist (Soviet) model, these needs (of society—*H.M.*) will not be determined from 'above' through central directives by the State and Party but by the action of the *market*..."¹

Here is an interesting situation. Garaudy assures us that modern capitalism is characterised by the extension of the planning principle in national production and the reduction of market influence. At the same time, however, he links the "market model of socialism" with the reverse processes—the

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 145.

disappearance of state planning and production and the increase of market influence.

If the socialist states were to follow Garaudy's advice they would inevitably lose, in the pursuit of a petty-bourgeois utopian ideal, the advantages of socialism in promoting scientific and technological progress and planned management of the national economy and be faced with such phenomena as competition and unemployment.

Garaudy's arguments and proposals are very reminiscent of the statements and activities of the notorious Czech reformist economist Ota Sik, who devoted a great deal of effort to the "theoretical substantiation" of the dismantling of socialism in Czechoslovakia. His "model of market socialism" was simply a version of the "peaceful transition" from socialism to capitalism.

Garaudy also writes a great deal about the Yugoslav "model of self-managing socialism". For purely political considerations he praises this "model" to the skies and contrasts it with the "traditional model". His conclusion is simple and categorical. The former is absolute good and the latter absolute evil; the former is "real socialism" and the latter, as we already know, is not even worthy of the name of socialism. Behind these demagogic perorations of Garaudy's one cannot but see an attempt to worsen the relations between the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia and those of other socialist countries.

On the basis of his "simple" scheme Garaudy tries to dismiss the experience of building socialism in the USSR and other countries as a mistake mainly because these countries have state planning and management of the economy. He knows full well, of course, that the state management of the economy does not exclude but presupposes the creative activity and initiative of producer collectives, but this does not stop him for his anti-Soviet purposes from presenting everything connected with the socialist state as a sort of "bureaucratic evil".

He is also aware, of course, that the specific experience of building socialism in Yugoslavia has its own difficulties and dangers. He quotes the resolution of the 9th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia which reads: "Social and economic reform, besides aggravating the con-

traditions inherent in our society, has provoked an intense political and ideological ferment."¹ But having quoted these words, instead of reflecting upon them he continues his panegyric in praise of the "self-managing model" simply in order to "vilify" the "traditional model".

Among the other "models of socialism" examined by Garaudy is the "French model" which he almost fully identified with the "Czechoslovak model". While repeating many important guidelines of the French Communist Party concerning the movement in France towards socialism, he also tries very hard to gloss over the general laws of the transition to socialism, ignoring the leading role of the French working class and its revolutionary party in the socialist transformation of society. In an obvious desire to win the support of bourgeois circles, he keeps assuring us that "French socialism" will not resemble "Soviet socialism". And indeed the "French model" constructed by him does not contain a hint of socialist revolution, the dictatorship of the working class, the abolition of the state machine of the monopolistic bourgeoisie or, in other words, of any of the radical transformations without which there is not and cannot be genuine socialism.

In Garaudy's writings, as in the "works" of other supporters of the concept of a plurality of "socialist models", one finds a very obvious attempt to combine some elements of a socialist basis with elements of the bourgeois superstructure. He has included in the "French model" a number of component parts of formal bourgeois democracy. Thus, in discussing the multi-party system in a future socialist France, he deliberately ignores the question that such a system could include only those parties which were willing to help build socialism and not prevent it.

Yet the existence in a socialist society of parties which are hostile to it and have the means of conducting a struggle against the victorious working class, against the people, is quite absurd. Everyone knows that socialism begins with the abolition of the exploiting classes. What is the point of allowing political parties of the abolished exploiting classes to remain active?

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 162.

The desire of revisionists to legitimatise the doctrine of "plural socialism" is accompanied by the development of the false concept of many versions of Marxist teaching. By distorting the fundamental ideas of Marx's teaching, the supporters of "poly-Marxism" maintain that it should be interpreted and mastered differently in different social and national environments.

We must begin by making the following reservation: what is being discussed here is not the creative application of theory in varying concrete conditions. Such an interpretation of the question is inseparable from Marxism-Leninism which is constantly developing, growing richer and perfecting in its striving to interpret and grasp reality in all its multiple manifestations.

The revisionists are discussing something else, namely, the transformation of the essence of Marxist-Leninist ideas depending on social and national environment. Thus, Garaudy, as we have already pointed out, tries to justify the subjectivist arbitrary rule of the Maoists by a "special" interpretation of Marxism in Chinese conditions. Yet subjectivist arbitrary rule, the destruction of cultural values under the guise of "cultural revolution", the replacement of socialist democracy by military and bureaucratic rule can have nothing in common with Marxism. The supporters of "poly-Marxism" give everyone the chance of accepting some propositions from Marxist-Leninist theory and rejecting others. In order to use Marxist theory to argue the need for the development of bourgeois relations in Russia, the Russian "legal Marxists" acted in the same way, borrowing from Marxist teaching the idea of the progressive nature of capitalism by comparison with feudalism. At the same time they rejected such cardinal Marxist propositions as the need for a revolutionary class struggle to abolish the exploitative order and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, and a great deal more. This "acceptance" of Marxism while rejecting its revolutionary essence has been reflected in the many different variations of petty-bourgeois, opportunist doctrines.

With the emergence of Leninism and the further creative development of Marxist teaching, revisionists of all trends began to make an active effort to draw a distinction between

Marxism and Leninism and to present Leninism, at best, as one of the possible interpretations of Marxism.

It is interesting to note that in *Marxism in the Twentieth Century* Garaudy carefully avoids using the word "Leninism", although Leninism is twentieth-century Marxism. Making compliments to Lenin Garaudy tends to regard Leninism as the Russian version of Marxism, a version which has little or no relevance in the West. This is why he assumes that the French path to socialism will be totally different from the one traversed by revolutionary Russia under the direct leadership of Lenin.

The supporters of "poly-Marxism" talk about different versions not only of Marxism but of its component parts. Thus, the Zagreb philosopher Predrag Vranicki, who as far back as 1961 was arguing that only one version of Marxism acquires true historical justification at each different stage of social development, presented the XIV International Philosophical Congress in Vienna (1968) with the theses that develop the ideas of poly-variations of Marxism. "We must radically reject the point of view," he wrote, "according to which there exists only one Marxist philosophy or one structure of this philosophy, we must recognise the existence of different versions of it."¹

In order to create his version of Marxist philosophy, Vranicki announced that the problem of the alienation of man was the central problem in Marxist philosophy, although he was fully aware that neither Marx nor Engels, nor Lenin could ever and under any circumstances turn such a secondary problem as that of alienation into the core of their teaching.

The Vranicki version of "Marxism" also proceeds from the idealist equation of subject and object in the confines of epistemology.

Naturally, Vranicki has not created and could not create a new version of Marxist philosophy. Yet he has clearly demonstrated his desire to distort its essence. And no wonder, for there is one truth, in spite of Garaudy's pluralistic exercises, but many forms of error.

The very basis of the idea of "plural" Marxism is false.

¹ *Akten des Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie*, Wien, 1968, Bd. 2, S. 140.

It proceeds from the assumption that Marxism is not a science but a form of ideology which reflects reality only in conformity with pragmatic aims. And since these aims change from time to time, Marxism, it is claimed, should also uphold different and sometimes even mutually exclusive views. This does not mean the need to apply theory in strict conformity with changing social practice. No, the advocates of "plural" Marxism have in mind changes of a subjectivist kind, produced by the interests of this or that social force.

It is easy to see that people who support the idea of many versions of Marxism-Leninism are basically trying to reduce it to a phenomenon similar to religion, which can be broken down, like Christianity, for example, into many competing churches, creeds, and sects.

But can such an approach easily be adopted to a scientific theory which has proved in practice the correctness of its generalisations? The answer is no. Therefore the avowed and covert opponents of Marxist-Leninist theory are forced to "labour hard and long" in their futile attempts to discredit the scientific nature of Marxism-Leninism, to oppose it with new theories which are then hastily replaced by other equally tenuous and short-lived ones.

The enemies of the working class are seeking to break up Marxist teaching according to national or regional characteristics. Yet in fact there is not and cannot be a Western or Eastern form of Marxism, an English, Russian, Italian or French Marxism, just as there cannot be, say, Eastern or Western physics, English, Russian, Italian or French physics. There is a single Marxist-Leninist science for all countries and peoples, the science of the construction of communist society.

In precisely the same way all attempts to draw a distinction between Marxism and Leninism are doomed to failure. They are as pointless as trying to exclude from mechanics, physics or chemistry the great achievements made in these sciences in the twentieth century.

"Plural Marxism" and the corresponding revisionist conception of different "models of socialism" have been rightly exposed by Marxists-Leninists in the socialist and capitalist countries as doctrines which are hostile to the cause of uniting the world socialist system and the international working-class movement.

3. THE SINGLE ESSENCE AND MANY FORMS OF SOCIALISM

The revisionist theory of different "models of socialism" exaggerates certain real processes and regards them as absolutes. We are referring to the fact that no socio-economic formation, including the communist formation, develops according to a preset, unified pattern.

By giving a distorted picture of the multiplicity of ways of building socialism, Garaudy and other supporters of the plurality of "models of socialism" try to create the impression that they are discovering a new page in Marxism.

In fact, however, the dialectics of the unity and variety of ways of building socialism occupies a very important place in Marxist-Leninist theory. We shall give special consideration to this question in order to show how wrong and absurd it is to ascribe the idea of "unified socialism" to Lenin and Leninism.

The emergence and development of a socio-economic formation is a complex, many-sided process. Yet the general laws of formation are the same for all countries passing through one and the same stage of historical development. The radical, decisive feature of each formation is the mode of production, the sum total of production relations which determine the principles of social and state organisation, the prevailing social ideas, and so on. The system of social relations common to the countries of one and the same formation and their interaction can be properly understood only on the basis of the universal laws of formation.

At the same time the materialist interpretation of history, proceeding from the existence of the general objective laws of the emergence and development of socio-economic formations, which constitute the *essence* of the historical process, rejects the oversimplified, schematic concept of *mono-linear* social development. This concept obliterates the diversity of the historical process. Behind the unity of the regular in phenomena it does not see all the richness in the forms of its manifestation and ignores the fact that the phenomenon is richer than the essence. The mono-linear theory replaces the vital, diverse, ascending development of history with its contradictions, unexpected twists and turns, accidents, reverses,

temporary setbacks, revolutionary outbursts and rapid upsurges to new forms of human community by oversimplified schemes more similar to train timetables than to the real history of peoples. "History as a whole," wrote Lenin, "and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes."¹

The dialectics of the general and particular penetrates the whole of the historical process. Here there is nothing general without the particular and nothing particular without the general. The same historical law never manifests itself in its "pure" form, uniformly. It is compelled to reveal itself in various forms. The latter, in reproducing the law, reproduce it with various modifications dictated by the time and circumstances.

History shows that no mode of social production underlying social structures has ever assumed the same form at different times and in different countries. Generalising this feature of historical development, Marx wrote: "This does not prevent the same economic basis—the same from the standpoint of its main conditions—due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial relations, external historical influences, etc., from showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances."²

The unity and diversity of historical development can be clearly seen in the early stages of human history. Thus the transition from a classless, primitive society to a class society was effected in a variety of ways. In some countries and regions the classless society changed into a slave-owning society, in others it bypassed the slave formation and effected a direct transition to feudalism.

The differences in the origin of feudalism gave it considerable variety. These differences are sometimes extremely important, which can be seen clearly from an analysis of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 95.

² K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, 1959, p. 772.

the history of a number of countries, for example, of Western Europe and Asia. Discussing the essence (of the concept) of feudalism and the forms in which it manifested itself, Engels wrote: "Did feudalism ever correspond to its concept? Founded in the kingdom of the West Franks, further developed in Normandy by the Norwegian conquerors, its formation continued by the French Norsemen in England and Southern Italy, it came nearest to its concept—in the ephemeral kingdom of Jerusalem, which in the *Assize of Jerusalem* left behind it the most classic expression of the feudal order."¹ Engels is developing here the correct idea that the essence of feudalism cannot be fully expressed in the particular and individual.

At the higher stage of historical development excessive differences in the formation and development of pre-capitalist formations in different countries tend to become reduced, but there can still be no question of their total disappearance. Suffice it to recall how diverse was the essentially single transition from feudalism to capitalism in England, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Russia, the USA, Japan and other countries. Marx wrote in his analysis of the actual process of the formation of the bourgeois order that when capitalism emerges it "assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different periods."²

The diverse ways of development and specific features of this or that socio-economic formation in different countries are determined by the emergence of this formation at different times and its uneven development in a heterogeneous social environment. Thus, whereas in Europe the development of capitalism experienced in varying degrees and forms the opposition of the sum total of feudal relations, in the USA, where the formation of capitalism began considerably later, there was no feudal system and capitalist development took on a highly distinctive form and progressed far more rapidly.

Lenin analysed the peculiarities of the development of capitalism in Russia which was hindered by many feudal-serf survivals. "... In no single capitalist country," wrote

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, 1965, p. 484.

² K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, 1963, p. 716.

Lenin at the end of the nineteenth century, "has there been such an abundant survival of ancient institutions that are incompatible with capitalism, retard its development, and immeasurably worsen the condition of the producers, who 'suffer not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness of that development'."¹

Historical analysis shows that after its establishment capitalism too, like feudalism, retains specific features in different countries. They manifest themselves in the presence or absence of structures inherited from the preceding order. Thus, the special features of capitalism in different countries are determined by the presence or total absence of vestigial phenomena of feudalism in the sphere of capitalist economy and in its superstructure, in the relation between industrial and agricultural production, in the distinctive features of the class structure, in the system of political administration, etc. These differences, which are extremely noticeable in the period of the emergence of capitalism and the early stages of its development in different countries, tend to become less pronounced as it is consolidated and as its scientific and technological production base grows relatively unified.

Thus, the unity and diversity of historical development is confirmed by the experience of all pre-socialist formations. It is also confirmed by the experience of socialist society. Having one essence and common general laws, socialism is established by different methods of struggle and acquires a number of specific features in different countries.

The fact that socialism is constructed on the basis of cognised objective historical laws, on the basis of scientific theory, and does not emerge spontaneously, but is erected with scientific knowledge of the matter, is bound, of course, to give the establishment of socialist relations in the various countries immeasurably more unity and common international character. This has been clearly demonstrated by the example of the many peoples who have effected the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism, peoples large and small, living in various parts of the globe and at various levels of development. Socialism is being built in different

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 599.

countries in the presence of different economic, social, political and cultural prerequisites and different alignments of class forces both at home and in the international arena. Since the transition to socialism is carried out not only at different levels of capitalist development, but sometimes even bypassing it, there were bound to arise and have in fact arisen distinctive forms of progression to socialism and specific features of socialism in the different countries. These objective conditions demanded precise consideration of the specific conditions of the countries embarking on the road to socialism in the realisation of the general immutable laws of the construction of socialism.

The teaching on the single substance and diversity of the forms of socialism is an organic part of Leninism. This question could not become a pressing one during the period when it was assumed that the transition to socialism could be effected almost simultaneously, at almost one and the same socio-economic level of the developed capitalist countries. To be fair, the founders of Marxism distinguished between the forms of transition to socialism on the continent, on the one hand, and in England and the United States, on the other. Marx and Engels also took into account certain peculiarities in the establishment of socialism in Russia. Nevertheless the question about the specific nature of the transition to socialism in different countries could not be of great importance at a time when the idea of a simultaneous transition of the developed capitalist countries to socialism was prevalent.

The law discovered by Lenin of the uneven economic and political development of capitalism in the age of imperialism not only substantiated the possibility of the transition to socialism first of all in a few countries or even one country, but also provided the basis for elaborating the teaching about the diversity of forms of transition to socialism.

The taking into account of local conditions was of considerable significance in the successful building of socialism. It was obvious that while coinciding in the main, the building of socialism in those Soviet republics where the transition to the new society was being effected bypassing capitalism, would take place differently than in Russia and the Ukraine, for example. The Communist Party of the

Soviet Union was invariably guided by a deep understanding of the dialectics of the general and particular, by careful consideration of the concrete conditions of life and struggle of the individual peoples for socialism. "Local distinctions," wrote Lenin, "specific economic formations, forms of everyday life, the degree of preparedness of the population, attempts to carry out a particular plan—all these are bound to be reflected in the specific features of the path to socialism. The greater such diversity—provided, of course, that it does not turn into eccentricity—the more surely and rapidly shall we ensure the achievement of . . . a socialist economy."¹

In April 1921 Lenin wrote his famous letter "To the Comrades Communists of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan, and the Mountaineer Republic", in which he advised them to take full account of the specific features of the Caucasus and recommended a slower and more cautious transition to socialism in the Caucasian republics than in the RSFSR. With equal care the CPSU and the Soviet government studied and took account of the peculiarities of building socialism in the Central Asian and other Soviet republics.

The fact that countries with different socio-economic and political structures fall away from capitalism at different times confronts the Communist parties with the task of finding a correct practical and theoretical solution to the question of the unity and diversity of the advance towards socialism.

This circumstance must be stressed, since modern right-wing revisionism, as we have seen, has armed itself with the slanderous thesis that the CPSU and other Communist parties stand for "unified socialism".

The view which the CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist parties defend has been very clearly formulated by Lenin. "All nations," he wrote, "will arrive at socialism—this is inevitable, but all will do so in not exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own to some form of democracy, to some variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the varying rate of socialist transformations in the different aspects of social life."²

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 208.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 23, pp. 69-70.

In the Comintern and at its congresses Lenin stressed the historic importance of the Great October Socialist Revolution which embodied the objective and universal laws of the transition from capitalism to socialism, but he did not consider that all the forms and methods of struggle employed in Russia were universally binding. He warned against ill-considered automatic transference to other countries of the methods of struggle which had justified themselves so brilliantly in the course of the Russian revolution. Thus, in one of his addresses, Lenin said: "The revolution in Italy will run a different course from that in Russia. It will start in a different way.... We never wanted Serrati in Italy to copy the Russian revolution. That would have been stupid. We are intelligent and flexible enough to avoid such stupidity."¹

Lenin's thesis on the single essence and diversity of forms of the formation of the new, socialist world can be traced in the example of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Single in substance, it manifested itself in a variety of forms. As a result of the Second World War and the victory of the socialist forces there arose the *popular democratic* form of dictatorship of the proletariat. As Lenin had foreseen, in a number of countries which embarked on the road of socialist development, there was no need for such a measure as depriving the overthrown exploiting classes of their electoral rights. The forms and periods for the abolition of private ownership in these countries varied. In some of them private ownership and small-scale trading, controlled by state organs, were allowed within certain limits. Unlike the Soviet Union many countries of the world socialist system effected the collectivisation of agriculture at a slower rate and by different methods.

For many a long year the Soviet economy developed in conditions of capitalist encirclement and deprived of the help and support of other states. This picture changed radically with the emergence of the world socialist system, which opened up broad prospects for mutual help between fraternal countries and their economies. It became possible to effect economic co-operation between the socialist countries, to

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, pp. 465-66.

gradually extend the principle of the international division of labour between socialist states, to organise widespread economic mutual aid permeated with profound internationalism and based on mutually advantageous conditions. All this was bound to give new features to the economy of the socialist states and open up broad and promising prospects for it.

The diversity of the process of formation of socialism also made itself felt in the sphere of the superstructure. Mention has been made above of minor differences in state administration. One might add that in socialist countries, unlike in the Soviet Union, the concrete conditions allowed the application of the multi-party system. In pre-revolutionary Russia, however, the leadership of such petty-bourgeois parties as the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries adopted a counter-revolutionary stand and refused to co-operate with the country's revolutionary forces. A comparison of the constitutions of the socialist countries reveals their specific peculiarities which were dictated by concrete economic, socio-political and historical conditions.

The diversity of features of socialism in various socialist countries is objective in nature and makes it possible to realise better the general laws of socialism. To ignore the best possible means and forms of advance towards socialism of countries which find themselves at different stages of social development could cause tremendous harm and retard the normal development of the socialist state.

This is why the Communist and Workers' parties consider it essential to take careful account of the peculiarities of their country's advance towards socialism and urge a creative search for the most effective means of socialist construction. They are invariably guided by Lenin's basic instruction that the theory of Marx "provides only general *guiding* principles, which, *in particular*, are applied in England differently than in France, in France differently than in Germany, and in Germany differently than in Russia."¹

In vain Garaudy, Fischer and other "reformed" Marxists assume that they are opening up a new page in Marxism by distorting the question of the peculiarities of the develop-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 212.

ment of socialism in different countries. The noisy appeals of modern right-wing revisionists to take into account the specific nature of the building of socialism in the various countries boil down, as we have seen, to attempts to divorce the particular from the general, to make a fetish of the particular in order to ignore the general, objective laws of socialism which cannot be disregarded by referring to the special features of a given country.

The desire to destroy the unity of the general and particular and to present the history of peoples as the history of self-contained civilisations which, by virtue of their essential heterogeneity, cannot associate with one another and exchange values is the most extreme expression of turning the particular and singular into the unique and inimitable void of general features.

It is on the defective methodological basis that the philosophico-historical conceptions of Spengler, Toynbee and, to a certain extent, Pitirim Sorokin and other exponents of twentieth-century philosophical, sociological and historical thought are based.

Racist, nationalist and chauvinistic conceptions with their cult of the chosen race or nation also rest on the contradiction between the general and particular and on making an absolute of the particular. In these misanthropic conceptions the "chosen" race or nation is invariably attributed unique features and qualities which elevate it above all other races or nations.

There can be no doubt that this distinguishing between peoples and races received great support with the emergence and development of capitalism with its spirit of competition, aggressive individualism, militant racialism and nationalism. History has shown that the establishment of one and the same bourgeois order does not mean the establishment of international harmony and peace between the capitalist countries. These countries regarded each other, first and foremost, as real and potential competitors or, at best, as temporary allies to destroy and defeat other countries. It is a well-known fact that capitalist England in the 18th century led a coalition of feudal states to suppress the French bourgeois revolution. The succession of wars between the bourgeois states has shown clearly that the exis-

tence of a single capitalist formation actually aggravated, instead of improving, relations between the bourgeois countries. Capitalist production relations inevitably give rise not only to inhumanity and anti-humanism in relation to the workers of "their own" people, but also to aggressive policy of the imperialist countries and groupings. Estrangement and hatred are the inevitable attributes of bourgeois relations.

It is essential to draw attention to this aspect of the matter because the revisionists have followed the example of the avowed defenders of the imperialist order who advanced the crafty theory of "national communism" with the aim of undermining socialist internationalism. They have made a barely masked attempt to "prove" that the common social character of the system is not a factor which draws peoples together. The revisionists extend (with this or that reservation) the peculiarities of the development of antagonistic formations, capitalism in particular, to socialist society. They use the contradictions which have arisen between the USSR and other socialist countries, on the one hand, and the Peking leadership, on the other, to substantiate in their theory of different "models" of socialism the unavoidable nature of clashes and conflicts between them. Moreover the revisionists deliberately ignore the fact that the Peking leaders are trying to present as socialist policy one which has nothing to do with the interests of the working class and the working people as a whole, or with the humanist and internationalist principles of socialism.

Marx, Engels and Lenin, in urging people not to overlook the concrete peculiarities in the struggle for socialism, constantly stressed the leading, guiding significance of its general laws. It is exceptionally important to take into account concrete peculiarities if they really are peculiarities of socialism. Marx and Engels, wrote Lenin, managed "to bring to the forefront and stress the various points, the various aspects of the problem, in application to the specific features of different political and economic conditions."⁴ But the founders of Marxism-Leninism were great dialecticians who proceeded with amazing perception from the sum total of

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 362.

similar phenomena to their essence, to the law of their existence and development.

In their profound study of the working-class movement in various countries, Marx and Engels strove to unite scientific socialism with the mass movement, to concentrate the struggle of the masses on the main, decisive tasks which by their very nature were general, international, and on the solution of which depended the fate of each national detachment of the working class. The call "Workers of All Countries, Unite!" was the generalised expression of the Marxist attitude to the international efforts of the working class, which were aimed at solving the historic task of establishing socialism.

In his time Marx severely criticised the sectarians who placed their group interests above the general interests of the revolutionary proletariat and prided themselves ostentatiously on their false originality. "The sect," Marx wrote, "sees the justification for its existence and its point of honour not in what it has in *common* with the class movement but in the *particular shibboleth* which *distinguishes* it from the movement."¹

These words are a direct condemnation of the modern "modellers of socialism" who are seeking to disprove the general laws of socialist revolution and socialist construction. What are these general laws? The socialist revolution in this or that form abolishes the state machinery of the exploiters; it sets up in this or that form the state power of the proletariat which enters into an alliance with friendly classes and strata. These general laws also include the abolition of the exploiter classes, the socialisation of the means of production and the establishment of socialist production and a different kind of social relations in town and country, as well as giving the masses access to cultural treasures, i.e., a cultural revolution in the Leninist sense. Integral features of the socialist society are the power of the working people with the vanguard role of the working class, the direction of social development by the Marxist-Leninist party; planned development of the whole economy at the highest technological level in the interests of the whole people; application of the principle "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, 1965, p. 214.

labour"; education of the whole people in the spirit of scientific communism, and in the spirit of friendship with the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries and the working people of the whole world; and a foreign policy based on the principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism.

The dialectic of the general and particular is not confined to simply noting their indivisible unity and interconditionality. A distinctive feature of the general is that it expresses what is most important, necessary, essential and decisive for the given group of phenomena. Not one of the essential, general features of a socio-economic formation can be discarded or moved to the category of the particular, specific. Like other revisionists Garaudy, although he avowedly acknowledges the general laws of socialism, treats them very freely indeed. As we have had occasion to see, he declares nearly all the main conditions and laws of socialist development in the USSR and other countries to be specific forms of the "deformation" of socialism. His main "laws" include subjectivist fabrications of reformist "socialism" renovated with fashionable bourgeois technocratic theories. And in speaking of the various "models" of socialism, Garaudy has in mind the various types of this pseudo-socialism.

It has been mentioned above how persistently Lenin urged that the peculiarities of establishing socialism in the various countries should be taken into account. At the same time throughout all his revolutionary activity as the founder and leader of a multinational socialist state and the leader of the world proletariat, Lenin was implacably opposed to trends and groups who under this or that slogan sought to undermine the internationalist unity of the working people, to play at "specificity", to stuff the proletariat into "national quarters", and oppose group interests to the common interests of socialism. Lenin urged us to "fight *against* small-nation narrow-mindedness, seclusion and isolation, consider the whole and the general, subordinate the particular to the general interest."¹

It has become fashionable with Garaudy and other revisionists to announce after a few barely masked hypocritical phrases about the Great October Revolution, that it is hardly

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 347.

possible or advisable for their countries to borrow from the experience of the Russian revolution in order to build socialism in their countries. The revisionists have repeatedly stressed that the Soviet Union cannot represent the future of France, Italy, Austria, etc. Of course, as Lenin predicted, these countries will have their own specific, distinctive features in their transition to socialism. But can it really be that the experience of the Soviet Union, the experience of the Great October Revolution contain nothing of international importance for effecting the transition to socialism in other countries? Garaudy, Fischer, Marek and other deviationists from Marxism try hard to avoid this question, making it clearly understood that "Russian Bolshevism" after the watered-down right-wing reformist hash which they have such a taste for, will not satisfy them at all in any form whatsoever. Under the guise of rejecting the experience of the October Revolution these petty bourgeois and timeservers reject all serious discussion of true socialist revolution.

Lenin as a revolutionary and dialectician was not afraid of the word "imitation" so long as it was properly understood. Why not imitate a correct example, why not take it over if it is suited to the conditions of another country and takes into account its concrete characteristics? Lenin wrote: "We are not in the least afraid to say that we want to imitate the Erfurt Programme: there is nothing bad in imitating what is good, and precisely today, when we so often hear opportunist and equivocal criticism of that programme, we consider it our duty to speak openly in its favour."¹

Desiring to be properly understood, Lenin explained his idea in greater detail: it is important to take over not this or that particular recommendation of the Erfurt Programme, which were dictated by the special conditions in Germany and certain other European countries, but the Programme's provisions which reflect the general, the regular. "Imitating, however," wrote Lenin, "must under no circumstances be simply copying. Imitation and borrowing are quite legitimate insofar as in Russia we see the same *basic* processes of the development of capitalism, the same *basic* tasks for the socialists and the working class; but they must not, under any

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 235.

circumstances, lead to our forgetting the *specific features* of Russia which must find *full expression* in the specific features of our programme."¹

This brilliantly formulated dialectic of the general and particular with the emphasis on that which is main and basic in the struggle for socialism became a programme aim for Lenin and the Leninists and in a comparatively short historical period, in spite of the most difficult conditions of the struggle, brought victory to the Russian working class.

The irresponsible claptrap of the advocates of "plural socialism" is intended only to disorientate the working class and the Communist parties. Let us repeat yet again: to reject all that was most important and decisive in the October Revolution is to reject socialist revolution in general and to go over to the standpoint of cowardly reformism, to waiting for the "mutation" which is supposed quietly and peacefully lead to a "socialist" type of industrial society.

The historic achievements of the Soviet Union, its transformation into a mighty socialist power, were determined by the use of the general laws of socialism taking into account local peculiarities, not imaginary ones, but real specific features of the development of this or that national republic. These achievements would have been impossible without the timely discovery of the harm which could be caused to the basic interests of the nations constituting the USSR by local self-interest, national limitations, nationalism, which by its very nature and essence is aimed against the general laws of socialist development.

Bourgeois nationalism sought to replace sensibly understood national interests by hypertrophied nationalistic interests which, if they could be satisfied at all, was only at the expense of the interests of other peoples, at the expense of the interests of the whole state. Experience has shown that the nationalistic interpretation of basic interests and means of satisfying them is invariably aimed against real, properly understood national interests.

Socialist society created the conditions for harmoniously combining international and national interests. This noble principle underlies the world socialist system, all the national

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 22, p. 347.

detachments of the world communist and working-class movement.

The great historic achievements of socialism are indissolubly linked with the creative application of the dialectic of the general and particular, taking careful account of the unity and diversity of socialist development. In the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th Party Congress Leonid Brezhnev paid special attention to the role and significance of correctly solving the problem of the single substance and variety of forms of the establishment of socialist society. He said: "Successes in socialist construction largely depend on the correct combination of the general and the nationally specific in social development. Not only are we now theoretically aware but also have been convinced in practice that the way to socialism and its main features are determined by the general regularities, which are inherent in the development of all the socialist countries."¹

We are also aware of the fact that the general regularities are displayed in different forms which correspond to concrete historical conditions and national peculiarities.

Thus, Marxism-Leninism is consistently guided by the dialectically interpreted unity of the general and particular and rejects their separation or contradistinction. There is a single scientific socialism, the establishment of which in different countries and regions of the world has its own specific characteristics. To contrapose the single substance of socialism to the diversity of its forms of establishment is just as absurd as separating content and form, essence and phenomenon, the whole and the part.

In vain Garaudy and the other right-wing revisionists have taken upon themselves the task of teaching everyone the need to take account of the peculiarities in the socialist development of different countries. This approach, as we have shown above, is indispensable for the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism. The "new" element which Garaudy and his friends introduce into the treatment of this question consists only in turning the particular into an absolute and ignoring the general laws of socialism, which theoretically "substantiates" splitting socialism and the

¹ *24th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 9-10.

world communist movement and replacing internationalist principles by bourgeois nationalist ones.

To sum up, one might say that Garaudy and the other right-wing revisionists who consider the subject of "plural socialism" as their own specific field are concerned only to distort the problem in a nationalistic way. In close connection with this task, those who seek to advocate and popularise the technocratic version of reformist "socialism" are inevitably forced to try and discredit the socialism built in the USSR and other countries, to abuse this "deformed" socialism, to maliciously present it in the gloomiest possible light. The renegades could do no greater service to bourgeois propaganda. In return for this they are paid richly by the bourgeois publishers. Their names are praised in the bourgeois press which admires the "depth and breadth" of the thought of "true", "authentic" Marxists of the anti-Soviet type. The bourgeois ideologists urge the opportunist elements in the Communist parties to strike a kind of ideological bargain. "They appear to be telling them: just give us proof that you are anti-Soviet, and we shall be prepared to proclaim that you are the true 'Marxists', and that you are taking completely 'independent attitudes'."¹ Events have shown, incidentally that such people also declare war on the Communist parties in their own countries. Examples are renegades such as Garaudy in France, Fischer in Austria, Petkoff in Venezuela, and the members of the Manifesto group in Italy.

Garaudy's grave errors and deviations from Marxism-Leninism were seriously criticised at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party in October 1969. In the closing speech at this meeting Waldeck Rochet said that Garaudy "is again trying to exploit the events in Czechoslovakia in order to feed anti-Sovietism and opportunist trends". Rochet made a most penetrating and thorough criticism of Garaudy's pet theory of "models of socialism". Garaudy, he stated, "systematically confuses the question of the ways of transition to socialism with the idea of models of socialism. To apply the term 'model' to the ways and means of transition from capitalism

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 27.

to socialism is a highly debatable procedure which gives rise to confusion, particularly because it leads to glossing over the universal traits which necessarily belong to any socialist revolution: for example, the need to win political power by the working class and its allies, the abolition of large capitalist property, and socialisation of the basic means of production and exchange, etc."¹

In conclusion it should be noted once more that the main aim and purpose of the theory of "models of socialism" is to dismiss the scientific criterion of socialist society and "substantiate" models of socio-political structures which are incompatible with true socialism. At the same time the inventors of these "models" do their utmost to vilify and distort existing socialism.

The construction of "models of socialism" which is linked with breaking up united socialist society into a number of varieties that differ fundamentally from one another in economic and socio-political structure is aimed against the unity of all detachments of the world communist movement and the countries of the world socialist system.

The theory of a "plurality of socialisms" is inseparable from the spirit of "specificity", from social individualism, isolationism, nationalism. It is incompatible with proletarian internationalism and ignores the dialectical unity of the whole and the part, the general and the particular, the national and the international. All this makes it an ideological device for disuniting the socialist forces, to the detriment of all progressive forces and the advantage of imperialism.

Bourgeois and reformist theoreticians react extremely sensitively to everything that is capable of spreading dissension in the ranks of their ideological opponents. At a time when revisionism was still only preparing to arm itself with the "new" theory of "plural socialism", one of the mainstays of anti-communism, Sidney Hook, in an article published in *Der Monat* in 1958, hastened to express the hope that different paths to the new society would lead logically to different versions of "socialism", just as differently applied means lead to different ends. He wrote, that if

¹ *Cahiers du Communisme*, No. 11, novembre 1969, pp. 135, 138.

it is true that the end is determined not by pious words but by the means employed, then the application of different methods in the building of socialism is even more likely to bring with it different forms of socialism—however unpleasant this may be for the leaders of the communist movement.

Today the members of the anti-Marxist camp note with satisfaction the "successes" of the authors of the theory of "models of socialism" in conducting their policy of splitting the revolutionary forces. Fighting against all forms of unity and solidarity of the world communist movement, the imperialist ideologists express their great fondness for "differentiated socialism" and show a touching hypocritical concern for the "full independence" of every Communist Party and every socialist country. They favour poly-centrism in the world communist movement, which in their language means the "self-isolation" of the Communist parties and socialist countries.

It is only natural that this policy is directed by imperialist ideologists primarily against the Soviet Union. "Neither can we afford to overlook the fact," said Leonid Brezhnev in his report at a joint meeting in celebration of the 50th anniversary of the USSR, "that nationalistic survivals are being encouraged from outside in every way by politicians and propagandists of the bourgeois world. Our class adversaries zestfully seize on all cases of this kind, inflating and encouraging them in the hope of impairing—if only a little—the unity of the peoples of our country."¹

Yet the efforts of the ideologists and politicians of imperialism are in vain. The objective forces which gave rise to socialism also create objective prerequisites for its consolidation and unity, for the overcoming of temporary, transient disagreements in the international communist movement. In order to realise these prerequisites and, if possible, in a short space of time, what is needed is the most active, purposeful, practical and theoretical activity in the struggle against false theories and actions hostile to the essence of proletarian internationalism and scientific communism.

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the USSR*, Moscow, 1972, p. 86.

CHAPTER V

**REVISIONIST DISTORTION
OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN COMMUNISTS
AND CHRISTIANS**

**1. REAL BASIS OF JOINT STRUGGLE
OF COMMUNISTS AND BELIEVERS
FOR PROGRESS**

The relations between communism and Christianity in the modern world have also been fundamentally distorted by right-wing revisionism and Roger Garaudy in particular. In taking note of the indisputable changes which have taken place in the behaviour of the Christian church and the religious consciousness of many millions of its members, the right-wing revisionists try to argue the need for an *ideological* drawing together of communism and Christianity. Garaudy is particularly assiduous in this respect.

Let us first of all consider the Marxist interpretation of unity of action between Communists and Christians in the present situation. As we shall see below, on this question the revisionists direct their efforts, by references to new conditions, towards dismissing the Marxist evaluation of religion and replacing the question of real possibilities of co-operation between Communists and Christians in the struggle for common progressive aims by ideological compromises between science and religion.

The question as to whether a joint effort by Communists and Christians to establish a just and rational order on earth is possible has been answered long ago by history itself. The Great October Socialist Revolution, which opened up a new era in the history of mankind, was brought about by the combined efforts of both non-believers and believers. Socialism was built in the USSR not only by the hands of Commu-

nist atheists, but also by those of people who believed in God. Socialism is also being successfully built in other socialist countries as a result of fraternal co-operation between working people, regardless of their atheistic or religious convictions.

Long before the October Revolution, Lenin wrote: "No number of pamphlets and no amount of preaching can enlighten the proletariat, if it is not enlightened by *its own struggle against the dark forces of capitalism*. Unity in this really revolutionary struggle of the oppressed class for the creation of a paradise on earth is more important to us than unity of proletarian opinion on paradise in heaven."¹ (My italics—H.M.)

Experience has shown that ideological disagreements have not been an insuperable barrier to unity of action between Communists and Christians in the struggle for practical revolutionary aims. One may ask why a person who believes in a religion which urges him to submit to his oppressors and place his hopes on retribution in an after-life should become an active fighter against social evil? Why should a Christian, in spite of the commandments of his religion which regards earthly life as a temporary halting-place on the path to the world beyond the grave, become a builder of a new life here on earth?

The reason is that religious illusions are not strong enough to suppress people's real needs, to force them for any length of time to act in a manner contrary to their vital interests. And indeed if a Christian wanted to carry out the requirements of his religion consistently, he would cease to live a normal life. For many a century Christianity has been teaching that this earthly life and earthly joys are of no real significance. But this has not prevented innumerable generations of Christians from doing their utmost to improve the conditions of their earthly existence. Throughout the centuries the Christian religion has preached against the use of violence to oppose evil, but this has not stopped the fierce struggle between the antagonistic classes from being the most real factor in human history since the emergence of classes. The Christian religion has called on people to love their enemies, but has it ever managed to make anyone love his oppressor and persecutor? Christianity glorifies the ideal of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 86-87.

death, preaching that true life begins only beyond the grave. But has it been able to suppress people's will to live? The eighteenth-century French materialist philosopher Diderot once remarked caustically that if Christians took their religion seriously they would be obliged to kill their children and, after confessing and receiving absolution, themselves too, in order to ensure themselves of eternal bliss.

But, as practice has shown, no religious ideas or doctrines are capable of suppressing people's natural, indestructible urge not only to preserve their existence, but also to improve the material conditions of their lives and defend their vital interests and rights. As a result there has arisen an inevitable, irremovable contradiction between the religious consciousness of the believer and his everyday conduct. Life forces him at every turn to act differently than he would if he were to observe strictly the basic principles of his faith. Here are a few historical examples. As we know from the 14th century onwards feudal Europe began to quake from the powerful peasant revolts provoked by the intensification of feudal exploitation and the impoverishment of the mass of the people. Suffice it to mention the movement of the Apostolic Brethren led by Fra Dolcino in Italy (14th century), the insurrection of the French peasantry known as the *Jacquerie* (14th century), the revolt of Wat Tyler in England (14th century), the great Peasant War in Germany (16th century) and the peasant uprising in Russia, led by Stepan Razin (17th century). As a rule the participants in these uprisings were deeply religious people, but this did not prevent them from having recourse to actions which flatly contradicted Christian principles. The peasants, however, while continuing to regard themselves as true Christians, were forced by circumstances beyond their control to take up arms in order to reply with force to the force of their masters. Mystical religious beliefs and the principles of the Sermon on the Mount had to take second place to the urgent demands of real life.

We observe the same picture in the subsequent stages of human history as well. The absolute state and feudal orders in France sanctified by the Christian religion were overthrown at the end of the 18th century by people, the majority of whom were devout Christians. The principles of religious morality were again forced to retreat before circumstances

produced by the operation of the objective laws of historical development.

Today we are witnessing the beginning of the collapse of the capitalist system, the existence of which contradicts the vital interests of the overwhelming majority of mankind. But the imperialist bourgeoisie will not reconcile itself to the facts and logic of history. It is seeking to preserve its existence with all the means at its disposal. With the help of violence and falsehood it hopes to perpetuate the system of hired slavery, the system of colonialism, and to restore a bourgeois order in the countries of the socialist community. The most reactionary and aggressive imperialist circles, who receive vast profits from producing the means of mass destruction, are bent on increasing international tension and intensifying the arms race.

It is not surprising that, by threatening the vital interests of the overwhelming majority of mankind, capitalism is causing many millions of people to rise up against it and unite independently of their atheistic or religious convictions. Today, as in the past, the basic, vital interests of people are relegating to the background differences of opinion on religious questions and creating the necessary conditions for unity of action by people belonging to different creeds or free from the influence of any religion.

The profound interest of all the working people in the USSR in destroying capitalist relations and building a socialist society, in spite of all the attempts of reactionary church leaders, has determined the unity of believers and atheists in attaining these great historic aims. The class solidarity of the working people has gained the upper hand over disagreements on matters of faith, and the joint struggle to build socialist society has created favourable conditions for the broad masses to acquire a scientific world outlook.

Reactionary church circles are seeking to create an unbridgeable gulf between Communists and believers, to isolate Christians from the communist movement. But each day brings fresh chagrin to the reactionary church leaders. Capitalism's increasing encroachment on the vital interests of the working people is compelling them to unite to defend their common interests irrespective of religious or atheistic convictions. Christian workers are becoming increasingly

convinced that the Communist parties are the true and selfless defenders of the rights of the oppressed. There are fewer and fewer people who would believe the slanderous statements about the "a-morality of communism", its incompatibility with humanism, its scorn for the individual and his rights, etc.

What could be more noble, just and moral than the activity of the Communists aimed at destroying a social order where an insignificant minority, which concentrates in its hands the basic means and implements of production, rules over the vast majority of the population, forces its will upon millions of unfortunate people, and prevents hundreds of millions of people from reaping the fruits of the twentieth-century scientific and technological revolution?

It is not surprising that each year sees an increase in the number of Christians who realise the total immorality of capitalist private ownership which enables the monopolies to force millions of unfortunate people to work for them, to control the fates of these people, and threaten them with total destruction in a nuclear war. And how can an honest thinking Christian worker justify a society where the treasures created by the people's toil are in the hands of those who do not toil at all? How can the Christian worker justify a society where some have an income of millions and others think themselves lucky to have a place in the doss-house and a crust of bread? Christian clergymen preach sermons on sympathy for the hungry and homeless and criticise extreme inequality. These sermons and prayers have been read for many a long century, but social inequality and injustice are increasing rather than disappearing.

Then the Communists appeared on the historical arena and, basing themselves on the objective laws of social development, began to destroy with deeds and not words the order of social inequality and enslavement, achieving some inspiring successes in a few decades. Could such an important fact be ignored by believers from among the working people? No, it could not, and many of them considered it their duty to take part in the struggle for a new world, for new, truly humane relations between people, for communism.

This struggle attracted not only rank-and-file believers, but also a few of the bravest and most honest members of

the clergy. In this connection one recalls the name of the American bishop, William Brown, who correctly evaluated the historic role of the Great October Socialist Revolution for the fate of mankind. Dispelling the myth of humane and democratic American capitalism, Brown remarked only two or so years after the emergence of the Soviet state: "If I am right in the conviction that the United States is more wholly given over to capitalism than any other nation, not excepting even England, it is the greatest robber, liar and murderer on earth. How then, can the United States become the standard for the governments of the nations?"

"If the government of Russia holds its own, it, rather than that of the United States, will become the standard to which all governments must measure up or else go down.

"Yes, not the government of the United States but that of Russia is destined to become the standard of all peoples, for the aim of our government is money, more money, and then some, for the few, while the infinitely higher aim of theirs is life, more life, fuller life for every man, woman and child."¹

Several decades have passed since these splendid penetrating words were uttered. In that time the growing successes of the countries of the socialist system have raised the moral prestige of communism even higher and drawn a vast number of believers under its banner. Today, more than ever before, there are broad prospects for close collaboration between Communists and Christians for the victory of communist ideals.

Can one hope for collaboration between Communists and church organisations in the struggle against capitalism? Probably not, if one is speaking of the church as a whole. The majority of religious organisations in the West are bound by many links to bourgeois society and, of course, cannot act in defence of the socialist ideal. The famous Brazilian Archbishop, Don Helder Camara, who has been nicknamed the "Red Archbishop" because of his radical political views, described the link between the church and bourgeois society as follows: "The fact is that the Catholic church is linked to the mechanism of power. The church has money which it

¹ William M. Brown, *Communism and Christianity*, Ohio, pp. 152-53.

puts to use. It is wallowing up to its neck in commercial deals and has bound itself to those who are hanging on to riches."¹

This does not prevent a certain section of the clergy and even individual religious organisations, as the class struggle grows more acute in the capitalist countries, from becoming active fighters against the imperialist bourgeoisie and gravitating towards socialist transformations. And indeed, certain churchmen in Latin America are even taking up arms in support of the people who are actively rallying against the oppression of the American monopolies, the compradore bourgeoisie and the feudal reaction. In this connection the above-mentioned Archbishop Don Helder Camara made the following interesting statement: "I greatly respect priests who take up arms. I have never considered it amoral or anti-Christian to use arms against oppressors."²

The logic of struggle forced some churchmen to reinterpret their Christian commandments and change from verbal humanism to the struggle for true humanism. We have in mind the Colombian priest Camilo Torres. He came from a wealthy family and with his exceptional gifts and strong will could have risen to the top of the hierarchical ladder in his society. He remained "at the bottom" to be together with his people, to suffer, think and fight in their ranks. He could not reconcile his outraged conscience with the fact that the lion's share of the riches produced by the people went to foreign firms, to the local feudal lords and compradore bourgeoisie. Up to 40 per cent of town-dwellers were living in extreme poverty and 40 per cent of the population were illiterate. The annual infant mortality rate was 25,000. In these circumstances Camilo Torres did not feel like doing what was incumbent upon a Christian priest: extinguishing the hate in the hearts of the people and comforting them with promises of retribution in the hereafter. He chose struggle. His call to fight against evil rang out from the pulpit. It conflicted with the exhortations of Pope Paul VI, who at a meeting with Latin American clergymen said: "Allow us to warn

¹ *L'Europeo*, No. 34, 20 Agosto, 1970, p. 23.

² *Ibid.*

you not to place your trust in force and revolution."¹ Camilo Torres wrote his revolutionary appeals to the people. Today they have been collected together and published as a separate volume under the significant title of *Revolution as the Duty of the Christians*.² Cardinal Concha, the archbishop of Bogota, condemned Torres' revolutionary views and activity and defrocked him. Three months later Torres changed his soutane for a partisan uniform and joined the National Liberation Army. In February 1966 he laid down his life for the freedom of his people.

Camilo Torres realised that if the people are forced to take up revolutionary struggle for their basic rights, such a struggle is just and sacred. He wrote: "Revolution is not only permissible for the Christian, it is his duty, if it is the only effective and adequate way of establishing the kingdom of love."³ Rising above a sentimental, illusory, contemplative love of man to a bold and effective love, this valiant son of the Colombian people wrote proudly in one of his appeals: "I have sworn allegiance to the revolution out of love for my fellow-men."⁴

Having embarked upon the road of revolutionary struggle for social justice, this warrior priest was filled with great respect for communist ideals and the Communist Party. He stated publicly: "The Communist Party contains truly revolutionary elements within itself and therefore I cannot be anti-communist, either as a Colombian, or as a sociologist, or as a Christian, or as a priest."⁵

Camilo Torres reflected very clearly the feelings, thoughts and actions of the finest people in the Christian church, for whom the needs of the people, its future, are not a matter of indifference.

The newspaper *Unidad* published an article by A. Strelin containing some interesting facts concerning the progressive stand of part of the Latin American clergy. For example, a symposium was organised in Colombia to discuss "The Theology of Freedom". It was attended by more than a

¹ *Der Spiegel*, 16 Juni, 1969, Nr. 25, S. 145.

² Camilo Torres, *Revolution als Aufgabe des Christen*, Mainz, 1969.

³ *Der Spiegel*, 16 Juni, 1969, Nr. 25, S. 145.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

thousand representatives of the clergy and laity from Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and other countries. As the article stated, the participants in the symposium declared the need for a radical reorganisation of the socio-economic structure of the Latin American countries. More than 500 priests expressed their belief in the need for a transition to socialism in Latin America. They firmly declared the need to reject the existing social system and defend a new social order which would correspond to the principles proclaimed by the church.¹

We are also told that democratic elements in the Brazilian clergy advocated co-operation with all progressive forces, including Communists. They announced boldly that it is "impossible to organise the modern world without the Communists".²

Such is the position with regard to the possibility for co-operation by believers and a section of the clergy with Communists in the struggle against the foundations of capitalist society. The prospects are even greater in the field of socio-political problems the solution of which is of interest not only to the working class and the broad mass of the people, but also to considerable sections of the bourgeoisie itself. These problems include, first and foremost, the campaign for peace, disarmament, the banning of nuclear weapons, and the removal of the terrible threat to mankind and human culture. Today, the consolidation of the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different socio-political systems, the positive moves towards the conversion of Europe into a bulwark of peace, settlement of political relations between the USSR and the USA and the growth of economic and cultural ties between them have become an effective basis for this struggle. The solution of these tasks meets the correctly understood interests of the overwhelming majority of people regardless of class, and religious or atheistic convictions.

The religious organisations, including the Catholic church, have made a number of official statements about their readiness to strive for peace between nations, to avert a new world war which in the present situation would inevitably become a nuclear war.

¹ *Noeuvos aspectos de la Iglesia en America Latina*, julio 16, 1970.

² *Ibid.*

Communists sincerely welcome these statements by church organisations in the defence of peace and are ready to co-operate with them actively in solving one of the greatest tasks in the history of mankind. There can be no doubt that concerted efforts by Communist and Workers' parties, and religious and other organisations to defend peace can thwart the plans of the warmongers. It is important that these good intentions should be put into effect. The Church has very great opportunities for using its influence with believers to increase the number of active fighters against war. War can only be averted not by prayers, but by the decisive, purposeful organised mass actions of millions.

The concerted actions of Communists and Christians should play a great role in abolishing the inequality of peoples and races, colonialism and neo-colonialism.

The communist standpoint on these questions is clear and obvious. Communists have not only proclaimed the principle of equality between peoples and races, but consistently striven for its application. They are wholly and fully on the side of peoples waging wars of liberation against imperialism and colonialism. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are giving effective aid to the former colonial peoples in their economic and cultural development. Internationalism, the fraternal unity of all peoples, was and remains the banner and programme of action for all Communists.

Referring to the Leninist nationalities policy of the Soviet Union, the Dean of Canterbury, Hewlett Johnson, expressed the feelings and thoughts of many Christians when he wrote: "With what joy then should we Christians welcome this new contact, the Soviet programme, with the spirit of the Jesus of the Gospels. What a mighty step forward in advance towards world brotherhood. The old evil, predatory exploiting of the world would be gone; the new attitude seeking the full expression of all that is within people would take its place."¹

There is nothing strange about the fact that many Christians, because they are unable to give scientific substantiation to the policy of the friendship of peoples, attempt to justify

¹ Hewlett Johnson. *Christians and Communism*, London, 1956, pp. 74-75.

it by sayings taken from the New Testament. The important thing is that today not only the ordinary Christians but the progressive clergymen are expressing their indignation at national and racial discrimination and to the best of their ability are fighting against racism and chauvinism. The activities of Father Trevor Huddleston are characteristic in this respect. Huddleston is far from being a Communist, but he is an honest man and a true friend of the oppressed Negro population of Africa. His conscience will not be reconciled to the dreadful things going on around him. He refuses to accept the enslavement and abasement of the black population by the colonialists.

Huddleston has written a book, *Naught For Your Comfort*, the aim of which is to show the influence of colonialist policy on the life of the black population, a policy which is totally anti-Christian and which is pursued by a government whose conduct is racist. Step by step the author exposes the inhuman, racist activities of the "white rulers" who pride themselves upon their civilisation and Christian morality. Destroying the myth of the British "Commonwealth" of nations, Huddleston says that the catch-phrases about a "free association of free peoples" and "constitutional sovereignty" reveal a terrible cynicism when people try to explain to an educated young African why he cannot get a British passport or leave his country to complete his education.

Like the resolutions of the Second Vatican Council the encyclical of the head of the Catholic church, Pope Paul VI, entitled "Popularum progressio" (March 26, 1967), contains many a kind word for the former colonial peoples and hopes for their free development. The church knows full well that colonial rule has left some terrible consequences behind it. The encyclical says that no one today can be ignorant of the fact that among the population of whole continents vast numbers of men and women are starving and many children are so undernourished that they die at an early age. This state of affairs means that the population of vast areas is sentenced to hopeless, dark despair.

The measures proposed by the church are not particularly effective or consistent, but nevertheless they can be of use to a certain extent in the joint struggle against national

and racial oppression, against colonialism, against intervention in the domestic affairs of the newly free countries and violation of their state sovereignty.

The present stage in the development of imperialism is characterised by the growth of political reaction in the capitalist world. Monopolist ruling circles and their loyal henchmen are seeking to curtail the democratic freedoms and rights of the individual as much as possible and to set up anti-democratic regimes wherever they can. It is a well-known fact that the Portuguese, Greek, Chilean and other fascists have the backing of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

Communists and believers have been waging a concerted struggle for human rights and democracy for many years in the capitalist countries. They are bravely resisting the fascist regime and political reaction.

The Christian church and its leaders frequently and publicly announce their readiness to defend the democratic rights and freedoms of the individual against all forms of violence and enslavement. The church has often condemned national and racial discrimination. The above-mentioned papal encyclical says that racism today is an obstacle to co-operation between peoples who are equally poor, and even within the bounds of a single state it is a source of strife and hatred when, contrary to the inviolable rights of the individual, separate persons or families are subjected to a special regime because of race or colour of skin.

We could quote many statements by high church officials condemning fascism. The task is obviously to realise democratic and humanist aims as effectively and fully as possible and to thwart the attempts of fascist forces to trample on elementary human rights.

Communists are ready to give full support not only to believers, but also to church circles in the struggle against all forms and varieties of political reaction, against everything that is aimed at the vital interests of the masses.

Consequently, ideological disagreements do not prevent Communists and Christians from fighting together for high and noble socio-political aims, for their rapid practical realisation. This is a perfectly practicable programme. But it by no means follows that, because ideological disagreements do not prevent Communists and Christians from fighting for

social progress, the existence of common socio-political aims between the two presupposes the need for an ideological reconciliation of communism and religion. Some people assume that mutual ideological concessions of a fundamental nature are necessary for a successful dialogue between Communists and Christians. This is a false premise which far from assisting the dialogue can radically distort it.

2. THE ESSENCE AND LIMITS OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND CHRISTIANS

The elaboration of principles and a programme of action for progressive socio-political aims naturally presupposes meetings and dialogues between Communists and Christians. Dialogue should help, first and foremost, to elucidate the range of questions on which joint discussion could be fruitful and strengthen contacts between Communists and Christians. Consequently it should also determine which questions there is little point in discussing. For example, it is unlikely that discussion of so-called "doctrinal" questions would promote the establishment of practical contacts between Communists and Christians. As we know, communism and Christianity advocate mutually exclusive philosophical principles and here no dialogue can help to remove their irreconcilable contradictions. This must be clearly realised and contacts and mutual understanding should be sought in fields where they are likely to yield the best results.

History shows that the irreconcilability of opposing ideologies does not exclude, as already noted, the possibility of coexistence and collaboration between peoples, parties and states in highly important spheres of practical life. It is well known, for example, that ideological contradictions by no means exclude the possibility of peaceful coexistence and co-operation between states with different social systems. There are broad areas for joint action between Communists and Christians. Any attempt to reconcile communist and Christian ideology, however, is bound to end in failure.

In the post-war years Communists and Christians have frequently met together to conduct this dialogue. The experience of these meetings also confirms the view that mutual under-

standing must be sought in areas where it is fundamentally possible and necessary.

The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in 1969 clearly defined the range of questions in which a dialogue between Communists and believers is both possible and productive. The main document says: "Positive co-operation and joint action between Communists and broad democratic masses of Catholics and followers of other religions are developing in some countries. The dialogue between them on issues such as war and peace, capitalism and socialism, and neo-colonialism and the problem of the developing countries, has become highly topical; their united action against imperialism, for democracy and socialism, is extremely timely. Communists are convinced that in this way—through broad contacts and joint action—the mass of religious people can become an active force in the anti-imperialist struggle and in carrying out far-reaching social changes."¹

The question of a proper understanding of the essence and aims of the dialogue is most important, for there have already been some fairly obvious attempts to channel the dialogue in the wrong direction.

By this we mean that certain participants in the dialogue are trying to draw together, to equate the initial philosophical principles of religion and Marxist atheism. Thus, one of the books on the relationship between Communists and Christians rightly notes that the dialogue between them is "one of the hopeful events of what has been a generally tense decade",² yet it also develops ideas which cannot promote the strengthening of mutual understanding between Marxists and Christians. Let us quote one such instance: both Christianity and communism are global because both are able to inspire a boundless loyalty and both are in a position to lead vast forces onto the battlefield. Both, finally, believe "in the ultimate and inevitable victory of good over evil, in the sense that both point man to utopia".³

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*. Moscow, 1969, Prague, 1969, pp. 26-27.

² *What Kind of Revolution? A Christian-Communist Dialogue*, edited by James Klugmann and Paul Oestreicher, London, 1968 (see title page).

³ *Ibid.*

It is easy to see that here the communist ideal, in spite of all its overwhelming strength, is regarded and presented as something unrealisable, illusory and in this sense close to the religious dream of rewards in the hereafter. This approach to the matter is based, of course, on a view of communism and of communist doctrine as a type of religion.

Honesty compels one to reject flatly, frankly and decisively such an idea of communism. The communist ideal, in direct contrast to the Christian expectation of redemption in the hereafter, is based on a rejection of all forms of the idea of the supernatural. It is born of real earthly needs and is realised on earth through the human struggle and toil.

In the Introduction to the above-mentioned book Paul Oestreicher writes: "The vast majority of people still hold the naive belief that Christianity and communism are two antagonistic and given constants..."¹ He goes on to say that the essays in the book were written to help to dispel that myth.

We have already had occasion to emphasise that, if they refrain from disputes on the existence of God, there is nothing to prevent Communists and Christians from working together to create conditions on earth worthy of man. But to go further and deny the antagonism between scientific communism and religion is futile, because on the ideological level the basic principles of communism and Christianity are truly antagonistic. Let us now consider the errors of those who, although they claim to be Marxists, revise the Marxist teaching on religion, its essence and social role in human history in the most impermissible way.

People who want to bring together Marxism and religion proceed by idealising the latter. Religion and Christianity in particular are presented as playing an extremely positive role in social progress, in the liberation movement of the oppressed classes, and in the development of culture and civilisation. As already noted, Marxism has never denied that some progressive ideas, even in their religious form of expression, were used to substantiate the just aspirations and interests of the exploited masses. It was Frederick Engels who noted the anti-feudal role of the mediaeval heresies and mystical sects. It is also a fact that the peasant wars against

¹ *What Kind of Revolution? A Christian-Communist Dialogue*, p. 10.

the feudal lords frequently made use of early Christian ideas aimed against social inequality. Nor can one deny that the socio-political and moral ideas expressed in Christianity and other religions have promoted the development of the arts in their time. As for religious organisations, some of them played an important part in the creation of the written language and in preserving cultural values, and took part in just wars of national liberation, etc.

The question arises as to whether these facts do not cast doubt on the basic critical assessment which Marxism made of religion as a force which restricts people's creative possibilities and the creative potential of the human intellect and transfers the realisation of mankind's most precious ideals to an imaginary hereafter. In short, do not the facts quoted above contradict the Marxist definition of religion as the *opium of the people*?

This is not a new question. The supporters of religion have, naturally, always rejected the Marxist evaluation of religion and attempted to ascribe to religion a great role in the self-preservation and self-affirmation of man, in his spiritual and moral progress. Today these apologetic statements are defended in original form by right-wing revisionist theoreticians, following in the wake of reformist ideologists. They seek to give their own interpretation of Marx's thesis on the essence and main social function of religion, to "prove" that cleansed of all its superstitions and myths it acts as an important spiritual factor in the development of human history.

This revision of the Marxist assessments of religion is seen most clearly in the works of Roger Garaudy. He declares openly that the thesis according to which religion has always acted as the opium of the people "has never been a thesis of Marx's"¹.

Naturally, one should have great "boldness" to affirm this, for Marx said in unambiguous words: "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people."²

¹ R. Garaudy, *De l'anathème au dialogue*, Paris, 1965, p. 96.

² K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1973, p. 42.

In support of his absurd statement Garaudy refers to the fact that "in the very paragraph where one finds the famous formula that religion is the opium of the people, Marx emphasises a few lines further on that Christianity [Marx said: "religious distress"] is 'on the one hand, the *expression* of real distress, and, on the other, a *protest* against this real distress'."¹

Thus Garaudy regards the fact that religion is an expression of protest against the real distress as sufficient grounds for casting doubt on the fundamental Marxist appraisal of religion. What is more, he carefully overlooks the question of the nature of the religious reflection of reality, and also the nature of the religious protest against reality. This is no accident. He is forced to resort to these tricks because if he did not his whole "philosophy of religion" would collapse, a philosophy according to which religion not only reflects the world, but is also constantly advancing designs for the active transformation of the world in the interests of mankind. Such "religion" cannot indeed be regarded either wholly or partly as the opium of the people. What sort of opium is it that instead of weakening men and lulling them to sleep urges them to take action and transform existing reality?

But the whole point is that this type of religion exists only in the minds of various theologians and seekers of religious truth, who are obsessed with the desire to cleanse and ennoble religion and endow it with all the virtues.

Marx, Engels and Lenin, remaining in the realm of real fact, constantly stressed that religion reflects existing reality, but reflects it in a distorted way, endowing it with supernatural forces and phenomena. As for religious protest against reality, this is passive and impotent, and to a large extent illusory. What is characteristic of religion, and of Christianity in particular, is the call not to action, not to the transformation of reality, the creation of something new, but, on the contrary, to humility, repentance and meek expectation of a better future. Throughout the many centuries of its history Christianity has diligently and "conscientiously" sanctified the power of the oppressors over the

¹ R. Garaudy, *De l'anathème au dialogue*, Paris, 1965, p. 96.

people, seeing its basic function as restraining the masses from revolutionary action.

Such are the facts, and Garaudy is fully aware of them. Yet nevertheless he maintains that "true Christianity" is not the same as the Christianity which actually existed over the centuries. Moreover he even draws a distinction between this official Christianity with its principle of passive reconciliation to reality and "true Christianity" which is supposed to proceed from man's active nature, to express the spirit of protest, and to be a "way out to the future", a call to action and struggle.

As we have already noted, the angry, albeit helpless protest of the enslaved lower classes against their masters, found expression in early Christianity. But this protest was born not of the Christian faith, but of actual social reality. Every religion, Christianity included, by acknowledging and sanctifying supernatural powers and their fatal power over man, leaves no room for real protest and revolutionary action, for this protest is aimed against powers and orders which are supposed to have been set up by God. By its very logic, every religion in maintaining the power of a divinity over man, excludes or greatly restricts people's historical initiative and substantiates the principle of conformism in its crudest form. Yet true Christians did take up arms against the feudal order, objects Garaudy. Yes, they did. Not because they were Christians, but because they were oppressed people.

With the same aim in mind of bringing together religion and Marxism Garaudy in effect attempts to remove the fundamental distinction between science and religion: "For a Marxist, therefore, there cannot exist the oversimplified, polarised opposition between religion and science characteristic of pre-Marxist materialism: between religion and science there is at one and the same time rupture, contradiction and continuity."¹ The reference to pre-Marxist materialism is inappropriate, because Marxist materialism proceeds from the fundamental incompatibility of science and religion far more strictly than preceding materialist doctrines.

Garaudy maintains, however, that religion and science are inspired by the same aim: "to reproduce, realise and create".²

¹ R. Garaudy, *De l'anathème au dialogue*, p. 68.

² *Ibid.*

It emerges that Marxism, too, as a world outlook which has elaborated the methodology of historical initiative, also owes a great deal to Christianity "as the religion of the absolute future" which discovered "the two essential dimensions of man: subjectivity and transcendence".¹ Garaudy is talking here of the principle of vigorous human activity. But could Marxism have inherited anything of the sort from Christianity? Is it not obvious that Marxist philosophy, the philosophy of the revolutionary transformation of the world, has as its basis the *consistent revolutionary nature of the working class*? Why then try to borrow the principle of activity from the Christian religion, which is the embodiment of the principle of adaptation and passive expectation?

But obsessed by the desire to pay religion as many compliments as possible, Garaudy has little regard for facts and logic. He speaks of the revolutionary potential of the Christian faith, persistently arguing that human faith, beginning with belief in God, "does not mutilate man, does not deprive him of any of the dimensions which he has won in the course of history".² It transpires that "faith in a transcendent God never limits or hampers faith in the human tasks".³

Garaudy persistently plays around with the idea of God in all manner of ways trying to reinterpret it and use it for his own ends. Here is one example of his "Marxist" theodicy: "...If the Word of God is always an act and if God speaks to men through the events of social transformation, cannot one say that God is present wherever something new is in the course of being born?"⁴ It appears that one can say that God is to be found in all forward movement, in national liberation movements and social revolution. According to Garaudy, God is present "wherever man is becoming more like the image of God, a creator, on all levels of creation, in economics and politics, scientific, artistic or spiritual invention".⁵ Even the Resurrection, so Garaudy assures us, is a paradigm of this new freedom: "death, the extreme limit

¹ R. Garaudy, *De l'anathème au dialogue*, pp. 111-12.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ R. Garaudy, *Pour un modèle français du socialisme*, p. 366.

⁵ *Ibid.*

by which our inevitable finiteness is defined, death itself has been vanquished."¹

Contrary to the true nature of religion, which was born of man's helplessness before the elemental forces of nature and society and which sanctified this helplessness with a halo of its own, Garaudy arbitrarily equates the concept of religion or God with creation, transformation, the search for and establishment of the new.

In such a way, of course, one can arbitrarily endow all religious images, tales and dogmas with a special meaning, interpreting them in one's own way, ennobling them and giving them a "revolutionary" aura.

Is there anything new or original in these exercises by Garaudy? No, nothing at all. The task of stripping religion of its most crude, vulgar, obviously senseless and foolhardy statements has long been the concern of church circles and all manner of theological intellectuals who have striven to adapt ideas and images engendered at the earliest stages of human civilisation to the spiritual world of twentieth-century man. We all know what dimensions the trend towards demythologising Christianity has assumed in the West today, a trend which hopes to rid religion of the irrational, of the most absurd myths and legends.

Garaudy seeks to present things in such a way as to suggest that he is deepening the Marxist interpretation of religion, freeing it of crude distortion and oversimplification. In fact, however, his striving to present religion as an active principle which stimulates man's creative powers is an almost word-for-word repetition of theological ideas.

As we know, the God-seekers in old Russia, as well as certain Christian socialists, argued that God is the sum total of ideas which arouse and organise social feelings necessary to link the individual with society.

Lenin criticised these attempts to glorify the idea of God most sharply. He wrote his famous lines: "It is untrue that God is the complex of ideas which awaken and organise social feelings. That is Bogdanov *idealism*, which suppresses the material origin of ideas. God is (in history and in real life) first of all the complex of ideas generated by the brutish

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

subjection of man both by external nature and by the class yoke—ideas which *consolidate* that subjection, *lull to sleep* the class struggle.”¹

Having committed himself to the task of rehabilitating religion and its role in social progress, Garaudy naturally ignores completely the fundamental evaluations of religion provided by Lenin. This is understandable. How can one possibly reconcile Garaudy’s statement that “faith in a transcendent God never limits or hampers faith in human tasks”² with Lenin’s proposition that the idea of God has *always* lulled and deadened “social feelings” replacing the vital by the moribund and being *always* the idea of slavery (the worst, most hopeless slavery). “Never has the idea of God ‘linked the individual with society’: it has always *tied* the oppressed *classes hand and foot* with faith in the *divinity* of the oppressors”.³

Today Garaudy prefers to base his assessments of religion on St Augustine, Cardinal Bellarmine, the Jesuits and Catholic theologians, carefully ignoring the critical evaluations of religion given by Marx, Engels and Lenin.

In another of his books, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, Garaudy departs even further from the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of religion and flirts openly with the idea of the supernatural. He approvingly cites statements to the effect that only a “primitive materialist” can criticise the supernatural in Christianity. He expresses his greatest sympathy for “Christian humanism”, for the utopian and hypocritical idea of the universal love of man for his neighbour in an antagonistic society. And in *The Turning-Point of Socialism* he defends the false “philosophical neutrality” of the right-wing socialists, as we have seen, by arguing that the Communist Party should stand above materialism and idealism, religion and atheism.

Garaudy’s most open expression of his renunciation of Marxist atheism is to be found in his book entitled *Reconquête de l’espoir*. It is here that he makes his greatest effort to reconcile Marxism and religion, science and faith. But here too he does not dare to dismiss the basic Marxist thesis

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 128.

² R. Garaudy, *De l’anathème au dialogue*, pp. 110-11.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 129.

on religion entirely, trying rather to "render it harmless" and interpret it as he sees fit.

He begins by restricting the claims of both religion and philosophical materialism. Thus he writes: "Is faith always and everywhere bound to be an 'opium' of the people, that is, a barrier, a curb to free intellectual research, to human action and struggle to change the world?"

"And likewise is philosophical materialism the only possible and necessary basis for all scientific thought and all true revolutionary action?"¹

Garaudy has to frame the question in this way in order to give a negative answer in both cases. And indeed, as we already know, he does not believe that religion is opium always and everywhere. One should also note the fact that nowhere does Garaudy define the essence of religion as a social phenomenon and nowhere does he state that the basic invariable feature of religion is a fantastic, wrong attitude towards reality and faith in the supernatural. To his first question Garaudy gives a reply which turns the essence of religion into the accidental, a transient, temporary property. "There can be no doubt," he writes, "that religion, including Christianity, has *often* played this role of opium in history."² It follows that religion has not always asserted the supernatural principle, not always given a false, fantastic reflection of reality and not always proclaimed the dominion of mystical, supernatural forces over man. But such a "religion" has never existed.

Garaudy needs to cleanse religion in this way in order to combine it more easily with Marxism. On the other hand, he also needs to somewhat "tone down" philosophical materialism, to moderate its claims to be a philosophy of revolutionary action, to deprive it of the sole right to substantiate the principle of activity, of transforming that which exists, and to affirm the new.

One might think that in order to carry out this "operation" Garaudy would have to turn to Marxist philosophical materialism as the highest form of materialism. But instead he tries to make his task easier by endeavouring to prove that materialist philosophy is inferior, using pre-Marxist material-

¹ R. Garaudy, *Reconquête de l'espoir*, p. 111.

² *Ibid.*

ist doctrines as his example. He reminds us that the materialist Hobbes defended absolute monarchy and that the Girondists and not the Jacobins were the successors to materialist philosophy in eighteenth-century France. Nor does he hesitate to declare that materialist philosophy was the philosophy of the French fascists. He writes: "At the end of the nineteenth century in France philosophical materialism became the basis of the most reactionary doctrine which our country had ever known."¹

Having thoroughly vilified materialist philosophy, Garaudy hypocritically announces: "This certainly does not mean that we are ceasing to be materialists and atheists (which I am myself), it simply means that there is no necessary connection between materialism, atheism and revolution".²

Completely deserting the Marxist interpretation of the revolutionary, transforming role of progressive philosophical thought and, in particular, of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, Garaudy announces: "To link revolutionary politics with any form of metaphysics (materialist, idealist, theological, etc.) would be a new form of clericalism which radically contradicts Marxist thought."³

So, if we are to believe Garaudy, it is Marx himself who denied the connection between revolutionary politics and philosophy. Such statements reveal an extraordinary disregard for the objective truth and for the reader's knowledge.

Marx saw dialectico-materialist philosophy as a force capable of becoming the revolutionary instrument of the economic, political and spiritual transformation of the world. Garaudy, however, falsifies the statements by Marx in order to prove that materialist philosophy, including Marxism, is metaphysical.

Garaudy generously bestows on religion the revolutionary potential which he has taken from materialist philosophy. We have already quoted several of his statements on the active nature of religious faith. In his book *Reconquête de l'espoir* these arguments are taken to their logical conclusion. It appears that "true" religious faith is not opium, but

¹ R. Garaudy, *Reconquête de l'espoir*, p. 120.

² *Ibid.*, p. 121.

³ *Ibid.*

heaven, and the Christian can be revolutionary not "in spite of his faith" but because of it.¹ Garaudy tries to assure us that modern Christianity has finally rid itself of everything that often made it an opium. This, it emerges, took place as a result of the Second Vatican Council. "It was only after the Second Vatican Council," writes Garaudy, "that the Catholic church began from the point of view of theology and the point of view of the conscience and conduct of Christians to interpret Biblical faith in a new way which was far removed from both Greek dualism and adulterated spiritualism based on the distinction of the earthly and divine, the profane and the sacred, the temporal and the eternal, the immanent and the transcendental."²

One may well ask in which Bible Garaudy found a rejection of the distinction between the earthly and celestial, carnal and spiritual, secular and sacred. Such a Bible does not exist and never has. Garaudy is most irresponsibly presenting his own and other people's fantasies about an ideal religious faith as if they were real. He is forced to do so in order to "reconcile" his distortion of Marxist philosophy with "revolutionised" Christianity. Moreover, this desire is so strong that Garaudy is prepared to reinterpret and employ all religious fabrications, even including the idea of original sin.

The "conciliatory quackery" about which Lenin wrote in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, rejecting the Machist and other attempts to reconcile materialism and idealism, science and religion, is regarded by Garaudy as an important condition for achieving "mutual understanding" between Marxists and Christians, and sees in it the means of its "mutual enrichment" with spiritual values. He writes: "... I often had cause to say: Marxism would be the poorer if St Paul, St John of the Cross or Pascal became alien to it. Today the opposite is true: Christianity would be the poorer if Marxism became alien to it."³

It is easy to see that the principle proposed by Garaudy leads to a complete ideological disarmament of the Party. Therefore it is quite natural that his attempted revision of

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

³ R. Garaudy, *Reconquête de l'espoir*, p. 126.

the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism should have met with a decisive rebuff from the French Communist Party and its leadership.

* * *

We have considered a few of the crudest errors and distortions in Garaudy's interpretation of the problem of the relationship between communism and Christianity. Similar "errors" are also to be found in the writings of certain right-wing ideologists in Italy and other West European countries.

What is it that inspires such reconciliatory moods and views in respect of religion? Without claiming to give anything like an exhaustive answer to this question, we would point out, first and foremost, the illusory desire to strengthen contact between Marxists and believers at the cost of fundamental concessions to religion. It is a concrete case of a utopian and reactionary attempt to reconcile opposing ideologies, science, and religion, Marxism and Christianity.

As we have already had occasion to see, under the pretext of bringing together Christians and Marxists Garaudy distorted Marxism and the Marxist interpretation of religion in order to ensure a "successful" dialogue between them. He forgets that the dialogue can only produce the desired results if it is carried on honestly and its participants do not indulge in illusions, do not have recourse to half-truths which in fact always appear as falsehood.

Indeed, should one promise Christians things that Marxists cannot and will not do? They cannot and will not encourage Christians to think that it is possible to reconcile the religious and atheist world outlook, idealist and materialist philosophy.

Garaudy and other revisionists are not averse to arguing their opportunist approach to the questions under discussion with references to the "special conditions" in Western Europe which, it is alleged, demand an "understanding" attitude towards religion and the church. These ruses are rejected with full justification by the leading organs of the West European Communist parties which, of course, know the specific features of their own countries just as well as Garaudy.

Thus, presenting the Central Committee report to the 19th Congress of the French Communist Party Georges Marchais noted that in order to establish and strengthen successful contacts between Communists and Christians "there is no need to suggest an impossible ideological conciliation in which the working-class movement would lose the scientific base of its struggle and, consequently, the pledge of its success".¹

The French Communists have subjected the attempts to "dilute" Marxism to detailed and convincing criticism. The eminent Marxist theoretician and member of the Politburo of the French Communist Party, Guy Besse, in his article entitled "Christians and Communists, Can They Strive Together for Socialism?" argues the absolutely correct idea that the unity of Communists and Christians in the struggle for progressive aims proceeds from dialectico-materialist, atheist philosophy and not in spite of it, not by robbing and deforming it. He points out that for the joint struggle of believers and Marxists for a new world based on social justice there is no need "to soak Marx and Lenin in the spirit of some 'natural religion' adapted to our age".² The correctly understood interests of Christian workers, he writes, "demand from us an unweakening loyalty to the principles which make us what we are, materialists and revolutionaries. It is as such that we call on Christians to fight with us for a more humane life. . . . We respect them, as we must respect all those, Communists or not, who believe that every effort should be made to change life".³

It is easy to see how profoundly the language of this Communist revolutionary differs from the language of the revisionist, who has no hesitation in repudiating Marxist principles and Marxist philosophy so as not to seem too "dogmatic" in the eyes of professional theologians and bourgeois theoreticians and to earn their approval and trust.

It goes without saying that Marxists are in favour of complete and consistent freedom of conscience. They are fundamentally opposed to any form of persecution of people, or infringement of their rights, because of their religious beliefs. Moreover, being well aware of the social roots of religion,

¹ *L'Humanité*, 1970, 5 février.

² *France Nouvelle*, No. 1160, 1968, 10 janvier, p. 111.

³ *Ibid.*

the reasons for its existence, Marxists adopt an understanding attitude towards believers and their religious convictions. At the same time consistent adherents to Marxist-Leninist theory cannot seek to win favour with Christians by paying compliments to religion. Marxists cannot and should not, let it be stressed once again, conceal the distinction between religion and science, the fact that the fantastic, false religious reflection of the world weakens rather than strengthens people in the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of reality on principles of social equality and justice.

In order to give some kind of "justification" to their conciliatory attitude towards religion Garaudy and certain of his companions maintain that religion has changed so much for the better in our age that there is no need to retain the negative definitions of it provided by Marx, Engels and Lenin. This idea was expressed very openly by Lucio Lombardo Radice as follows: "For a positive, fruitful relation between Marxism and Christianity," he writes in the article "Balance of a Dialogue", "I think one must begin not with Karl Marx who was a contemporary of Pius IX, or with Vladimir Lenin who was a contemporary of Pius X, but with Palmiro Togliatti who was a contemporary of Pope John XXIII."¹

Leaving aside the most unjustified comparison between Togliatti and Marx and Lenin, and also the writer's attempts to regard individual statements by the eminent Italian Marxist theoretician as absolutes, let us try to elucidate whether it is true that "the papal reign of John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council were an historical turning-point".²

Today one can observe certain obvious attempts by the most far-seeing and sober circles in the Christian church to reject crude anti-communism. It has become clear that communism has turned into a mighty modern movement of the times. It has also gripped the minds of many millions of believers. In such a situation bitter invectives against communism, its consignment to anathema and damnation, have begun to alienate believers not from communism but from the church.

¹ *Weg und Ziel*, 24 Jahrgang, Nr. 1, Wien, Jänner 1967, S. 8.

² *Ibid.*, S. 12.

It is precisely here that one must look for the reasons for a change of behaviour by a number of influential religious organisations, their more cautious and restrained attitude towards rabid anti-communism, and their growing readiness to enter into a debate with Marxists for their own interests.

The Spanish theologian José Gonzalez Ruiz rightly defines the meaning and causes of the "new line" of church circles when he writes: "Today Marxist humanism provides spiritual nourishment for practically one-third of the world population. We cannot subject to unfounded criticism an ideology by which so many people and so many nations are living and on which so many oppressed and exploited have set their hopes."¹

There can be no doubt that the elevated and noble ideals of communism have today won the hearts of a certain number of Christian leaders who sincerely want the mutual interaction of Christian and communist ideas. It is equally indisputable that, reflecting the mood of Christians in general, church circles have expressed serious concern in connection with the arms race and the danger of nuclear war. They are giving increasingly clear expression to their pacifist mood and their readiness to support the peace movement more or less consistently and radically.

It is true that modern Christian organisations, more than ever before, differ from one another greatly in their political sympathies and antipathies. Most of the right-wing church leaders preach anti-communism rather than the religion of Christ. But this should not make us forget other Christian organisations, unfortunately as yet less numerous, who, setting aside abstract humanistic appeals to love one's enemies, are ready to support and in fact are supporting the active struggle of the oppressed masses against the yoke of the monopolies, against reactionary political regimes, against colonialism and neo-colonialism, and against fascist racial discrimination and fanaticism.

Marxists, of course, are aware of all these processes taking place in modern Christianity, the desire of a number of quite eminent leaders of Christian organisations to review their line of conduct for this or that reason and bring it into

¹ *Juventud Obrera*, No. 91, 1965.

conformity with the new socio-political situation and the new spiritual requirements of the age.

All these facts are quite indisputable, but there are no grounds for going further and talking about a "dramatic" turning-point in the history of the church, about a "radical" reassessment of religious values. For many centuries religious organisations have constituted an organic part of the superstructure of bourgeois society, protecting and sanctifying this society in the name of God. And one would have to be very naive to believe in that the church, which is bound by a thousand links with bourgeois society, could suddenly be transformed into its opposite. Those who are inclined to overestimate the essence and meaning of the renewal in religious organisations, including the Catholic church, are overlooking one very important fact. In the capitalist world all the very large religious organisations are themselves the owners of great wealth. The Vatican, for example, is not only a religious and administrative centre, but also the possessor of vast capital, land, enterprises, etc. "...The Vatican's capital investments in Italian joint-stock companies total not less than 100,000 million lire. This makes it the largest Italian shareholder. The interests of the Vatican and the 'cement king', the owner of Italcementi and leader of extreme right-wing economic circles, are closely intertwined in other trusts and banks."¹

One would need a very inventive imagination to believe that such an organisation would reject capitalism and adopt a neutral position in the assessment of bourgeois and socialist society, proclaiming "neither capitalism nor socialism".

Let us look at the facts. The Second Vatican Council refrained from traditional anti-communist actions and expressed many friendly words and hopes concerning an improvement in the lives of "poor people and poor peoples", unambiguously approved the desire for peace throughout the world, gave more decisive emphasis to the values of the earthly life and the need to improve it, etc. But, as one might have expected, the Council also refrained from moral criticism of capitalism, capitalist exploitation, private owner-

¹ L. I. Velikovich, *The Crisis of Contemporary Catholicism* (in Russian), Moscow, 1967, p. 134.

ship, everything that engenders the enslavement of man by man, the poverty of some and the fabulous wealth of others, everything which deepens the inequality of peoples and whips up militarism and dangerous military collisions in our atomic age.

In Paul VI's encyclical "Popularum progressio" of March 26, 1967, in which the head of the Catholic church popularises the decisions of the Second Vatican Council, there is a statement about private ownership to the effect that the right of ownership should never be exercised to the detriment of the common good, according to the traditional doctrine of the church Fathers and the great theologians.

So there has been no reassessment of such a fundamental phenomenon as private ownership—it is a traditional doctrine. As for the reservation that private ownership should never be detrimental to the "public good", this is obviously meaningless and utopian, for private ownership by its very essence and nature cannot help conflicting with the interests of the majority of members of society who are deprived of property and forced to work for those who have concentrated the instruments and means of production in their own hands.

Paul VI's encyclical notes a number of social injustices but does not approve any real measures for doing away with them. We have already seen this from the example of private capitalist ownership. It must also be mentioned that the head of the Catholic church objects particularly strongly to attempts at the revolutionary transformation of reality. He assures us that with rare exceptions revolutionary insurrection engenders new injustices, leads to new social imbalances and provokes new disaster, and that one cannot combat a real evil at the cost of a greater misfortune.

The whole of history disproves such assessments of the role of revolution in the destiny of peoples. It is a well-known fact that all the greatest turning-points in social progress have been brought about by the revolutionary overcoming of reactionary orders which have outlived their time. With what means does the church propose to overcome the most blatant and prolonged social injustice? By simple reforms, it emerges. A little further on we learn that in order to carry out these reforms all those who possess riches are to voluntarily give up part of their possessions to those who

have nothing. So it all boils down to the old idea of charity.

One could quote many other examples of the fact that the above-mentioned encyclical, while paying attention to the real evils and profound contradictions of capitalist society and to the sufferings which they cause hundreds of millions of people, points to directions that lead nowhere and measures that, for the most part, solve nothing.

All this goes to show that there are no grounds for arguing there has been a radical change in church policy, particularly that of the Catholic church.

The same applies to the "disappearance" or "softening" of the contradictions between science and religion. An attempt is made to assure us that the age-old antagonism between the religious and scientific world outlooks has now been overcome. On what are such statements based? Clearly the church has long since lost the desire and opportunity to persecute science and scientists. It is concentrating now its energies on insisting on the peaceful coexistence of two types of truth—religious and scientific. In arguing the "absence" of contradictions between religion and science, the leaders of the Catholic church, for example, constantly stress that science cannot exclude religion, for scientists in their laboratories are engaged in unfolding the Divine intentions.

To argue the idea of the reconciliation of science and religion they occasionally bring in the concept of "de-mythologisation". What exactly is this? It is an attempt to free religion from the miracles, myths and fantastic fabrications which were invented many hundreds of years ago by the imagination of people at the lowest stages of spiritual development. It goes without saying that many modern theologians in this age of great scientific and technological revolution cannot seriously defend the primitive ideas of the "creation of the world in six days", the "immaculate conception" of Christ, his supernatural actions, his resurrection from the dead, "paradise", "hell" and so on. In order to salvage the authority of religion they attempt to present religious myths as allegories, symbols and figurative generalisations.

This striving for "de-mythologisation" as a means of salvaging the authority of religion is fairly clearly expressed in the writings of the Protestant theologian Rudolf Bult-

mann. Bultmann separates the essence of Christian doctrine from its mythical form of expression. An even more energetic attempt to free Christianity from myths has been made by the English bishop John Robinson, author of the book *Honest to God*. The rejection of the image of a primitive anthropomorphic god has found its expression in the extravagant formula "God is dead". This formula, incidentally, which has been borrowed from Nietzsche, is defended by so-called "atheistic Christianity".

A superficial or tendentious approach to "de-mythologisation" may suggest that the same "dramatic" turning-point has occurred in the philosophical bases of religion as in its socio-political conception. People who are inclined to idealise modern religion and strive for a convergence of Marxist and Christian ideas greatly exaggerate "de-mythologisation" in order to distort its true essence and aim. Official Christian circles do not approve of "de-mythologisation" and regard people like Bultmann and Robinson as heretics. As we know, the Second Vatican Council refrained from reviewing any aspects of Christian doctrine, Christian dogmas or the modernisation of religion and the church, and confined itself to extremely secondary changes, primarily in the sphere of the conduct of religious services.

This position of official Christian circles has a logic of its own. They regard the excessively rationalistic testing of religious beliefs and the excessively free treatment of age-old traditions and age-old religious convictions as dangerous. The church is afraid that the more consistent and searching minds will take "de-mythologisation" to its logical conclusion, the rejection of all myths and all idea of the supernatural. One cannot say that these fears are groundless.

Let us quote an example that illustrates this. In 1969 Adolf Wischmann, a doctor of theology from the Federal Republic of Germany, gave a sermon in the St Nicholas Cathedral in Leningrad. He decided to explain one of the most contradictory and absurd ideas in the New Testament. This is Christ's call to take no thought for food or raiment, but to leave these cares to the heavenly Father. According to another Gospel, Christ urges people to be like the birds of the air who neither sow nor reap, but are fed by the will of God. In short, in flagrant contradiction to other New Tes-

tament texts the call to take no thought for food or raiment is a call to reject work, i.e., to reject that which makes the existence of the human race possible.

Dr. Wischmann fully understands the complexity of the task—the task of giving meaning to the most meaningless religious exhortation. He admits that he both loves and fears these famous New Testament words: “take no thought”. He fears them because he often has occasion to travel to “those well-known areas of the world where hunger is rampant. People are in the streets because they are tormented by hunger; people are in the hospitals because they are threatened with starvation; people take flight because they are persecuted by racial hatred. . . . And in these conditions one is supposed to say and preach: ‘take no thought’, ‘take no thought for the morrow’! One might well fear that a sermon of this kind would produce an ironical attitude to oneself and ridicule. . . .”¹

A churchman who supports the modernisation of religion would probably have urged people not to take the words “give no thought” literally, but as an allegory, as a warning not to attach too much importance to earthly blessings and earthly life in general. Yet this course is unacceptable for official Christian church circles. They are afraid of rationalist analysis of religious “truths”, their secularisation and adaption to logical thinking. They prefer the formula “*Credo, quia absurdum*”. This is why Dr. Wischmann, too, in a great many words, retells a New Testament exhortation absurd for the sensible-minded person, and remains true to its spirit and letter, pointing to the negative attitude of the leaders of religious circles towards the rational reinterpret- ing of religious myths, etc.

But does it not follow, then, that “de-mythologisation” as it is presented by Bultmann, Robinson and like-minded theologians, is atheistic in essence and direction? Such a conclusion would be a false one. Regardless of what conclusions may be drawn from “de-mythologisation” by this or that group of believers, it strives not to reject religious thinking, but to strengthen it, to defend it with new means and de-

¹ *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* (in Russian). 1970. No. 1. pp. 48-49.

vices. The advocates of "de-mythologisation" undoubtedly make concessions to scientific thinking, but this is a case of sacrificing the part in order to preserve the whole.

Lenin repeatedly warned people against adopting a complacent, conciliatory attitude towards refined, "cleansed" religion. By discarding the most absurd, crude, primitive and anti-scientific of its dogmas and myths, religion does not draw any closer whatsoever to science and Marxism, as revisionists, both old and new, have thought. This very "renewal", "cleansing", "rearming" of religion is dictated by the desire to survive, to withstand the onslaught of the scientific world outlook.

Summing up what has been said, we can say that the revisionist version of radical changes in the religious world outlook, church dogma and policy is a false one. This version has been produced, as we have seen, to justify the impermissible fundamental concessions which Garaudy and those of like mind are making to religion.

It is obvious that whereas in the name of the dialogue between Marxists and Christians revisionist theoreticians light-heartedly reject tested Marxist truths and definitions of religion and the church, the representatives of Christianity—and one must give them credit for this—defend their religious illusions with dignity and conviction.

In one of the issues of the West German weekly *Der Spiegel* the following interesting statement was made: "While, on the one hand, modern Marxist thinkers, such as the East German Robert Havemann, the West German Jew Ernst Bloch, the Frenchman Roger Garaudy and the Pole Leszek Kolakowski, have been getting more and more theological recently; on the other hand, modern Christian theologians are inclining to an increasing extent towards revolutionary ambitions."¹

Whereas the description of Garaudy, Kolakowski and the other "theologising Marxists" is an apt one, the statement that many theologians are "inclining towards revolutionary ambitions" is way off the mark. Of course, one must always distinguish between churchmen who are anti-communist and those who, without sharing Marxist, communist views, nev-

¹ *Der Spiegel*, Nr. 4, 1968, S. 95.

ertheless allow of joint action between Marxists and Christians in the struggle for progressive socio-political aims. But even those Christian theologians who do not deny the value of joint action with Marxists are still not prepared to deviate from the fundamental principles of their Christian outlook in the name of a "successful dialogue".

Let us take J. Girardi, for example, the author of the book entitled *Marxism and Christianity*. He is prepared to give credit to Marxism and Marxist humanism, and not to ignore the unsightly pages in the history of the Christian church, but in the dialogue with Marxism he would not dream of making concessions on questions of a philosophical nature. On the contrary, Girardi would like to "adapt" Marxism to Christianity, to strengthen the position of religion.

Girardi knows full well that consistent Marxist atheist theory defies Christian "processing". Consequently he is counting on Marxism gradually losing its integrated character, i.e., its monolithic nature. He writes that Marxism can overcome integrism by "inner development". This inner development, or "regeneration" of Marxism is linked by this Catholic theologian, first and foremost, with the disappearance of materialist and collectivist ideas in the Marxist world outlook.

Girardi advocates the principle of pluralism which, apart from anything else, means the reconciliation of materialism and idealism, religion and atheism, a reconciliation which would leave nothing of either materialism or atheism.

He is relieved to note that, alongside what he refers to as monist, "institutionalised", "integristic" Marxism there is "Western", "humanist" Marxism which tends towards "social pluralism" and is prepared to go to any lengths to reach a compromise with non-Marxist doctrines. A dialogue, he maintains, is possible, of course, not with monist, but with pluralist Marxism or, to be more precise, the quasi-Marxism of Garaudy, Kolakowski and other revisionists.

The example of Girardi shows that for Christians the dialogue is not an occasion for ideological disarmament. This can be seen even more clearly from the writings of the official representatives of the Christian church. They exclude any possibility whatsoever of a review of the basic principles of the Christian world outlook. On the contrary, they assume

that the Christian who takes part in a dialogue with a non-believer should strive to enlighten him with "his religion".

A special document of August 28, 1968, published by the Vatican Secretariat for Non-Believers and entitled "The Dialogue with Non-Believers" says that although the dialogue does not necessarily pursue apostolic aims, it is for Christians the testimony of their own faith and in fact in its way serves to fulfil the task entrusted to the church: the propagation of the Gospel.

There is frequent mention in the document of the fact that a Catholic taking part in the dialogue should make sure that he is loyal to the truth and to Christian values. The document, which is actually a set of instructions, instructs Christians in their dialogue with Marxists not to betray the true content of their faith by making concessions to oversimplified irenicism and syncretism, and not to expose it imprudently to dangers.

The compilers of the instructions, of course, regard the dialogue first and foremost as a means of defending and propagating Christianity, of restoring non-believers to the bosom of the church. But they are sensible enough to realise that the dialogue on questions of Christian and atheist doctrines generally could end without producing any results. This is why the document also says that when doctrinal disagreements cannot be resolved, one must strive to reach agreement in certain practical areas.

It is easy to see how definitely the Catholic churchmen, unlike "Marxists" of the Garaudy type, do not propose to renounce their principles for the sake of the dialogue.

The dialogue is necessary to both Marxists and Christians. This dialogue has essentially been going on for decades. And it does produce results, but not in areas where certain "Marxists" and Christian theologians would hope to reconcile scientific atheism and theology. It is fruitful where and when Marxists and Christians realise that their atheist and religious views should not prevent them from marching together, fighting against the dark and destructive forces of our time, transforming life on principles of social equality, and seeing that the great achievements of the scientific and technological revolution are made equally accessible to one and all.

A society liberated from the power of money and the enslavement of man by man, a society of free people with equal rights; a society which creates all the necessary conditions for the all-round development of the individual—such a society cannot fail to be the ideal of every honest, thinking person. It is for this ideal that Communists have fought and will continue to fight together with all believers. Nothing can or should disunite the great army of the working people in their struggle for a sensibly and justly organised life on earth.

CHAPTER VI

FROM REAL HUMANISM TO QUASI-HUMANISM

Garaudy's review of a number of cardinal ideas in the Marxist philosophy of history, historical materialism, and his replacement of them by ill-disguised postulates of the idealist conception of social development, were bound, naturally, to lead to a revision of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on man. Garaudy's "searchings" in the sphere of philosophical anthropology, in the interpretation of humanism, the essence of man and the ways and prospects for his development, have nothing novel about them whatsoever. Everything that he is writing today with the enthusiasm of the "pioneer" has already been said long ago and reiterated many times by bourgeois ideologists, Marxologists and Sovietologists. For the most part, it has fallen to the lot of Garaudy and his companions from the ranks of right-wing revisionism, to refurbish the pathetic, old ideas of bourgeois quasi-humanism, and to create the impression that they are "enriching" socialist humanism in keeping with the "spirit of the age".

As we know, for many decades now bourgeois theoreticians—philosophers, sociologists, ethicists and so on—have been seeking to defend and perfect an idea which is quite fallacious but very necessary and convenient from their point of view. This is the idea of "the autonomy of the individual". More or less crudely, with or without reservations and fideistic arguments, many bourgeois ideologists of our day are seeking to present the individual as an independent element, endowed with remarkable activity and infinite potential for "self-creation". This individual in the spirit of

the Fichtean Ego creates not only himself but also his external world. He possesses "freedom" of will, choice, self-expression and self-assertion. Hence it is clear that only this "sovereign" individual can be responsible for his own fate. He and he alone is able to make his choice and draw up his plan.

The apologetic nature of the concept of the autonomy of the individual is quite obvious. It makes it possible to place the responsibility for all the misfortune and suffering of the vast mass of the people on the people themselves, on these "free choosers", to protect the capitalist system, capitalist exploitation and alienation of man, and to present each person as the "captain of his fate". This crude and primitive distortion of the real links between society and man, this rejection of the fact that the individual and its behaviour are determined by society, this turning of the human individual into a demiurge, into the mainspring of social development, have provoked serious objections even from progressive bourgeois thinkers of past centuries.

The creators and defenders of the concept of the autonomy or sovereignty of the individual seek to show it in the best possible light. Anti-scientific divorcing of the individual from the sum total of social relations, rejection of social determinism in the formation of the individual, and extreme, absurd individualism are presented as the elevation of the individual, the substantiation of its freedom, initiative, activity, etc. The most enthusiastic supporters of this concept believe that they are transferring to man the attributes, the immutable qualities of God the Creator.

This man endowed with divine attributes is invariably contrasted with the "fettered man" in Marxist theory. Bourgeois Marxologists and Sovietologists have now produced a whole library in which the Marxist treatment of the problem of man is fundamentally distorted. These works reproduce the fallacious arguments which first appeared over a century ago and according to which Marxism has adopted a nihilistic attitude towards the problem of the individual or has relegated this problem to the background in its ideological interests. One extremely widespread version is that Marxism, by using such global concepts as "class", "the masses", "political parties", etc., has reduced man to a being of infinites-

imally small magnitude. And this is written about a teaching which regards the revolutionary rejection of the last exploiter society and the construction of rationally organised communist society as the main way of attaining the freedom, well-being and all-round development of one and all!

An important part in this "operation" to oust man and his freedom from Marxism is played by equating the materialist conception of history with fatalism. Heinrich Falk, one of the many falsifiers of the Marxist interpretation of historical development, tries to argue that the Marxist interpretation of history excludes entirely the significance of will and human consciousness in social progress. "Like a boulder rolls down a slope in accordance with strictly determined laws, so world history is supposed to be rolling inevitably into communism and sweeping away with it all men, who in their entirety represent this 'boulder' of world history".¹ Thus according to Falk's caricature of Marxism, man is no more than a passive particle of a "boulder" which is rolling down a slope and is subject only to its own, extrahuman laws of motion. In Alfred Meyer's book entitled *Leninism*, however, Marx searches in everything for a manifestation of the Will of History, and considers himself to be its prophet and interpreter. "History," writes Meyer, "for Marx, played the role others attributed to divine forces, namely, to lead mankind to the new Eden."² One could quote many other statements in the same vein: that, according to Marx, history is everything, and man is nothing; that history is an impersonal, strictly regulated process which advances towards its goal with fatal inevitability, independently of the wishes of people, social classes and the whole of mankind.

The theoreticians of right-wing socialism follow in the wake of the bourgeois philosophers and sociologists, in complete agreement with them against Marxist "fatalism" or, to be more precise, against the idea of the objective historical law. They cheerfully make short work of "callous", Marxist interpreted, historical necessity and fight for freedom, for the

¹ Heinrich Falk, *Die ideologischen Grundlagen des Kommunismus*, München, 1961, S. 45-46.

² Alfred G. Meyer, *Leninism*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1957, p. 291.

free creation of history according to abstract ethical ideals. This is how Willi Eichler dissociates himself from Marxist "fatalism" and defends the idealist rejection of historical necessity. "History," he states, "does not follow immutable laws, whose course can be regarded pessimistically or optimistically, according to one's taste. The democratic socialism regards history as the work of responsible people—for better or for worse."¹

The statements of Walter Theimer, who fully appreciated Fichte's voluntarism long before Garaudy, are also worthy of attention. Theimer believes that the socialist movement would have benefited greatly if its philosophical roots had been in Fichte's teaching, instead of Hegelian fatalism. "Fichte's philosophy," he writes, "was idealistic and voluntarist. It regarded moral values as more important than the mechanism of the course of history, and believed in the power of the human will and in human responsibility."² It is also interesting that this panegyric in praise of Fichte was written by Theimer almost ten years before *Marxism in the Twentieth Century* in which Garaudy, having risen from his "dogmatic slumber", began to "enrich" Marxism with Fichtean philosophy.

Falk, Meyer, Eichler, Theimer and hundreds of other "commentators" and "abolitionists" of Marxism are unquestionably relying on the reader's total ignorance of the true attitude of the Marxist philosophy of history to the role and place of man in social development. Marxism cannot, of course, answer for those who equate the materialist interpretation of history with an impersonal, fatal process and then with ease tackles the task of refuting such "Marxism".

It was in fact Marx and Engels themselves who, quite consistently and categorically, rejected the concept of "mystified history" as something external and dominating the thoughts and actions of human beings. In refuting this ridiculous view of history and social progress they wrote: "*History does nothing, it 'possesses no immense wealth', it 'wages*

¹ *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 18. bis 23. Mai 1958 in Stuttgart*, Stuttgart, 1958, S. 368.

² Walter Theimer, *Von Bebel zu Ollenhauer*, Bern-München 1957, S. 17-18.

no battles'. It is *man*, real living man, that does all that, that possesses and fights; 'history' is not a person apart, using man as a means for *its own* particular aims; history is *nothing but* the activity of man pursuing his aims."¹

Marx and Engels also came out most definitely and categorically against "theological inhumanity"², yet Meyer and others are attempting to ascribe this fatalist, theological inhumanity to the Marxist interpretation of social development and social progress.

Having discovered the objective laws of social development, Marxism then proved that they are the laws of human activity. As they increase their knowledge of the essential historical laws, people extend the limits of their conscious and purposeful historical activity. The philosophy of Marx, Engels and Lenin provides strictly scientific substantiation of the possibility of and need for active change of the external environment—natural and social—and man himself in the process of his revolutionary transforming activity. Whereas Hegel's philosophy sought "to know the content, the reality of the Divine Idea and to justify despised reality"³, Marxist-Leninist philosophy is revolutionary and critical in spirit and essence, and totally alien to conformism and conservatism. Marxism has rejected the principle of the passive contemplative attitude to reality and, as we have already stressed, has substantiated the dialectico-materialist interpretation of the subject and the subjective, the principle of scientifically interpreted activity.

It seems incredible that anyone should attempt to ascribe the absurd ideas of fatalism, finalism, quietism, etc., to Marxism-Leninism, the most revolutionary teaching in its essence and calling.

Recognition of the active nature of the superstructure, its relative independence and its active influence on the economic basis is an integral feature of the materialist interpretation of history. To Marxist sociologists must go the credit for discovering the source of the strength and efficacy of progressive ideas and theories, for discovering the conditions in

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1956, p. 126.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Hegels Werke*, Volständige Ausgabe, Neunter Band, Berlin, 1840, S. 46.

which the conscious purposeful action of people, classes and political parties can meet with success. Lenin wrote that, unlike all other socialist theories, Marxism combines scientific analysis of the objective course of historical development with the most decisive recognition of the energy and revolutionary initiative of the masses, classes, parties and separate individuals. He repudiated all attempts by Mikhailovsky and other exponents of historical idealism to ascribe absurd fatalistic views to Marx.

The time has now come to answer the question of how Garaudy is proposing to enrich the Marxist teaching on man, his essence and his role in social progress. In *Marxism in the Twentieth Century* and other works, as already mentioned, he quotes a number of fundamental Marxist propositions concerning the interaction between society and the individual. Among them is Marx's famous proposition that the essence of man is the sum total of all social relations. Garaudy also refers in a general way to other Marxist propositions about the determining role of social relations in the development of the individual, and points out, albeit most cautiously, the methodological unacceptability of Sartre's interpretation of the freedom of the individual. Nevertheless, these and other similar propositions do not stand at the centre of Garaudy's reflections on man and humanism. He only really comes to life when he has to plunge into battle against those who, clearly and unambiguously, stress the socially determined nature of the individual and leave aside the creative potential of the individual himself. Garaudy tells us in advance that his blows are directed not against the Marxist conception of social development and the development of the individual, but against dogmatic treatment of the problem, whereby the active nature of the human individual is glossed over, the problem of humanism as being incompatible with the class struggle is ignored, etc. One might almost think that Garaudy's main concern was to attack vulgar economic materialism, scientistic anti-humanism, Maoist slighting of humanism as a bourgeois-liberal legacy, and the false ascetic sermons of the Maoist propagandists. But careful study of Garaudy's writing and, in particular, consideration of the fact that he has been most active in the defence of the defeated anti-communist, right-wing revisionist elements in

Czechoslovakia, their false slogans about a "new humanism", a "new conception" of man and democracy, reveal all his true intentions. He is obsessed by the desire to "revise" the Marxist-Leninist conception of man and humanism ever so *slightly*, to shift the emphasis *a little*, to *enrich* its achievements with "non-Marxist thought" (including Christianity), in order to fight more effectively against . . . "dogmatism". It is easy to see that Garaudy is seeking to disrupt Marxist humanism under the guise of fighting against dogmatism. He may think that he is marching forward and scaling new heights of theoretical thought, but in fact he is descending to idle bourgeois-liberal and right-wing reformist talk in defence of man and humanism in the abstract.

Let us examine these questions more closely.

Under the guise of criticising economic materialism, mechanistic determinism, the nihilistic attitude towards the individual, his creative potential and his impulse to construct, Garaudy is in fact campaigning against the fundamental Marxist-Leninist proposition that a concrete person is the result of a concrete social environment. The errors of vulgarisers of Marxism who, by turning the role of the basis, the role of the social structure, into an absolute, have reduced the active role of the superstructure itself, of the creative-transformative powers of the human intellect to nothing, are presented by Garaudy as the officially accepted views in the socialist countries. He writes that whereas in the capitalist countries there is a myth that "the development of the productive forces alone" would automatically solve all the problems of our time, in the socialist countries one finds the exact opposite. In socialist countries, he tells us, we find "the proposition which is the exact opposite of the above, to the effect that *a change in production relations would alone be enough* to solve these problems once and for all and would automatically bring into being the new man. . . ."¹ Garaudy firmly dissociates himself from the view, which he himself has invented, that changes will automatically take place in man and his political and moral consciousness in the socialist countries as a result of the development of the social structure. He announces that overemphasis on the role of produc-

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 33.

tion relations has "held back and actually distorted" the construction of socialism in the USSR and other socialist countries. Garaudy regards the view that the superstructure is determined by the sum total of production relations as a dangerous illusion. "The impoverishment and mutilation of the Marxist concept of historical materialism is at the root of this illusion which, by unduly stressing only one of the spheres of the social structure, that of the production relations or class relations, ultimately leads to the underestimation by those at the top of the importance of changes in the productive forces, and to a similar underestimation by those at the bottom of the possible repercussions of the superstructure upon the basis,"¹ he writes.

Garaudy accuses the socialist countries of being guided by the illusory belief that "a change in the productive relations in itself constitutes socialism and that it will automatically lead to changes in the superstructure, namely to socialist democracy in the State, to a socialist ideology, and to a new socialist man".² From the whole context of Garaudy's reflections it is clear that he is striving, first and foremost, to discredit the practice of socialist construction in the USSR, which, he asserts, is based on the false conception of vulgar economic materialism that ignores the active role of the political, legal and ideological superstructure and regards the formation of the new man as an automatic consequence of the development of production relations. Arguing here in flagrant contradiction to his own statements to the contrary, Garaudy attempts to give a semblance of truth to the absurd theory of the depreciation of the political, legal and ideological superstructure in socialist countries. He is not worried by the fact that he has written many reams arguing that the progress of "distorted" socialism in the USSR and other socialist countries is a string of "voluntarist acts" which do not take into account the nature of socialist production relations, the nature of the socialist basis, or its laws of development. Yet in the passages quoted above Garaudy is arguing another idea: the overstressing of production relations and the belittling of the role of the superstructure, namely, of the

¹ R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, p. 35.

² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

will and consciousness of people and their organisation in the attainment of their set aims.

Let us now consider Garaudy's assertion that socialist countries are hoping that the new man will be formed automatically. This is written by a man who lived for a considerable time in the USSR and had the opportunity of getting to know not only from books and statistical reports, but from personal observation, about the tremendous successes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state, of the whole system of political administration in the USSR, directed towards educating the multi-million masses in the spirit of communism. In the period of his "dogmatic slumber" Garaudy wrote a great deal most enthusiastically about the vast sums that were being spent on public education, on implementing and extending the cultural revolution in the Soviet Union. Having adopted an attitude of "creative" anti-Sovietism, he is now arguing that the USSR and other socialist countries are counting on the automatic formation of a new man in the course of development of their "overemphasised" production, class relations.

Nevertheless, in Garaudy's *Magnum opus* on questions of social environment and the individual one detects an idea which belittles the role and importance of social environment in the formation of the individual. In the spirit of a Fichtean type of subjectivism, he attempts to ascribe not only to thinking in general, but to the individual as a whole, mystified activism and many other characteristics borrowed from the arsenal of modern idealism and, in particular, from existentialism. Garaudy's reservations and critical remarks concerning Sartre do not change the fact of the matter.

Although he does not deny in so many words the determining role of social environment in the formation and development of the individual, Garaudy nevertheless puts the human individual at the centre of his discussions with the aim of turning it into the measure of all things in the spirit of fashionable philosophical anthropologism. In order to defend his conception of the individual and the "new humanism" he frequently appeals to the famous proposition of Marx and Engels that in the future communist society the free development of each will be the condition for the free development of all. "*In place of the old bourgeois society,*

with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."¹ In making this statement Marx and Engels were seeking, as it were, to reject all the surmises attributed to Communists that man would become depersonalised under communism and to stress the growth of the creative principle in man in the future society.

Garaudy, however, seeks to give an individualist interpretation to this idea of Marx and Engels in the spirit of Fichtean activation of the individual and its consciousness. It is no accident that each time he quotes this statement by Marx and Engels he carefully omits the lines which we have put in italics, and which make it quite clear that only radical social transformations of society are capable of making the individual the bearer of vast, creative energy. It is surely not necessary to make the reservation that for the classics of Marxism an inversion of the correlation of the concepts of "mass" and "individual" and turning the freedom of the single individual into a condition of the freedom of the masses was excluded as a matter of principle, in all conditions. It is well known how fiercely they attacked the individualist conception and, in particular, the anarchistic idea of the freedom of the individual as a condition for the liberation of society.

To avoid the impression that we are accusing Garaudy unfairly and wrongly ascribing to him a subjectivist emphasis in his treatment of the problem of the mass and the individual, let us refer to his statements on the relationship between the social environment and the individual. Garaudy also attempts to twist in his favour Marx's idea that man depends on circumstances, but that the latter in their turn may be changed by people. He does this by overemphasising the idea, which is basically a correct one, about the transforming activity of man, but glossing over the fact that this transforming activity is determined by *objective* circumstances. Garaudy tends all the time to belittle social environment and overstress the transforming role of the individual. Let us quote his actual words: "To say that Marxist materialism is dialectical is to emphasise that, unlike all earlier

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1970, p. 53.

forms of materialism, every man is other than and more than the resultant of the conditions which produced him. It was only thus that Marx was able to base a methodology of historical initiative on a materialist conception of the world."¹

Thus, man is not the sum total of the social conditions that form him. He is something different from these conditions and considerably more important than them. True, man should not be reduced to the conditions which produced him, yet one cannot help noting that Garaudy, it would seem, consciously avoids saying anything at all definite about the place and role of social conditions in the formation of man. Does the Marxist proposition that the sum total of all social relations constitutes the *essence* of man remain valid? And does the Marxist idea that a change in the living conditions of people is the *basis* of a change in them themselves, the *basis* of the formation of their new behaviour and understanding of the world, still stand?

Garaudy avoids these tricky questions. It is so much easier to expand on "historical initiative" without revealing its historical prerequisites and the fact that this initiative is determined by objective social relations. In criticising the meta-physical solution of the problem of object and subject in pre-Marxist materialism, Garaudy masks his real intentions behind fine phrases and is actually attacking the materialist solution of the problem and trying to dismiss the idea of the social determination of the essence, activity, ideas and feelings of the individual. Yet the slightest deviation from the materialist position on this question is capable of distorting the Marxist teaching on man, the Marxist conception of humanism, and of divorcing the task of freeing the individual from the task of destroying capitalist relations and creating a socialist society which is called upon to produce the real conditions for the elevation of man. Garaudy allows himself to be ironical and to poke fun at the "omnipotence" of production relations and at those who seek to ascribe them the function which was played by "divine Providence in Bossuet's *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*".²

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 200.

² *Ibid.*

Irony is all very well, but production relations are not so simple a thing that one can dismiss them by joking. For it is they that characterise socio-economic formations. In the last analysis it is they that determine the position of man in society, his essence and existence, his mode of living, his real possibilities and strivings. If we were to adopt Garaudy's jargon and his playful tone, we might say that Marx's discovery of production relations played a greater role in history than God in Bossuet's conception of Providence, because production relations are reality of the first order, whereas the role of God in history is extremely "limited" if only for the fact that He is only fiction.

By adopting a "creative" attitude towards Marxism, Garaudy has made his position much easier. Now he prefers to speak of man in general, outside social links and conditions, outside classes and class relations. Garaudy evidently regards all of these as "banalities" and "commonplaces". Yet furtively, with a few formal concessions to "orthodoxy", he drags out the old, tattered dogma of pre-Marxist and modern bourgeois doctrines on man in general, on human initiative in general, on human freedom and choice in general, and so on. This "fresh" approach to the matter enables Garaudy to bring the Marxist teaching on man closer to idealist, religious forms of humanism with their invariable cult of the "abstract man".

We have already mentioned Garaudy's general tendency to approximate, to reconcile Marxism with religion, in particular, with Christianity. This tendency also shows itself most clearly in his attempts to fuse Marxist and Christian humanism. As a result of Garaudy's manipulations the "new humanism" appears as a curious blend of Marxist and Christian ideas. He attempts to give authority to his fabrications by appealing to structuralism, cybernetics and other serious subjects. Garaudy writes about the inner links between Marxist humanism and Christian humanism as if they had been proved long ago and were now accepted facts. Moreover, he does so fully aware that Marx criticised most strongly the social principles of Christianity and everything that can be called "Christian humanism". Nevertheless Garaudy imagines that by playing around with the words "structuralism" and "cybernetics" you can change Saul into Paul. "...Struc-

turalism can, like cybernetics, be one of the ways of comprehending the world and of conceiving man and his action, which corresponds best to the spirit of our time, to the development of a new humanism: this will be precisely the humanism of which Marx was the pioneer, integrating all that was won by Graeco-Roman humanism and Judaeo-Christian humanism, and going beyond both in a new synthesis of nature and man, of the external world and subjectivity, of necessary law and liberty."¹ As we see, Garaudy is again peddling his "theory of integration", as a result of which he tells us that Judaeo-Christian humanism in "sublated form" is found at the roots of Marxist humanism. In order to appreciate fully Garaudy's statement about the "enrichment" of Marxist humanism by dialectically "sublated" Christian humanism, let us recall Marx's famous evaluation of the social principles of Christianity, an assessment which neither he, nor Engels, nor Lenin, nor any revolutionary Marxist has ever repudiated.

"The social principles of Christianity," Marx wrote, "explain all the vile acts of the oppressors against the oppressed either as just punishment for original sin and other sins or as temptations which the Lord in His infinite wisdom inflicts on the redeemed.

"The social principles of Christianity preach cowardice, self-contempt, self-abasement, submissiveness, humility, in short, all the qualities of the mob, and the proletariat, which will not allow itself to be treated as the mob, needs its courage, its self-esteem, its pride and its independence far more than its bread.

"The social principles of Christianity are cowardly, and the proletariat is revolutionary."²

How could anyone draw a more precise, more categorical contrast between the Marxist and Christian definition of man, his calling, and his behaviour? How could anyone contrast Marxist and Christian humanism more clearly than Marx has here?

Garaudy pretends that he finds no difficulty in bringing together Christian and Marxist humanism, and does so by

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 75.

² K. Marx, F. Engels, *Werke*, Band 4, Berlin, 1959, S. 200-201.

referring to . . . Marx! What do Marx's real views on religion and religious humanism matter, if Garaudy simply must find an outlet for his Christian piety? We shall return later to this synthesis of Marxist and Christian humanism, but for the moment let us consider a most strange point. Garaudy looks for the precursors of Marxist humanism at the beginning of the last millennium, in Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian humanism, but for some reason ignores the humanism of the Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment, which, in spite of their class limitations, nevertheless gave credit to man, his intellect and his creative mission on earth. Why does Garaudy completely overlook this pre-Marxist humanism? Is it because this humanism, by fighting for man and for human intellect, was bound logically to turn against religion, religious belittling of man, human passions, true human questing and creativity? Naturally such "blasphemous" humanism could not find favour with Garaudy, obsessed as he is today with "God-seeking" ideas and moods.

Let us return, however, to Roger Garaudy's efforts to "enrich" Marxist humanism with ideas borrowed from religious and mystical sources. Incredible though it may sound, it is a fact that the "Marxist" Garaudy wants to credit Marx's humanism with such a virtue as Christian love for one's neighbour. "... The essential Christian teaching," he writes, "even if it has often been host to the parasite of Hellenism or gnosticism, is based on incarnation, and entails very different relations with the other man, our 'neighbour'. It means treating every being, no matter who, as though he were Christ, as though he were the living God, standing before us. The love of man is one with the love of God. That, moreover, is why the mystics, following a tradition that is as old as the Song of Songs, speak of the love of God in images appropriate to human love. . . ."¹

One might have thought that Garaudy, after noting the place which the exhortation to universal love occupies in Christianity, would discuss the essence and social function of this exhortation in a class-antagonistic society. But no, Garaudy has lost this approach to historical truth. His aim is to elevate the Christian faith and he does so with all the me-

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 137.

thods at his disposal. He completely overlooks the historical fact that the idea of universal love in Christianity, the idea of loving even one's enemies and oppressors, emerged in the period of defeated slave uprisings, in the period when people were ceasing to believe in the possibility of destroying the hated slave-owning orders by meeting force with force. This pitiful and degrading love for everyone, for friend and foe, for the bearers of good and the bearers of evil, was false and hypocritical in its very essence from beginning to end. Christianity never succeeded, nor could it succeed, in making man love his oppressor. People cannot be *forced* to love. Christianity succeeded in doing something else, namely, instilling in those who were degraded and enslaved a feeling of *submission* to the powers-that-be, by promising a reward for this in the hereafter. True, in spite of the Christian exhortation to love one's fellow men, the oppressed mass of toiling Christians, driven to the point of despair, frequently preferred to take up the axe to express their Christian feelings for their wicked and greedy class enemies.

Garaudy is well aware of these facts. He frequently refers to acts of class force performed in the name of Christianity, but he does so only in order to stress . . . the progressive role of Christianity! A really staggering piece of dialectics. On the one hand, the progressive nature of Christianity is argued by reference to love for one's fellow men, on the other, by justifying the use of revolutionary force. To be fair, we must point out that as Garaudy moves increasingly to the right his liking for Christianity because of its tireless "Christian love" increases.

With reference to Christian love, Garaudy writes: "It is important to stress this cardinal aspect of the Christian heritage, because. . . the new dimensions and significance given to love by Christianity are the richest contribution it has made. . . . At the same time, it is what can be most fully integrated in the Marxist concept of man and the world."¹

Garaudy is pretending that he does not know or does not remember that Marxist humanism has always rejected the abstract posing of the question of love for one's fellow men

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 137.

in a class-antagonistic society. It has also rejected at the same time the abstract posing of the question about the use of force. Marxism has always put the question in a more precise form: force in the name of what ideals and in relation to whom? Having taken its stand on concrete-historical, class grounds, Marxist humanism has always combined active love for men of labour with equally active hatred for their enemies and oppressors.

These fundamental and, at the same time, self-evident truths of Marxism-Leninism Garaudy seeks to oust by panegyrics in praise of Christian love, the hypocritical and false nature of which has been proved by many centuries of class struggle.

At the same time as priests connected with the oppressed masses take up arms to defend the people's rights and write books arguing the right to use revolutionary force, as Camillo Torres did, Garaudy is bubbling over with enthusiasm about the delights of Christian humanism. "... Through incarnate love," he writes, "it gave an absolute value to the other man and to the world. In the fundamental (that is, the Christo-centric) Christian tradition, to turn to God in no way implies turning away from the world, since the living God can be met in every being."¹

This quotation shows clearly Garaudy's strong tendency not only to revise and distort Marxism, but also to revise and distort the essence of Christianity and Christian humanism. It is well known that over the centuries Christianity has sought to suppress constructive human activity aimed at transforming life on earth. In every way possible it has depreciated the value of this life, likening it to a temporary halting place, to a brief moment by comparison with the eternal life "beyond the grave", etc., yet Garaudy blithely attempts, contrary to the spirit and letter of Christian doctrine, to ascribe an active nature to Christian humanism, to portray it as a call to action, to creation, to the transformation of earthly life on the basis of reason and justice.

There is nothing new in these attempts. Many theologians realised a long time ago that in our dynamic age, the age of historic social transformations, the age of the great scientific

¹ R. Garaudy, *Marxism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 138.

and technological revolution, the Christian religion with its call to renounce this earthly life, its exhortations to asceticism, quietism, and so on, simply antagonises believers who are particularly depressed by religious alienation and the call to be reconciled with the forces dominating them. It was in this situation that modernist trends in Christian theology began to argue the value of earthly life, to reinterpret the texts of the New Testament, and use them to support the idea of "active" Christian humanism, which does not call upon people in the name of the life hereafter to depreciate the greater value and meaning of man's earthly life and of his efforts aimed at improving the conditions in which he lives. Garaudy may have thought he had made a great discovery. But compared with the Christian theologians of the modernist trend he has proposed nothing new at all. To him must go the "credit" for something else: for combining "revised" Christianity, Christian humanism, with a Marxism and Marxist humanism which have been distorted beyond all recognition. Here, too, he has his predecessors, but Garaudy's "contribution" to the distortion of Marxist humanism is unquestionably an important and considerable one. It is also worthy of note that some of Garaudy's predecessors from the right-wing reformist camp, who "synthesised" Marxist and Christian humanism long before him, abandoned this sport at a certain stage, deserted Marxism and became good Christians.

Let us now sum up the foregoing. In rejecting the "narrow" and "rigid" confines of Marxist humanism and seeking to "enrich" Marxism with humanist traditions of non-Marxist origin, Garaudy presents the matter in such a way as to suggest that he is advancing forward, "extending" and "deepening" the Marxist conception of man. In fact, however, he has capitulated to bourgeois doctrines, in the struggle against which Marxist-Leninist humanism developed and continues to develop.

Garaudy's "new humanism" reflects the class-conciliatory trends which are turning against the revolutionary working class, blunting its consciousness with illusions of a class peace and the amicable solving of all the "wretched questions" of the modern age. In a situation in which the Communist and Workers' parties are calling on the working class to get or-

ganised and join forces with all the masses oppressed by the monopolies, and are arming the attacking class with a consistently revolutionary ideology, Garaudy and other declassed intellectuals are offering the proletariat false, sentimental, "Christo-centric" ideas of "incarnate love" and so on.

Revision of the Marxist-Leninist teaching about man and humanism, and departure from class positions in considering these cardinal questions, are closely connected with bourgeois and reformist humanism, with quasi-humanist interpretation of the rights of the individual and its freedom.

Revisionist humanism provides additional formulas for fundamental ideological concessions to the imperialist bourgeoisie on questions of democracy and democratic freedoms, and the interpretation of freedom itself.

The meaning and aims of the quasi-humanism of Garaudy and those of like mind became particularly obvious in the Czechoslovak crisis. Here, too, one has to speak openly and bluntly about the traitorous role of Garaudy at a time when the quiet counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia was seeking to destroy the socialist order in that country. We have already had occasion to note the fervour with which Garaudy attempted, under the cover of many loud, fine words, to draw a picture of the "Czechoslovak model of socialism", which in fact was nothing but the transition stage to the restoration of a bourgeois republic of the Beneš type, or perhaps something worse.

The anarchy created by anti-socialist, right-wing elements in the second half of 1968, when counter-revolutionary elements which had not been neutralised in time rallied their strength, organised themselves and began open anti-socialist propaganda and agitation, slandering people devoted to communism, and making crude, unseemly attacks on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, this whole disgusting "witches' sabbath" was called by Garaudy the flowering... of socialist humanism and democracy. In the name of abstract humanism and abstract democracy he welcomed the words and deeds of blatant enemies of the Czechoslovak people and socialism. He extolled as "socialism with a human face" a social order which, as has already been said, was intended to be the transition to a bourgeois order. In the period when counter-revolutionary thugs were committing

outrages at an ever-increasing rate in Czechoslovakia, subjecting Marxists-Leninists to physical and moral terror, Garaudy did not have a single word of disapproval for the counter-revolutionaries. On the contrary, his sympathies lay with the raging mob.

In their quasi-humanist reasoning Garaudy and his "disciples" in Czechoslovakia argued for unlimited freedom of speech, including also the freedom to slander, abuse and revile socialism, to play on the petty-bourgeois instincts and raise people against the working class. In the interests of the same false humanism Garaudy supported the idea of the creation and functioning of different parties, as long as they proclaimed "their adherence to socialism".¹

In lauding the supporters of "socialism with a human face", Garaudy stressed their striving to inflate the "human element" of the false socialism. This abstract "human face" was formulated by him, however, without any clear or concrete indications as to the class nature of socialism, the guiding role of the working class and its communist vanguard, the leading role of the socialist state in the planned management of industrial development, and the predominance of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Instead of a concrete definition of the essence of socialism, its material bases, its political, legal and ideological superstructure, which in their entirety make socialism a *truly humane system*, Garaudy preferred definitions in the spirit of abstract humanism with its invariably abstract man. In supporting and justifying the Czechoslovak "socialism with a human face", Garaudy described it as follows: "The touchstone of a socialist system which is being built is its attitude towards those who create. For the essence of socialism is precisely that it should be a regime capable of making every man a man, that is to say, a creator, a decisive factor in initiative of the history of the continuous creation of man by man."²

One can fully agree with Lucien Mathey who has caught the meaning of this abstract definition of the essence of socialism. He noted reasonably: "A fine literary formulation, perhaps, but one which—at least in my view—has

¹ R. Garaudy, *La liberté en sursis*, Prague, 1968, Paris, 1968, p. 22.

² *Ibid*, p. 23.

little scientific value and which, amongst other things, totally obscures the notion of a social class."¹ True enough, this time, too, Garaudy preferred to replace the class analysis of socialism by phrases about man in general, about human initiative in general, by similar empty and vague concepts.

Thus we see that, by rejecting the concrete class analysis of the relation between society and man and divorcing the human individual from objective social relations, Garaudy has abandoned the true Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the problem of the individual and humanism. He may think that he is stressing the elevation of the individual by removing him from the social conditions and connections which engendered and determined him. The true strength of the individual, however, lies in the profound understanding of his links with social environment and class. It is from this unity with his socio-class environment that the individual is able to acquire the power of creation, the power of forging ahead. Garaudy has solved the old, old question of the relation between society and the individual in the old, old way, in the spirit of the individualist tradition. On this course it was, obviously, impossible to defend and develop the truly revolutionary, active, constructive spirit of Marxist humanism. On this course all that could be done was to repeat with absurd fervour what had been said and reiterated by idealist philosophy, its past and present exponents. On this course one could even go as far as fideistic ideas, as glorifying the false and sentimental Christian idea of universal love for one's fellow men in the conditions of class-social antagonisms. Garaudy went that far. Having crossed the Rubicon, the "Marxist" Garaudy has appeared before us in a cassock holding a New Testament. Everything has its own logic. Including apostasy.

¹ *L'Humanité*, 21 octobre 1968.

CONCLUSION

We have considered some of the concepts which are defended and propagated by Garaudy. At the centre of all his theoretical and political speculations lies the problem of socialism, its essence and ways of achieving it. This is problem number one, which he is seeking to distort beyond all recognition. He challenges the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of socialism, scientific socialism in theory and practice with a "new" interpretation of socialism which corresponds, he assures us, to the possibilities and demands of the last third of the twentieth century.

We have had the chance to see the true face of this "socialism". It is nothing more than a type of reformist quasi-socialism "technocratically" refurbished. True, Garaudy has been lavish with cosmetics in order to make this pseudo-socialism look attractive. It is literally drenched in a stream of hypocritical bourgeois humanism and democratism. In place of militant proletarian socialism Garaudy has substituted a "socialism" which is intended to please everyone: the working man and the social parasite, the enslaved and the enslaver, the person who really wants to abolish social inequality and injustice, and the person who would like to preserve the bourgeois order by force and deception.

Since Garaudy's "socialism" is an invention it needs lies in order to survive and convince. This is why he uses the words "fraternity", "equality" and "liberty" so profusely, concealing the fact that *fraternity, equality and liberty* will be established in the resolute struggle against the powerful capitalist monopolies with their freedom to appropriate

the results of the labour of millions of workers, and enslave nations if they possibly can.

Marx and Engels demonstrated the true nature and worth of the various versions of sugary "true socialism" and all the attempts to oust the idea of the class revolutionary-political struggle by abstract humanistic phrases and exhortations. Marx wrote about a "whole gang of half-mature students and super-wise diplomaed doctors who want to give socialism a 'higher, idealistic' orientation, that is to say, to replace its materialistic basis (which demands serious objective study from anyone who tried to use it) by modern mythology with its goddesses of Justice, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity".¹

This description can well be extended to Garaudy's "de-classed" socialism, in spite of his insistent emphasis on "present-day reality", "the demands of the times", etc. And it is a fact that in his desire not to appear ridiculous and old-fashioned, Garaudy constantly plays around with masses of words and ideas relating to scientific and technological progress, "electronics", "cybernetics", etc. But these words and concepts cannot conceal the old-fashioned nature, eclecticism and poverty of the ideas used by Garaudy who tries at one and the same time to draw on Marx and Lenin, St Paul and St John of the Cross, Sartre and Heidegger, Einstein and Wiener, and the theologians and myth-makers of the twentieth century.

The bourgeoisie willingly forgive Garaudy and renegades like him all their lack of logic, spuriousness and downright charlatanism and all other defects and deviations from the elementary standards of morality as long as they, these renegades, are capable of confusing and bewildering some sections of the working class and the intelligentsia, slandering and vilifying the world of socialism which was built and is being built by the heroic and selfless efforts of millions of people. Of course there are bound to be mistakes and setbacks in the establishment of the new world. But the truth is on the side of the builders of this fine world and not on the side of those who are making the sacrilegious attempt to present the history of socialist construction as nothing but errors and failures.

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, 1965, p. 309.

The bourgeoisie have long since forgotten all the former mistakes of the renegades, bearing in mind their services not only in radically distorting socialism but also the real paths leading to it. It is no accident, as we have already pointed out, that Garaudy employs a term borrowed from biology, namely, "mutation", i.e., the unforeseen change, the spontaneous transition to new biological formations. What is Garaudy's profuse talk of the "single-minded struggle for socialism" worth, if he has no real socialism, no truly single-minded struggle for socialism? All this has been rejected and Garaudy has set his hopes on "mutation", on the reformist idea of capitalism growing into socialism in the course of the scientific and technological revolution. Is it not clear that after all this his talk about a "national strike" to paralyse the capitalist economy, etc., does not fit in at all with involuntary "mutation"?

Rejection of the leading role of the working class and its revolutionary party armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, fits in perfectly with reformism and the new version of the Kautskian "theory of productive forces", etc. Odd "leftish" phrases from the renegades from the camp of right-wing revisionism do not frighten the monopolists in the slightest.

Ever since its emergence the international working-class movement has become increasingly aware, as it developed and matured, that the unity of the proletariat is the decisive factor for the abolition of the capitalist order.

It is no accident that in its turn the bourgeoisie and its ideologists have done all they can to drive a wedge between the national detachments of the international working-class movement, and to poison the mind of the proletariat with bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalism.

At the present time the imperialist bourgeoisie are trying even harder to disunite the forces of the international working-class movement and the world socialist system. The right-wing revisionist doctrine about many types of "socialism", the "plurality of socialism" fragmented by all manner of nationalistic divisions responds to these requirements of the monopolistic bourgeoisie.

Garaudy has undoubtedly made his contribution to the new ideological assault on proletarian internationalism. The

theory of various "models of socialism" which he argues serves this aim.

This nationalistic function of the doctrine of various "models of socialism" is indissolubly linked with the anti-Sovietism of Garaudy and his companions. "New" models are used in order to discredit socialism built in the USSR and other countries.

The history of the working-class movement shows that any "respectable" revisionist in order to distort and slander scientific socialism has had to challenge the dialectico-materialist method of studying phenomena with his "special" philosophical conception, in accordance with his degree of education. Garaudy is no exception. It might even be said that, chronologically, he began his revision of Marxism with a revision of dialectical and historical materialism, and the Marxist interpretation of ethics, aesthetics and religion.

In this sphere, too, as we have attempted to show, Garaudy cannot claim to be a "trailblazer". He is simply using new words to say what has been said long before he was born by many apostates from Marxism and Marxist philosophy. We are referring to the typically revisionist rejection of materialism and dialectics or, to be more precise, their fundamental distortion in favour of idealism and metaphysics. To Garaudy's nostalgia for the subjectivism of Fichte and Kant, and to his clear descent from the principle of subjectivity and activity to subjectivism. Garaudy turns dialectics into primitive relativism and eclecticism, from the standpoint of which he can justify all that is subjectively desirable and equally radically reject the objective conditions and laws if they do not suit him.

Garaudy's pluralistic theory is an instrument for reconciling the most contradictory and incompatible ideological phenomena. This is particularly evident in his attempts to "reconcile" Marxism and religion.

Events have totally disappointed the naive expectations of those who thought that Garaudy would probably have second thoughts, would seek and find a path back to Marxism and the ranks of the French Communist Party. Garaudy's book *L'alternative* has shown how ill-founded these expectations were. Here he speaks frankly of things which in his other books he preferred to discuss more cautiously and covertly.

He has taken over, after giving it a little revision, the false and hypocritical formula of "neither capitalism nor socialism" which is popular in certain Catholic church circles. Even in *L'alternative* Garaudy does not dare to renounce socialism publicly. He presents the churchmen's formula in the following fashion: "Neither capitalism nor Stalinist techno-bureaucracy."¹ By "techno-bureaucracy" Garaudy means the socialist system which has been built in the USSR and other socialist countries. He does not regard this real socialism, created by the heroic efforts of many millions of working people, as socialism "in the true sense of the word".

In Garaudy's eyes the guiding role of the Communist Party and the socialist state are facts which deprive socialism of its "socialist nature". In all the books written in his "creative" period Garaudy quoted several times Lenin's saying that socialism is built not only for the people but by the people. Nothing could have been further from Lenin's mind, however, than to belittle the role of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. On the contrary, the Communist Party and the Soviet state are, according to Lenin, the factors which assist and direct the constructive energy of the masses, their creative search and initiative. Garaudy, however, seeks to ascribe to Lenin anarcho-syndicalist fabrications, ideas of "worker opposition" which are most detrimental to socialism, on the assumption that true "democratic socialism" can only be created on the basis of the petty-bourgeois, anarchistic rejection of the leading role of the party and centralised state management of the socialist economy. All these petty-bourgeois rantings are a reflection, first and foremost, of anti-Soviet moods and feelings. In *L'alternative*, more than in all his previous works, Garaudy enthuses over the notorious Maoist "cultural revolution", as a fine example of the struggle against bureaucracy. Totally unabashed, he writes: "In 1966 Mao Tse-tung launched the Chinese people into an assault on the party apparatus and its conception of socialism. As in the case of the bourgeois state, which cannot be 'reformed' but must, as Marx said, 'have its apparatus broken' . . . Mao thought that . . . the apparatus of the party must be dismantled, together with that of the state."² Without the

¹ R. Garaudy, *L'alternative*, Paris, 1972, p. 47.

² *Ibid.*, p. 129.

slightest hesitation Garaudy equates the breaking of the bourgeois state with breaking the party and state machines set up by the Chinese party members and people. It should also be added that Garaudy, who exults over the destruction of the party and state organs in China, becomes extremely restrained and cautious on the subject of breaking the state machine of imperialist bourgeoisie. He urges the reader to distinguish between "convulsive" and "constructive" revolution.

The whole of *L'alternative* frankly exudes opportunist conciliatoriness. Already in the preface to the book Garaudy warns the reader that he is offering not theses, but merely working hypotheses which "call on each young person, each man, each woman, without leaving their party, their trade union, their church or their community, whatever these may be",¹ to reflect upon Garaudy's words. But he calls on everyone irrespective of class affiliation and political convictions to find a common language in order to avert "universal chaos". This idea of reconciling everyone and everything, the idea of universal human integration which assumes that class antagonisms will be destroyed and the bearers of social evil will be rendered harmless in the modern world, is evidently regarded by Garaudy as his important "contribution" to the theory of social development.

L'alternative, and particularly its conclusion, is the true confession of a renegade. Garaudy is now openly talking about the reassessment of values which he has made and no longer trying to defend himself against "unjust" criticism.

There was a time when Garaudy would snap violently if he were accused of blurring the distinctions between bourgeois and socialist democracy. But now the author of *L'alternative* writes: "In a country like France socialist democracy cannot be the negation of bourgeois democracy, it goes beyond the latter's limits."²

There was a time when Garaudy denied accusations that he was making major concessions to religion. Now he has stopped playing hide-and-seek and states about himself in the third person: "It is extremely confusing, in the life of a person who has professed atheism for so many years, to dis-

¹ R. Garaudy, *L'alternative*, p. 14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 78.

cover the Christian which he carries within himself and which he has never stopped carrying."¹

Quite recently Garaudy tried to justify himself by saying that he did not reject the guiding role of the party, but simply did not accept the "bureaucratized" principle of democratic centralism. Today he is writing about himself: "It is agony, after being an active member of the same party for thirty-seven years and one of its leaders for twenty years and having found in it the meaning and beauty of one's life, to question the very conception of the party, precisely in order to realise the hopes which this party has engendered."² Even in his confession Garaudy cannot get along without sophistry and hypocrisy. He is rejecting the very concept of the party in order to realise the party's ideals! Just fancy that!

Bourgeois circles in France did not conceal their great expectations in connection with the activities of Garaudy and his fellows. Reactionary French forces hoped that the large editions of Garaudy's books, his press articles, his television and radio broadcasts, his numerous interviews given to French and other representatives of the anti-communist press, would create confusion in certain strata of the French Communist Party.

Nothing of the sort has happened. Garaudy himself has admitted receiving many letters from Communist workers, from ordinary rank-and-file members of the French Communist Party, criticising him for using bourgeois mass media to attack the FCP, the CPSU, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and discredit Marxist-Leninist theory. Garaudy comforts himself with the idea that these people have misunderstood him. But they have understood him as he needs to be understood. The French Communists have dealt the renegade a worthy rebuff. The 20th Congress of the French Communist Party unanimously demonstrated its unflinching adherence to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and resolved to unite all the left-wing forces in the country more energetically in order to bring about the important democratic transformation which will open up France's path to socialism.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 245-46.

To conclude, we might say that revisionists come and go, but Marxism-Leninism is winning the hearts and minds of new millions of people on all continents. But this victorious progression of Marxism is linked with the implacable, uncompromising struggle against false ideas which are aimed at hampering social progress.

The former Communist and Marxist Roger Garaudy has taken on the unenviable and unscrupulous role of a pedlar of false ideas in "Marxist" guise. His political, theoretical and moral collapse is a warning, a cruel but just warning, to those who begin by flirting with bourgeois ideas and end by selling their birthright for a pottage.

REQUEST TO READERS

Progress Publishers would be glad to have your opinion of this book, its translation and design and any suggestions you may have for future publications.

Please send all your comments to 21, Zubovsky Boulevard, Moscow, USSR.

This book contains a systematic criticism of the attempts by the French revisionist Roger Garaudy to dispute and falsify Marxist-Leninist theory and replace a number of its tenets with bourgeois and reformist ideas. The author demonstrates the inconsistency of Garaudy's arguments against dialectical and historical materialism. A considerable portion of the book is devoted to a critique of the revisionist conception of different "models of socialism". He also makes an analysis of Garaudy's views on religion and his distortion of the gist of the dialogue between Communists and Christians.